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Introduction
Monroe E. Price
This collection of essays was prepared as a follow up to 
the exuberant meetings in São Paolo—NETmundial—
an event that sought to develop a roadmap for internet 
policy and an internet “bill of rights.”  Our goal, in this 
project, has been to assist and support the extraordi-
nary community that has prepared the 2014 Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF) in Istanbul. This is the an-
nual gathering in which civil society, governments, 
international governmental organizations, members 
of the private sphere and technical communities come 
together to discuss and debate internet policy devel-
opments and internet governance processes and 
structures.   
At the 2014 IGF, at least two dramatic processes are 
taking place. 
First, there are the significant debates over the actual 
content and substance of internet policy, tooth and nail 
questions of how restrictive or how unencumbered the 
internet should and must be. These include, as well, 
internet infrastructural issues. Pervasive, too, is the dis-
course over core internet values, issues of access, net 
neutrality, freedom of expression online, and others.  
Churning alongside these substantive debates is the 
highly consequential and encompassing discussion of 
how the institutions of internet policy formation should 
themselves be structured:  Who are the participants, 
and how should weight be distributed among them? 
How and where are decisions made and how do con-
clusions from these debates gain the ability to move 
from idea to adoption? How do we work towards con-
sensus, for example, if consensus is the standard?  
The meetings in Istanbul are a significant moment in a 
massive experiment in shaping global institutions. The 
interplay of gatherings—in this case from NETmundial 
to IGF—is a complex, messy, disputed set of interac-
tions with much at stake. Future flows of information, 
political arrangements, and economic opportunities are 
affected.  It is because of these very consequences that 
the IG community constantly struggles to reinvent and 
reestablish ideals of participation.
The working out of this experiment in fashioning policy 
takes place in the vortex of many acronymic entities: 
complex historic intergovernmental organizations, 
internet-specific structures of opportunity, powerful in-
vented quasi-private entities, multistakeholder venues, 
and sovereign states—to describe only part of the ecol-
ogy.  What occurs at Istanbul’s IGF is both an efferves-
cent celebration and an amalgam of enthusiasts on the 
verge of nervous breakdown.  All of this is what makes 
internet governance processes so interesting, impor-
tant and in constant need of input and review.  
We have tried, in this collection of essays, to capture 
what might be called the spirit that fueled NETmundial 
and that now seeks to enrich the Internet Governance 
Forum. That spirit has components of enthusiasm, sus-
tained attention, self-creation of roles, voluntariness, 
intensity of knowledge of what has come before, com-
mitment, idealism, practicality and inventiveness. The 
tone of these pages is almost invariably one of hope 
and faith, not quite religious, but definitely imbued with 
elements of belief. The chapters capture the brave 
effort at NETmundial to develop new institutional ap-
proaches and the concerted endeavor to build on that 
energy in Istanbul through constructive ideas and new 
governing conceptions. Everyone will bring his or her 
own reading to these contributions.  My reading sug-
gests that these analyses, recommendations, and as-
pirations can be read as sharpening the internet policy 
debate through the examination of purpose, efficacy 
and legitimacy. 
The issue of purpose is of hallmark importance.  What 
do NETmundial and its aftermath suggest in redefining 
the task of the IGF?  It would be enough for some—and 
probably deservedly so—if the IGF were perceived as 
the zone for semi-organized debate and discussion—
not just a society for the exchange of views, but an ef-
fective public sphere.  Or it could be perceived as an 
important, though not the exclusive, incubator of ideas 
(ideas about accountability, about representation, 
about the mechanisms by which the internet is gov-
erned).  It could be seen as an instrument in achieving 
a particular kind of internet—one that maintains certain 
principles, upholds human rights and preserves open-
ness. It could be the proxy site for jurisdictional and 
substantive battles fought equally in other fora.  The 
essays in this collection are very much concerned with 
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how these questions of purpose are debated and re-
solved, a debate marked out in Tunis and developed 
at the NETmundial in São Paolo as the essays here 
attest.
Efficacy is defined in relation to purpose.  Is the IGF 
constituted to perform the roles that are assigned to it? 
The IGF has become part of the fabric of internet gov-
ernance.  But should the warp and woof of that fabric 
be refashioned?   It is a characteristic of the galaxy of 
internet entities, and the IGF itself—indeed one of its 
charms—that the question is continuously asked.  The 
IGF can be seen as a lubricant, to use a word from the 
machine age, which allows various complex parts to 
interact without undue friction.  Visible in many of the 
contributions to this book is this necessary occupation 
with efficacy, sometimes invoked as part of the desire 
to create a more defined purposes for the IGF, to push 
it towards making specific recommendations and to 
achieve more measurable results.  
In a way, legitimacy is all.  In the swirling rounds of 
acronyms and meetings, in the search for some new 
world order of participation and governance, it is legiti-
macy that is the Holy Grail. How does the NETmundial 
process point the way to new mechanisms for legiti-
macy, here a legitimacy that surmounts the exercise of 
traditional modes of authority? In the history of the in-
ternet, legitimacy issued from the ranks of the software 
engineers; it issued from the authority, in the great ac-
counts of origin, of single heroes like John Postel. Le-
gitimacy can arise from perceptions of consensus or 
agreed upon democratic procedures. Sovereigns have 
innovated to adjust their ancient practices to the new 
global realities, as have, to some extent, international 
organizations. 
The contributions echo the Montevideo Statement in 
terms of the collective importance of restoring legitima-
cy. That document stressed the “concern over the un-
dermining of the trust and confidence of internet users 
globally due to recent revelations of pervasive moni-
toring and surveillance” and “warned against Internet 
fragmentation at a national level.” It also recognized the 
need “to address Internet Governance challenges (...) 
towards the evolution of global multistakeholder Inter-
net cooperation” and for “accelerating the globalization 
of ICANN and IANA functions, towards an environment 
in which all stakeholders, including all governments, 
participate on an equal footing.”1    
NETmundial took up this challenge and the Istanbul 
meeting continues the evolution. As the processes of 
discourse become more complex, models of civility will 
1 “Montevideo Statement on the Future of Internet Cooperation.” 
ICANN.org. Last accessed August 28, 2014. https://www.icann.
org/news/announcement-2013-10-07-en
come under challenge.  NETmundial was concerned 
very much with the symbols of participation—every-
thing from badges to rooms used to eating arrange-
ments were considered from this point of view.  Istan-
bul, Tunis, plenipotentiaries, NETmundial—these are 
all scenes in the grand theater of creating or hoping to 
create legitimacy for the interaction of players and poli-
cies concerning the internet.
As Kofi Annan has said, “In managing, promoting and 
protecting [the internet’s] presence in our lives, we 
need to be no less creative than those who invented 
it.”2  The contributors to this guide write with this charge 
in mind.  All have worked to make the NETmundial and 
the IGF important efforts in the history of the internet 
and—consciously or not—in the history of thinking 
about institutions and society. In the months ahead, in 
a contested world, we anticipate additional policy trem-
ors. Coalitions will recalibrate and assertions of new 
leadership will make their mark.  As global geopolitics 
change, what might be called the “foreign policies of in-
ternet policy” will change as well. Furthermore, as sev-
eral of the essays here make clear, and as NETmundial 
made manifest, the interconnection between global in-
ternet governance and issues of state sovereignty will 
become more salient.  
This project is sponsored by the Internet Policy Obser-
vatory, a program at the Center for Global Communica-
tion Studies of the Annenberg School for Communica-
tion at the University of Pennsylvania.  It could not have 
been possible without the energetic drive of William 
Drake, who was the principal architect, the organizer 
and the institutional historian who could bring so many 
pieces together.  His leadership resulted in the par-
ticipation of many defining figures in creating this col-
lection in remarkably short order.  At Annenberg, Briar 
Smith, Laura Schwartz-Henderson, Alex Esenler, and 
Octavia Bray furnished editorial leadership in bringing 
the task to completion.  
 
2 Ban Ki-moon. “Secretary General’s remarks at the open-
ing session of the Global Forum on Internet Governance.” 
Last accessed August 28, 2014. http://www.un.org/sg/
statements/?nid=837
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Overview of the Book
William J. Drake
OVERVIEWS
On 23 – 24 April 2014, the NETmundial “Global 
Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet 
Governance” was held in São Paulo, Brazil. 1229 
participants from 97 countries came together to debate 
a wide range of internet governance issues and adopt 
by rough consensus the NETmundial Multistakeholder 
Statement. In the aftermath of the meeting, there has 
been a great deal of debate on the internet and in 
various internet governance-related forums about who 
won and who lost by how much in the text that was 
adopted and in the process more generally. Opinions 
predictably vary, and there are research projects 
underway designed to sort out the meaning of it all for 
the future of internet governance and multistakeholder 
cooperation.
The purpose of this publication is much more limited. 
Quickly assembled in the summer of 2014 for release 
at the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) meeting in 
Istanbul on 2 - 5 September, it brings together a group 
of scholars and practitioners to consider selected 
provisions of just one part of the NETmundial outcome 
document: The Roadmap for the Future Evolution of 
the Internet Governance [sic] (hereafter the Roadmap). 
As the name implies, the Roadmap is said by the 
organizers and many proponents of the meeting to lay 
out the way forward with respect to the evolution and 
improvement of global internet governance institutions 
and processes. If so, how exactly shall the global 
community proceed with its implementation? What 
are the priorities and challenges involved? These are 
the questions this book seeks to explore, with an eye 
toward informing the relevant discussions at the IGF 
Istanbul and other upcoming meetings in the months 
and perhaps years ahead, including within Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN) and the recently announced NETmundial 
Initiative that is initially to be facilitated by the World 
Economic Forum (WEF).
Despite its potential importance, the Roadmap is 
actually a rather slight text.  It occupies just three and 
a half of the outcome document’s eleven pages.  Its 
provisions are divided into three sections: I. Issues 
that deserve attention of all stakeholders in the future 
evolution of Internet governance (eight paragraphs); 
II. Issues dealing with institutional improvements (six 
paragraphs); and, III. Issues dealing with specific 
Internet Governance topics (three paragraphs).   The 
last of these comprises rather general statements 
about the importance of international cooperation to 
promote cybersecurity and prevent cybercrime; a hotly 
contested and controversial statement that mass and 
arbitrary surveillance undermines trust, and that the 
collection and processing of personal data by state and 
non-state actors should be conducted in accordance 
with international human rights law and be the subject 
of more dialogue; and an endorsement of capacity 
building and financing in order to ensure that diverse 
stakeholders can effectively participate in internet 
governance processes.  
These are all crucially important topics about which 
much has and will be said going forward. However, 
in the design of this project we decided to leave them 
aside for others to explore more thoroughly. Instead, 
we concentrate on some more bounded institutional 
issues that generally did not receive sufficient attention 
in São Paulo and the online consultations prior, or that 
could be the subject of specific concrete actions over 
the course of the next year.  Most of these issues are 
scheduled to be discussed at the IGF Istanbul meeting, 
and they are covered in the first two sections of the 
Roadmap.
In the course of organizing this project and discussing 
it with colleagues, I have been reminded often that 
in light of the book’s release on the eve of the event, 
probably few people will be able to read through the 
fifteen chapters to follow amidst all the frenzied activity 
that will occur in Istanbul.  That being the case, this 
overview provides a synopsis of the chapters’ main foci 
and arguments.  It is hoped that readers of this summary 
who find they are especially interested to know more 
about particular contributions will be able to delve into 
them and save the others for later. The chapters are 
grouped into six sections: The NETmundial Meeting; 
Strengthening the Internet Governance Forum; Filling 
the Gaps; Improving ICANN; Broader Analytical 
Perspectives; and Moving Forward.
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The NETmundial Meeting
Section I. of the Roadmap includes the following 
provisions:
1.   Internet governance decisions are 
sometimes taken without the meaningful 
participation of all stakeholders. It is 
important that multistakeholder decision-
making and policy formulation are improved 
in order to ensure the full participation of all 
interested parties, recognizing the different 
roles played by different stakeholders in 
different issues.
3.   Stakeholder representatives appointed 
to multistakeholder internet governance 
processes should be selected through 
open, democratic, and transparent 
processes. Different stakeholder groups 
should self-manage their processes based 
on inclusive, publicly known, well defined 
and accountable mechanisms.
5.   There should be meaningful participation by 
all interested parties in Internet governance 
discussions and decision-making, with 
attention to geographic, stakeholder 
and gender balance in order to avoid 
asymmetries.
6.   Enabling capacity building and 
empowerment through such measures 
such as remote participation and adequate 
funding, and access to meaningful and 
timely information are essential for 
promoting inclusive and effective Internet 
governance.
8.   Internet governance discussions would 
benefit from improved communication and 
coordination between technical and non-
technical communities, providing a better 
understanding about the policy implications 
in technical decisions and technical 
implications in policy decision-making.1
In The NETmundial: An Innovative First Step on a Long 
Road, Joana Varon Ferraz provides a stage-setting 
overview of the NETmundial meeting and shows 
how its organization and conduct embodied these 
provisions of the Roadmap. Having served as a civil 
society representative on the meeting’s Logistics and 
Organizational Committee, she had not only a front row 
seat from which to analyse but also a direct hand in the 
operational mechanics of the meeting, which she notes 
1 The NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement, Sao Paulo, 
24 April 2014, pp. 8 & 9, http://netmundial.br/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf.
drew 1229 participants from ninety seven countries to 
São Paulo.
Varon emphasizes the innovative set of structures used 
to engage and organize diverse stakeholders from 
around the world in the preparatory process. Drawing 
on its experiences with the multistakeholder Brazilian 
Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br) and the then 
pending Marco Civil law, the host country devised a 
series of task-specific committees and groups that were 
mostly populated through invitations to governments 
and bottom-up selection processes undertaken by the 
private sector, technical community and civil society. 
Online consultations were conducted and drew 180 
contributions from forty six countries that served as 
basis for the draft outcome document. The section on 
principles received more than 60% of the comments 
with the roadmap coming in a distant second, results 
that foreshadowed the dichotomy in interest that was 
evidenced during the meeting itself. Moreover, within 
the roadmap section, it was the provisions on mass 
surveillance that elicited the most comments; with 
the exception of the IANA and enhanced cooperation 
language, attention to the institutional reform agenda 
paled in comparison.  
But despite the highly inclusive structures, consultations, 
and conduct of the plenary sessions, the final text was 
revised in drafting committees where the power and 
organization of states and business trumped other 
perspectives and led to somewhat forced compromises 
on items like net neutrality, intellectual property, and 
surveillance that left other participants dispirited. 
Hence, the overall sense of accomplishment felt by 
many was tempered somewhat by closing complaints 
about process and substance from some civil society 
participants, as well as (for entirely different reasons) 
the governments Russia, India, and Cuba.
Strengthening the Internet 
Governance Forum
Section II of the Roadmap includes the following 
provisions:
3.  There is a need for a strengthened Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF). Important 
recommendations to that end were made 
by the UN CSTD working group on IGF 
improvements. It is suggested that these 
recommendations will be implemented by 
the end of 2015.
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Improvements should include inter-alia:
a.   Improved outcomes: Improvements can 
be implemented including creative ways of 
providing outcomes/recommendations and 
the analysis of policy options;
b.  Extending the IGF mandate beyond five-
year terms;
c.  Ensuring guaranteed stable and predictable 
funding for the IGF, including through a 
broadened donor base, is essential;
d. The IGF should adopt mechanisms to 
promote worldwide discussions between 
meetings through intersessional dialogues.  
A strengthened IGF could better serve as a platform 
for discussing both long standing and emerging issues 
with a view to contributing to the identification of 
possible ways to address them.2
In A Perspective from the Technical Community, 
Markus Kummer argues that the NETmundial was a 
watershed moment and successful celebration of the 
multistakeholder model. He traces the evolution of 
“multistakeholder cooperation” during the WSIS, and 
argues that the WGIG proved a milestone for the UN 
by introducing the term “multistakeholder” in internet 
governance, thereby laying the foundation for an IGF 
where all stakeholders take part on an equal footing. 
Turning to the NETmundial, he suggests that the 
meeting both built on the ground that was laid by the 
IGF and now is revealing a path forward for the IGF. In 
parallel, Kummer also finds possible inspiration for the 
IGF in the IETF, where new ideas usually get tested first 
in a Bird of a Feather session. Such sessions can lead 
to focused working groups and ultimately to consensus 
on complex problems. This approach could be adapted 
and transferred to the IGF in order to produce non-
binding policy outcomes, the evolution of which could 
be well documented. 
Kummer suggests that the 2014 IGF in Istanbul could 
be the starting point for developing intersessional work 
on substantive issues, as many in civil society have long 
advocated. Whether by building on existing Dynamic 
Coalitions or creating new ones, work on different 
topics could be pursued online and complemented by 
physical meetings held alongside the IGF preparatory 
consultations and at the annual IGF. The trick would 
be to develop a process that allows for adoption of 
non-binding documents by rough consensus, as was 
successfully done at the NETmundial.   
2   ibid., pp. 9 & 10.
In A Perspective from the Private Sector: Ensuring that 
Forum Follows Function, Vint Cerf, Patrick Ryan, Max 
Senges, and Rick Whitt develop a three-step analysis. 
They begin with the role of the private sector in the 
internet’s development as a way to underscore their view 
that the internet’s governance is a shared responsibility 
of governments, civil society and the private sector. 
The authors highlight key aspects of the internet’s 
architecture, applications, and technical governance. 
Against this background, they then outline some of the 
main incentives for private sector engagement at the 
IGF.  These include businesses’ abilities to: “engage at 
scale” by reaching multiple stakeholders in one place, 
saving time and travel costs; promote a transnational 
multistakeholder internet governance ecosystem by 
addressing potentially dangerous developments that 
could otherwise lead to fragmentation of the web and 
the deceleration of progress through bureaucratization; 
encourage cooperation and alliances between firms in 
an environment where competitive interests can be set 
aside in order to pursue broader shared policy goals; 
pursue policymaking tech-transfer and knowledge 
sharing by ensuring that challenges and proposed 
solutions are openly evaluated and optimized 
based on stakeholder feedback; and increase their 
understanding of the cultural expectations of the “next 
5 billion” by engaging with dialogue with governments 
and stakeholders from developing countries.
The authors then consider options for improving the 
IGF. In their view, the IGF should strengthen its ability to 
perform three clearinghouse functions so as to secure 
its place as the key transnational platform for facilitating 
internet governance. These are to identify emergent 
internet governance challenges; frame them so that 
experts from all relevant institutions can cooperate in 
developing and implementing innovative solutions; and 
assure that the progress and discourse are archived 
and available for analysis.  In order to achieve this, 
they recommend documenting the mandate of the 
Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) in order to 
specify its roles, responsibilities and expectations. This 
could be undertaken as part of a Web of Affirmation of 
Commitments that sets out expectations of the MAG 
vis-a-vis other stakeholders in the IGF and within the 
governance community, generally.  Another important 
step would be to promote a culture of learning so that 
the IGF can better acknowledge and learn from its 
mistakes and then course correct. A good example 
of this need concerns the way IGF host countries are 
selected and the way in which Host Country Agreements 
are executed; until late in the game, problems with the 
latter almost led to the cancelation of the 2013 meeting 
in Bali.  Finally, they argue that there is a pressing need 
to implement transparency mechanisms, particularly 
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with respect to the ways in which the UN’s central 
administration oversees the Secretariat and related 
organizational matters. 
In A Perspective from Civil Society, Jeremy Malcolm 
begins by recalling the initial vision and expectations of 
civil society participants in the WSIS process regarding 
the then proposed IGF. At the time, the civil society 
Internet Governance Caucus (IGC) expressed strong 
support for the concept and felt that the forum should 
serve as a vehicle for the development of soft law 
instruments such as recommendations, guidelines, and 
declarations. The mandate later set forth in the Tunis 
Agenda for the Information Society held the promise 
of helping civil society to advocate for the global public 
interest.  For example, the IGF’s mandate to promote 
and assess, on an ongoing basis, the embodiment 
in internet governance processes of the WSIS 
procedural principles of being multilateral, transparent, 
democratic and inclusive provided a baseline from 
which to encourage good governance across the 
global ecosystem.  But alas, Malcolm argues, the 
IGF has failed to take advantage of the possibilities 
built into its mandate.  He ascribes this failure to a 
number of sources, in particular an over-large and 
historically stagnant MAG that has been dominated 
by stakeholders whose preferences differ from those 
of civil society; an undue level of deference to the 
views of governments; an organizational culture that 
resists innovation, “and is inclined to compromise and 
back down in the face of reservations about proposed 
changes that are expressed from any quarter.”  Even 
the recommendations advanced in 2012 by the UN’s 
multistakeholder Working Group on Improvements to 
the Internet Governance Forum (WGIGF), such as 
to develop more tangible outputs,  have failed to be 
enacted seriously.  His bleak conclusion is that the IGF 
“has become well and truly ossified.”
Malcolm asserts that the NETmundial meeting 
showed just how easily and quickly some of the 
reforms civil society has long advocated could now 
be implemented. Issue-specific intersessional working 
groups could operate continuously and provide online 
and offline users equivalent opportunities to participate. 
Soft law recommendations could be developed 
through a participatory rough consensus process.  A 
Multistakeholder Internet Policy Council could be 
established to ensure buy-in from all stakeholders to 
such outcomes.  The IGF could ensure that its own 
structures and processes fully embody the WSIS 
procedural principles, inter alia by allowing stakeholder 
groups to directly select their MAG representatives. 
Documentation could be strengthened, as could 
the online presence, including by accepting offers of 
support from the community.  The IGF could actively 
facilitate the engagement of stakeholders, particularly 
those from developing countries, and provide a 
coordination mechanism to direct stakeholders to 
external processes or institutions that can deal with 
a given public policy issue.  These and related steps 
would enable the IGF to live up to its mandate, as civil 
society participants have long advocated.
Filling the Gaps
Section I. of the Roadmap includes the following 
provisions:
2.    Enhanced cooperation as referred to in the 
Tunis Agenda to address international public 
policy issues pertaining to the Internet 
must be implemented on a priority and 
consensual basis. Taking into consideration 
the efforts of the CSTD working group on 
enhanced cooperation, it is important that 
all stakeholders commit to advancing this 
discussion in a multistakeholder fashion.
4.  There is a need to develop multistakeholder 
mechanisms at the national level owing 
to the fact that a good portion of Internet 
governance issues should be tackled 
at this level. National multistakeholder 
mechanisms should serve as a link between 
local  discussions and regional and global 
instances. Therefore a fluent coordination 
and dialogue across those different 
dimensions is essential. 
And Section II. includes the following provisions:
1.  All of the organizations with responsibilities 
in the Internet governance ecosystem 
should develop and implement principles 
for transparency, accountability and 
inclusiveness. All such organizations should 
prepare periodic reports on their progress 
and status on these issues. Those reports 
should be made publicly available.
2.  Consideration should be given to the 
possible need for mechanisms to consider 
emerging topics and issues that are not 
currently being adequately addressed by 
existing Internet governance arrangements.
4.  There should be adequate communication 
and coordination among existing forums, 
task forces and organizations of the Internet 
governance ecosystem. Periodic reports, 
formal liaisons and timely feedbacks are 
examples of mechanisms that could be 
implemented to that end. It would be 
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recommendable to analyze the option of 
creating Internet governance coordination 
tools to perform on-going monitoring, 
analysis, and information-sharing functions.3 
In Institutionalizing the Clearinghouse Function, 
William J. Drake and Lea Kaspar build off the last 
sentence in paragraph four above to develop a 
proposal to enhance the gathering, assessment and 
distribution of governance-related information and 
facilitation of distributed governance networks.  The 
underlying objectives of such an initiative would be 
to help empower developing country governments 
and other non-dominant actors to respond effectively 
to policy challenges, particularly with respect to 
“orphan issues;” and potentially, to enhance the 
spread and application of good governance principles, 
such as transparency, accountability, and inclusive 
participation. To these ends, they outline an ensemble 
of programmatic elements that could be addressed in 
a coordinated manner and which they refer to as  the 
clearinghouse function. Drawing on the experiences 
of similar initiatives in the climate change arena, the 
authors suggest that performance of the function 
would involve deciding on the balance between human 
expertise and machine processes; defining the scope 
of the governance issues to be addressed; undertaking 
user needs assessments; information identification, 
gathering, and verification; balancing between 
centralized and distributed information management; 
analysing events and trends; dissemination; trust and 
buy-in; and relationship management. 
Drake and Kaspar then consider five possible options 
for institutionalizing the function. These include a  status 
quo+ approach of strengthening existing enablers in 
the ecosystem, and establishing a new mechanism in 
an intergovernmental organization, a new multistake-
holder organization, the IGF, or a mixed model in which 
an independent multistakeholder body establishes 
working linkages with the IGF.
In Global Mechanisms to Support National 
Multistakeholder Efforts, Anriette Esterhuysen 
assesses the concept of multistakeholderism, and 
then considers mechanisms that can strengthen and 
sustain multistakeholder policymaking at the national 
level. She begins by arguing that the internet is an 
inherently multistakeholder global public resource, 
but that unequal power relations characterize its 
development, use, and governance. Moreover, as 
it is often not possible to clearly divide the “national” 
from the “global” issues, it makes no sense to argue 
that the former do not belong in global discussions. 
3  ibid., pp. 8 – 10.
This artificial separation has made participation by 
developing country stakeholders very difficult; they 
are made to feel that internet policy issues that matter 
to them are not important enough to be discussed. If 
they do want to participate in global discussions, they 
are under pressure to show knowledge and interest 
in issues that are often quite remote to them. The 
simplistic division of people into stakeholder groups 
also causes problems, and is a direct result of the 
absence of systematic acknowledgement of the 
differences in power, capacities, and resources among 
various social groups.  Against this backdrop, she maps 
out seven types of mechanisms to support democratic 
multistakeholder governance, as well as risks that 
should be considered in their operationalization.  She 
discusses mechanisms for sharing information and 
innovation; for dialogue, networking and debate; to 
provide normative frameworks and guiding principles; 
for capacity building; for research, monitoring and 
evaluation; to ensure balanced inclusion of relevant 
stakeholder groups; and directed specifically at 
governments, linked to intergovernmental processes 
and institutions. 
Esterhuysen then turns to the questions of who 
establishes these mechanisms, where should they be 
located, and their coordination. We should begin by 
documenting existing mechanisms, and establishing 
where the main gaps are. Any coordination function 
needs to be located in a space that is trusted by civil 
society, business, the technical community, and by 
both the ‘new’ governance institutions and formations, 
and the traditional ‘intergovernmental’ sector. It 
needs to be non-aligned, particularly in the sense of 
not being dependent on an institution or entity that is 
currently seen as playing a controlling role in internet 
governance, or one with designs on playing such a role. 
She concludes that the IGF could be the ideal home for 
coordination and clearinghouse functions. Accordingly, 
she expresses concern that the proposed NETmundial 
Initiative, while well intentioned, is seriously tainted 
by the lack of transparency and inclusion around its 
formation. 
In Feet on the Ground: Marco Civil as an Example 
of Multistakeholderism in Practice, Ronaldo Lemos 
shows how Brazil successfully developed the “Marco 
Civil da Internet” legislation that was signed by Brazil’s 
President Dilma Rousseff at the São Paulo meeting.  He 
traces the evolution of the project through seven years 
of intense debate with numerous stakeholders.  Of great 
significance was that the legislation was proposed by 
civil society rather than the government, and was the 
product of an open and collaborative effort. Contributions 
were solicited from a wide variety of stakeholders, all of 
whom were able to assess one another’s contributions. 
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The law sets forth a comprehensive “bill of rights” for 
the internet.  It protects rights such as net neutrality 
and privacy.  Moreover, it takes a strong stance against 
mass surveillance practices, for example by banning 
the use of deep packet inspection at the physical layer 
of internet connections.  The Marco Civil also protects 
freedom of expression, creating safe harbours for 
online intermediaries in Brazil, and internet platforms 
have to take down content only when served with a 
valid court order.  
Lemos points out that the law embeds multistake-
holderism as a principle for internet governance in 
Brazil, which will directly influence Brazilian positions 
on global internet governance in international forums. 
In addition, its influence is spreading regionally and 
beyond, as governments and stakeholders elsewhere 
consider its implications and applicability in their own 
contexts. 
In A Journey Can be More important than the 
Destination: Reflecting on the CSTD Working Group 
on Enhanced Cooperation, Samantha Dickinson 
provides a first-hand recollection and assessment 
of the WGEC’s trials, tribulations, and implications. 
The WGIGF had set a precedent for multistakeholder 
cooperation in UN Commission on Science, 
Technology and Development (CSTD) working groups, 
making it easier for the WGEC to follow suit. Even 
governments that had not always been associated 
with supporting openness and transparency did not 
object, so nongovernmental stakeholders would be 
on an equal footing with governments in devising any 
recommendations for further implementing enhanced 
cooperation.  Moreover, when the group began to meet 
in May 2013, the members agreed to open meetings 
to observers, pending size limitations of the meeting 
room. In addition, observers had a short daily speaking 
slot in which they could make interventions on the 
group’s work. All this allowed the WGEC to push the 
boundaries of its multistakeholder modalities, but it did 
not help the members reach consensus on a set of 
recommendations about enhanced cooperation. 
Despite this failing, Dickinson believes the WGEC made 
two very significant contributions to internet governance 
going forward. First, its experience could encourage 
further use of more sophisticated and multistakeholder 
mechanisms within the UN system, with each 
stakeholder group directly choosing the people that 
represent it in similar processes. Rather than demanding 
that all internet governance discussions within the UN 
should immediately become fully open and bottom-up, 
it may be useful for stakeholders to encourage and 
adopt wider use of this representative model so that 
governments become more comfortable and confident 
over time in interacting with other stakeholder groups 
on equal footing.  Second, the WGEC experience 
could encourage more evidence-based discussions 
on enhanced cooperation in the future. As volunteer 
observers, Dickinson and Lea Kaspar worked in the 
WGEC’s “Correspondence Group” to organize and 
cull evidence from hundreds of pages of responses 
received to a questionnaire inviting examples of 
enhanced cooperation.  The “mapping document” they 
were developing when the WGEC concluded its efforts 
in May 2014 not only lists existing examples but also 
details gaps in governance processes in order to set 
an evidence-based approach to the development of 
recommendations.  This work is supposed to be carried 
forward by the CSTD Secretariat, and has the potential 
to move us beyond the decade-long political stalemate 
on enhanced cooperation.
Improving ICANN
Section II. includes the following provisions:
5.   In the follow up to the recent and 
welcomed announcement of US 
Government with regard to its intent 
to transition the stewardship of IANA 
functions, the discussion about mechanisms 
for guaranteeing the transparency and 
accountability of those functions after the 
US Government role ends,  has to take 
place through an open process with the 
participation of all stakeholders extending 
beyond the ICANN community.
 
 The IANA functions are currently performed 
under policies developed in processes 
hosted by several organizations and forums. 
Any adopted mechanism should protect the 
bottom up, open and participatory nature 
of those policy development processes 
and ensure the stability and resilience of 
the Internet. It is desirable to discuss the 
adequate relation between the policy and 
operational aspects.
 This transition should be conducted 
thoughtfully with a focus on maintaining 
the security and stability of the Internet, 
empowering the principle of equal 
participation among all stakeholder groups 
and striving towards a completed transition 
by September 2015.
6.   It is expected that the process of 
globalization of ICANN speeds up leading to 
a truly international and global organization 
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serving the public interest with clearly 
implementable and verifiable accountability 
and transparency mechanisms that 
satisfy requirements from both internal 
stakeholders and the global community.
 The active representation from all 
stakeholders in the ICANN structure from 
all regions is a key issue in the process of a 
successful globalization.
In The IANA Transition in the Context of Global Internet 
Governance, Emma Llansó and Matt Shears lay out the 
tangled tale that began with the US  National Telecom-
munications and Information Administration’s (NTIA) 
14 March 2014 announcement that it was seeking to 
relinquish its responsibilities in the management of the 
Domain Name System (DNS) to the global multistake-
holder community. NTIA asked ICANN to convene a 
process that would develop a transition proposal that 
would support and enhance the multistakeholder mod-
el; maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the 
internet DNS; meet the needs and expectation of the 
global customers and partners of the IANA services; 
and maintain the openness of the internet.  In addi-
tion, NTIA stated that it “will not accept a proposal that 
replaces the NTIA role with a government-led or an in-
ter-governmental organization solution.” Subsequently, 
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications 
and Information Lawrence Strickling elaborated on 
the announcement and specified that there should be 
continued separation of policy development and opera-
tional activities, and that “the neutral and judgment free 
administration of the technical DNS and IANA func-
tions” must be maintained.  To put this in context, the 
authors trace the evolution of the relationship between 
the US government and the IANA functions; clarify the 
nature of the US government’s procedural role in ad-
ministering changes to the authoritative root zone file 
and serving as the steward of the DNS; examine the 
international political dimensions of the US role, and 
the controversies that have swirled around it since the 
WSIS process and in light of the revelations by Edward 
Snowden of US mass surveillance programs; and ex-
plain the challenges faced by NTIA with respect to US 
domestic politics, where certain business interests and 
Congressional Republicans have sought to slow down 
and even derail the transition process.
Against this background, Llansó and Shears then map 
out the main developments in the process that ICANN 
has launched to facilitate consensus building around 
a transition proposal.  They recount that ICANN’s 
convening process initially was marred by what were 
perceived to be an overly restrictive scoping of the 
issues that could be discussed, an overly prescriptive 
process for the development of a transition proposal, 
and a proposed consultation process that revolved 
around ICANN meetings alone. Significant and 
sustained pushback from the ICANN community led 
to a recalibration and multiple adjustments to the 
process, and a contested interrelationship between the 
transition and the pending launch of a parallel process 
to assess and enhance ICANN’s overall accountability. 
The process of developing a transition proposal has 
been placed in the hands of a recently constructed 
IANA Transition Coordination Group that comprises 
representatives from the internet technical community 
organizations, the ICANN constituencies, and global 
business. The group will coordinate the inputs from the 
various communities in order to arrive at a transition 
proposal.  The authors conclude by outlining a series of 
challenges that must be overcome in this process, such 
arriving at a global multistakeholder, community-driven 
proposal that can garner the required broad community 
support. In addition, the initiative must reach beyond 
the ICANN environment and actively solicit input from 
the broader global community, consistent with the 
NETmundial document and views that have been 
expressed in other international forums.
In ICANN Globalization, Accountability, and Trans-
parency, Avri Doria  considers in turn each of these 
three major objectives as they are being addressed in 
ICANN today.  With regard to globalization, she notes 
a shift over the years from the language of “internation-
alization” due to fears that the ITU or some other UN 
body would make a serious play to move the control 
of ICANN and its functions into the intergovernmen-
tal realm.  ICANN has been seeking to free itself from 
oversight by a single nation for over 13 years or does 
not want to replace this with oversight by a multi plicity 
of governments.  Globalization or denationalization 
would mean shifting this role into the multistakehold-
er environment.  In the meanwhile, under President 
and Chief Executive Officer Fadi Chehadé, ICANN 
has expanded and revised its organizational struc-
ture by opening hub offices in Singapore and Turkey 
and engagement offices in a number of countries. 
However, there are limits on the extent of possible glo-
balization because generic Top Level Domain names 
(gTLD), are in effect regulated via Registry and Regis-
trar  contracts  concluded under the laws of the United 
States,  California, and other US states.  She notes that 
ICANN has also sought to globalize in other ways, e.g. 
the languages used in its processes, the launching of 
multilingual or Internationalized Domain Names, and 
so on.  Nevertheless, ICANN continues to struggle with 
promoting the engagement of developing countries, 
particularly as homes to contracted parties in the gTLD 
industry.  As such, she recommends a new round of 
gTLD  applications oriented toward the private sector 
and civil society organizations in the developing world. 
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With regard to accountability, Doria breaks the 
objective down into three major elements: oversight, 
transparency, and methods for redress.  She outlines 
alternative types of oversight, e.g. hard (commanding) 
vs. soft (recommending) forms; internal vs. external 
sources; and proscriptive and a-priori vs. exception-
based.  ICANN’s Affirmation of Commitments provides 
a well-developed type of internal, soft oversight, but it 
could be strengthened by incorporating the required 
reviews into ICANN’s bylaws.  Finally, with regard 
to transparency, she asserts that ICANN is in line 
with to a model according to which  carefully vetted 
rationales for decisions are published, but the actual 
discussions and documents that went into the decision 
are not made available to the community.  She also 
maintains that ICANN lacks a strong whistleblower 
program and sufficient means for parties seeking 
redress of decisions and non-decisions that cause 
material harm.  She concludes by recounting some of 
the controversies currently swirling around ICANN’s 
emerging accountability enhancement initiative.
Broader Analytical 
Perspectives
The next section of the book begins a shift away from the 
implementation of particular elements of the Roadmap 
to wider contextualizing views on the NETmundial and 
global internet governance generally. The first two 
contributions offer academic perspectives on a meta-
issue that underlies many policy debates about the 
Internet, namely the contested interface between the 
territorial nation-state and the transterritorial internet.
In Towards Information Interdependence, James 
Losey defines what he calls a “third-way” approach 
that offers a middle ground between extraterritorial 
policy regimes and national sovereignty. He considers 
the nature of sovereignty and its implications for the 
erection of “cyberborders” in order to maintain cultural 
or regime stability. He describes how in addition to 
excluding foreign content, some states have taken or 
contemplated measures to strengthen their authority 
through controls over the location of stored data and 
internet traffic routing. The author then advances the 
competing notion of “information empire,” i.e. policies 
and practices in which states seek extraterritorial 
applications of internet jurisdiction. Actions by the 
Canada courts, the European Court of Justice’s “right to 
be forgotten” ruling, and US mass surveillance practices 
are cited as examples of this phenomenon.  With this 
binary established, he suggests that the political science 
concept of complex interdependence---consisting of 
multiple channels connecting societies, a multitude of 
interstate issues with no particular hierarchy, and less 
reliance on military force---can provide a framework 
for pursuing stable information interdependence at the 
global level, particularly for emerging “swing states” in 
global internet policy debates. 
Losey then illustrates his thesis, highlighting five issue-
areas that have been addressed in global internet 
governance debates. Regarding critical internet 
resources, he takes note of proposals to separate the 
IANA policy and operational functions by creating an 
independent DNS authority and granting oversight 
to a consortium of TLD registries. On the problem 
of content regulation, he points to the proliferation 
of national censorship policies that are inconsistent 
with human rights and create trade barriers for digital 
economies. He argues that policies are needed that 
preclude barriers to content production and distribution, 
limit intermediary liability and support freedom of 
expression. With respect to cybersecurity, he suggests 
a distributed approach that is grounded in principles for 
society, considers international implications, limits the 
secrecy of intelligence agencies, respects core privacy 
rights, and works towards international norms. On the 
hot topics of mass surveillance and data retention, he 
points out that the global scope of US surveillance 
has generated concerns about the control of internet 
traffic, the localization of data, and the trustworthiness 
of services offered by US providers. Finally, he 
suggests that the evolution of global intellectual 
property protection offers a cautionary tale about the 
risks of interdependence, as US influence combines 
with select business interests rather than leading to 
interdependence as a framework for state relations. 
He concludes that the emerging shift to a multipolar 
world necessitates a third way that both minimizes the 
information empire and reduces incentives for countries 
that might otherwise use cyberborders to rally national 
interests. 
In Towards Information Sovereignty, Shawn Powers 
approaches the contested relationship between the 
national and the global spheres from a different but 
related angle. He posits a continuum between absolute 
freedom of expression and total information control, 
and then considers examples in which states have 
discouraged access to a singular shared internet by 
developing malleable domestic networks that are 
more capable of facilitating a balance between the two 
poles. He begins his exploration by tracing the rise of 
debates about “information sovereignty” in the 1970s, 
mostly notably in the New World Information and 
Communication Order battle within the United Nations 
Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. Fueled 
by the emergence of direct satellite broadcasting and 
related trends, many Soviet Bloc and developing 
country governments expressed concern about the 
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dissemination of US cultural products and news. While 
the negotiations did not yield a meaningful international 
regulatory agreement, the issue resurfaced in the WSIS 
process and is of relevance in the internet age.  States 
with concerns about their information sovereignty 
face countervailing pressures, e.g. from businesses, 
citizens and activists preferring open cyberborders. 
They therefore work to find solutions that reduce 
political risks while allowing them to reap the benefits of 
connectivity, e.g. by filtering, monitoring and structuring 
industry-government relations in order to maximize 
state preferences. 
The author argues that both democratic and non-
democratic governments are exploring ways to control 
access to the internet without losing legitimacy and 
power. He illustrates this by offering three brief case 
studies of states restricting access to networks, 
incentivizing domestically-oriented web browsing, and 
developing popular and robust de facto national intranet 
systems. Denmark is widely considered a bastion for 
freedom of expression but engages in surveillance, 
data retention and strict copyright enforcement which 
serves to stifle political speech.  And the US is pursuing 
various means of controlling access to the internet 
under the auspices of security, maintaining the integrity 
of confidential information, and protecting intellectual 
property. Powers briefly traces both key antecedents 
and concurrent practices to the recently revealed mass 
surveillance exemplified by the PRISM program. He 
concludes that IGF participants need to consider such 
state practices more carefully, and that participation 
in multistakeholder forums such as NETmundial 
and the IGF may not necessarily benefit civil society 
groups unless they are able to win clear and actionable 
concessions from governments and the private sector. 
Moving Forward
While the previous two chapters widened the project’s 
focus latitudinally, the final three chapters do it 
longitudinally.  They look to the future, and how the 
processes begun at the NETmundial meeting and the 
global ecosystem more generally may evolve. 
In Creating a Global Internet Public Policy Space: Is 
there a Way Forward?, Marília Maciel  begins as well 
from the tension between nation-states and the internet, 
and suggests that the technical terminology used to 
discuss internet governance can have the effect of de-
politicizing an inherently political topic. Governments in 
the developing world have legitimate concerns about 
the geopolitics of power and interdependence, and the 
thus far failed debate on enhanced cooperation means 
that there is no organizational setting in which they can 
pursue many global public policy issues of particular 
relevance to them.  Proposals to create a centralized 
space in the United Nations should be understood as 
attempts to place policy development under democratic 
control anchored in the view that states’ representatives 
can legitimately voice the concerns of their peoples. 
Moreover, there are efforts to place all countries on 
an equal footing in policy development, mitigating the 
disproportionate influence that some states have on 
private actors, mostly due to their capacity to exert 
jurisdiction.
Dissatisfaction with the status quo helps to fuel demands 
to enhance the role of existing intergovernmental 
organizations, most notably the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU).  It also will continue 
to fuel the bargaining over the WSIS +10 agenda, and 
the author suggest the need for a full-scale review 
of progress made since the WSIS. In June 2015, an 
intergovernmental negotiation process will commence, 
leading to a new intergovernmental outcome document 
for adoption at a high-level meeting of the UN General 
Assembly in December 2015. Maciel argues that the 
most reasonable solution is to revisit the Tunis Agenda 
and discuss its implementation by making the necessary 
adjustments and compromises in order to update it to 
present challenges. While recent meetings indicate 
that major breakthroughs are unlikely, she argues that it 
could be useful to revisit some of the various proposals 
put forward regarding centralized and distributed 
institutional arrangements. She contrasts India’s 
suggestion of a UN Committee for Internet-Related 
Policies with the Brazilian government’s more broadly 
framed support for a single space or platform that 
would be respectful of the multistakeholder model and 
considers as well proposals advanced by civil society 
analysts for new multistakeholder policy spaces. In 
contrast, she expresses concerns about the recently 
announced NETmundial Initiative spearheaded by Fadi 
Chehadé and the WEF.
In Moving from the NETmundial of Today to the 
“NETmundial +” of Tomorrow, Nnenna Nwakanma 
contemplates the evolution of the ecosystem in 
the post-NETmundial environment. In considering 
ways to move forward, she draws lessons from the 
experience of the WSIS and its principles and notes 
that traditional multilateral processes are likely to 
produce disputed outputs. The NETmundial meeting 
was a response to the need for more leadership in 
the internet governance space, and we need more 
countries that can demonstrate the sort of leadership 
that Brazil displayed. The meeting’s organizers were 
wise to stick to global principles and the Roadmap, 
rather than delving into a multitude of topics at the 
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same time. The NETmundial did recognize though that 
there are many key issues that remain in dire need of 
attention in appropriate forums, such as net neutrality, 
jurisdictional issues, disputes over stakeholder roles 
and responsibilities, the meaning and application of 
“equal footing”, and the development of benchmarking 
systems and related indicators regarding the application 
of good governance principles. She suggests that any 
similar global meetings held in the future choose to 
focus on a limited number of issues and a clear plan for 
following up on them.  
Nwakanma draws the interesting conclusion that 
perhaps the most important takeaway from São Paulo 
concerns remote participation. The interactive and 
transparent systems put in place contributed much 
to the meeting’s success and impact on stakeholders 
around the world.  This is an important element of 
emerging participatory paradigms for the conduct 
of internet governance.  These systems could help 
to provide more opportunities for the global South to 
participate, although she also acknowledges that many 
other steps will be needed as well. She concludes that 
the “letter and spirit” of the NETmundial needs to be 
kept alive, and the legacy should be transformed from 
documents to actions, from intentions to policies, and 
from agreements to achievements. 
Last but not least, in NETmundial: Watershed in 
Internet Policy Making?, Wolfgang Kleinwächter also 
takes stock of the meeting’s outcome and implications. 
He begins with the proposition that since the adoption 
of the Tunis Agenda in 2005, the internet governance 
discussion has not really moved forward. Numerous 
meetings and endless committees produced a never-
ending chain of reports, summaries and papers with 
nice reflections but very little move towards action. 
In support of this claim, he reviews a number of 
developments in the UN setting, including the WGIGF, 
the WGEC, and the WSIS + 10 process. Even the IGF 
is today more or less still the same as it was in 2006, 
with calls for more concrete outputs being repeated 
year after year with nobody proposing a workable 
approach for it to address practical problems without 
becoming a negotiation body. The IGF needs to be 
strengthened and have its mandate renewed, and 
we should develop a linked multistakeholder internet 
policymaking mechanism that is responsive to the 
changing shape of the internet environment and the 
needs of all actors.
Kleinwächter argues that internet governance cannot 
be a hierarchical system with a sole intergovernmental 
decision maker at the top of a pyramid. What we 
have is an internet governance ecosystem with 
various governance models for specific issues and 
where different governmental and non-governmental 
stakeholders work hand in hand in a decentralized and 
layered system of shared responsibilities. He likens 
it to a virtual rainforest, with an endless and growing 
diversity of networks, services, applications, regimes 
and other properties that co-exist and conflict. It is 
not a homogeneous, manageable entity, and there 
is no “silver bullet” or “one size fits all” solution. The 
specific form of each sub-system has to be designed 
according to the very particular needs and natures of 
each individual issue. The challenge then is to find 
flexible mechanisms for enhanced communication 
and coordination, designing a mechanism for formal 
and informal collaboration among the various 
players at the different layers. These processes 
must also allow for all stakeholders to be able to 
play their respective roles on equal footing without 
discrimination, promoting openness and transparency 
and providing democratic checks and balances as 
well as a recognized accountability system. Keeping it 
growing will require efforts by all stakeholders. In this 
respect, the NETmundial offered a third way between 
the purported polar opposites of multilateral and 
multistakeholder cooperation, one based on an equal 
footing model of deliberation. Of particular importance 
to Kleinwächter is the section on internet governance 
principles, which provides a common basis for moving 
forward. Like the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, the NETmundial statement is a legally non-
binding document, and it sets key standards that will 
help to guide the future evolution of the global Internet 
governance ecosystem.
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On April 23rd and 24th, São Paulo hosted a historic event: 
the NETmundial, also called the “Global Multistakeholder 
Meeting on the Future of Internet Governance,” was a 
diplomatic event with the goals to “pursue consensus 
about universally accepted governance principles and 
to improve their institutional framework.”1 Whether one 
concludes that such ambitious goals were reached or 
not through NETmundial, the meeting should serve as 
a subject for reflective assessments on the processes 
guiding the meeting’s implementation as well as an 
examination of each issue in the outcome document 
and its eventual implementation. The historical status 
of NETmundial became undeniable at least as far as it 
represented an innovation in the processes governing 
internet policy.
In order to document the pioneering ways in which 
the NETmundial organizing committee incorporated 
public participation into such a diplomatic meeting, 
this chapter dissects how the meeting was organized 
and functioned in order to result in the final outcome 
document, which will be object of the several chapters 
ahead in this publication. What were the lessons 
learned in terms of building a more democratic and 
inclusive arena for debate? What kind of practices 
can be replicated? What aspects should be improved? 
This essay will explore these questions in an effort to 
analyze NETmundial’s role in paving a new way for 
internet governance.
The Political Context 
The meeting was announced to the world in the 
 beginning of October 2013 by Brazilian president 
 Dilma Rousseff, after a meeting she had with the CEO 
of ICANN, Fadi Chehadé. This meeting occurred as a 
result of two significant events: President Rousseff’s 
speech from September 24 at the 68th session of the UN 
1 Center for Information and Coordination Ponto BR, 2013. 
‘Announcement Of The Brazilian Internet Steering Committee 
About The Global Multistakeholder Meeting On Internet Gover-
nance’. http://www.nic.br/imprensa/releases/2013/rl-2013-62.
htm.
The NETmundial: An Innovative First Step 
on a Long Road
Joana Varon 
General Assembly and the release of the Montevideo 
Statement on the Future of Internet Cooperation,2 
crafted by several representatives from the technical 
community, including ICANN3, IETF4, W3C5 and many 
Internet Registries. Both statements were made in 
the aftermath of the Snowden revelations and can be 
seen as different and probably convergent reactions 
to the allegations of widespread online surveillance 
conducted by the United States of America.
The Montevideo Statement stressed the “concern 
over the undermining of the trust and confidence of 
Internet users globally due to recent revelations of 
pervasive monitoring and surveillance” and “warned 
against  Internet fragmentation at a national level.” 
It has also recognized the need “to address Internet 
Governance challenges (...) towards the evolution 
of global multistakeholder Internet cooperation” and 
for “accelerating the globalization of ICANN and 
IANA functions, towards an environment in which all 
stakeholders, including all governments, participate on 
an equal footing.”6
President Rousseff’s speech served as strong criticism, 
mostly directed at the government of the United 
States, to which she “expressed disapproval and 
demanded explanations, apologies and guarantees 
that such procedures will never be repeated.” Recalling 
national sovereignty, she affirmed that, “tampering 
[communications] in such a manner in the affairs of 
other countries is a breach of international law and an 
affront of the principles that must guide the relations 
among them, especially among friendly nations.”7 
2 ICANN, 2013. ‘Montevideo Statement On The Future Of Internet 
Cooperation’. https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2013-
10-07-en.
3 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, https://
www.icann.org/
4 Internet Engineering Task Force, http://www.ietf.org/ 
5 World Wide Web Consortium, http://www.w3.org/
6 ICANN, 2013. ‘Montevideo Statement On The Future Of Internet 
Cooperation’. https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2013-
10-07-en.
7 H.E. Dilma Rousseff, “Brazil” (statement given at the opening 
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During the speech, Rousseff has also cautioned that 
ICTs can become “a new battleground between States,” 
as “in the absence of the respect for sovereignty, 
there is no basis for the relationship among nations.” 
Therefore, she stated that the problem affects the 
[whole] international community and it requires 
response,” identifying the United Nations as the 
organization that, “must play a leading role in the effort 
to regulate the conduct of States with regard to these 
technologies.”8
 
Searching for a solution, she stressed that Brazil was 
going to “present proposals for the establishment of a 
civilian multilateral framework for the governance and 
use of the Internet and to ensure the effective protection 
of data,” but not only, she stressed the “need to create 
a multilateral mechanism for the worldwide network”9 
capable of ensuring the following principles:
1. “Freedom of expression, privacy of the 
individual and respect for human rights.
2. Open, multilateral and democratic 
governance, carried out with transparency 
by stimulating collective creativity and the 
participation of society, Governments and the 
private sector.
3. Universality that ensures the social and 
human development and the construction of 
inclusive and non-discriminatory societies.
4. Cultural diversity, without the imposition of 
beliefs, customs and values.
5. Neutrality of the network, guided only by 
technical and ethical criteria, rendering 
it inadmissible to restrict it for political, 
commercial, religious or any other 
purposes.”10
Therefore, the idea of NETmundial emerged at the helm 
of this new era in which monitoring and surveillance 
practices were understood as an undeniable reality 
and with various stakeholder groups from around the 
world calling for international cooperation towards 
developing basic principles for the internet.  It was clear 
to many in the internet governance community that 
these answers could not be found in the wide variety 
of internet governance meetings foreseen for the 
diplomatic agenda of 201411 of the UN or other foras. 
of the general debate of the 68th session of the United Nations 
General Assembly). http://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/
gastatements/68/BR_en.pdf
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 “Internet Governance Processes: visualising the playing field” 
http://www.gp-digital.org/publication/internet-governance- 
processes-visualising-the-playing-field/
As such, NETmundial was conceived as a single event 
outside of the logic and dynamic of the traditional UN 
system and organized with the intent to be open to all 
the stakeholder groups and pursue some consensus 
for principle-based improvement of the institutional 
ecosystem of internet governance.
The idea was met with a mix of skepticism, excitement 
and concerns from different stakeholder groups. 
However, Brazil had two significant innovative 
experiences that provided many in the international 
community with the hope, and perhaps even trust, that 
NETmundial could truly serve as an innovative arena 
for collaborative decision-making and principle-setting: 
a) The multistakeholder experience of the Brazilian 
Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br), which is 
composed of representatives from the government, 
corporate sector, civil society and scientific and 
technological community,12 was established by 
presidential decree to propose policies and  directives 
for use and development of the internet in the country, 
but also to recommend standards, promote studies 
and coordinate the allocation of IP addresses and the 
registration of “.br”
b) The process of drafting the Brazilian Civil Rights 
Based Framework for the Internet – Marco Civil: 
This lengthy legislative process sought to establish 
principles, guarantees, rights and obligations for the 
use of the internet in Brazil. Marco Civil was written 
through an open online public consultation process, 
where internet users were allowed to comment on the 
draft, paragraph by paragraph, directly on the website. 
Such an experiment, with its flaws and successes, 
became an achievement in itself and continues to be a 
point of reference in international discussions on using 
online  tools to foster democratic participation. 13
Organizing the Governance 
Structure  
Inspired by the CGI.br model, the secretariat formed 
different committees all composed of representatives 
from the different stakeholder groups each with the 
following attributions:
The High-Level Multistakeholder Committee (HLC) 
was responsible for overseeing the overall strategy 
of the meeting and fostering the involvement of the 
12 “About the CGI.br.” http://cgi.br/pagina/about-the-cgi-br/148
13  Wikipedia contributors, “Brazilian Civil Rights Framework 
for the Internet,” Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_Civil_Rights_Framework_for 
_the_Internet
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international community”14 and was composed of: 
• Twelve Ministerial-level governmental representa-
tives (Argentina; Brazil; France; Ghana; Germany; 
India; Indonesia; South Africa; South Korea; Tuni-
sia; Turkey and United States of America); 
• Twelve non-governmental representatives from 
the different stakeholder groups (three from civil 
society, three from the private sector, three from 
academia and three from the technical community)
• Two representatives from International 
Organizations, appointed by the Secretary General 
of the United Nations (Hamadoun Touré, Secretary 
General from the International Telecommunication 
Union;  Wu Hongbo, Under-Secretary General 
from the United Nations Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs and a representative from the 
European Commission).
• Chair: Brazilian Ministry of Communications, Paulo 
Bernardo
The Executive Multistakeholder Committee (EMC) 
was “responsible for the meeting agenda, the design 
of the meeting format and the invitation of attendees, 
all equally balanced across the global multistakeholder 
community”15 and was composed of: 
• Eight Brazilian representatives appointed by CGI.
br (two from civil society, two from the private 
 sector, two from government, from the Ministry of 
Communications and Ministry of Foreign Affairs; 
one from academia and one from the technical 
community)
• Eight non-governmental international representa-
tives from the different stakeholder groups (two 
from civil society, two from the private sector,  two 
from academia and two from the technical commu-
nity)
• One representative from an International 
 Organization, appointed by the Secretary General 
of the United Nations: again a representative from 
the United Nations Department of Economic and 
 Social Affairs.
• Co-Chairs: Two representatives from the technical 
community, one from CGI.br and another from the 
international tech community, both were already 
also involved in the above groups.
The Logistics and Organizational Committee (LOC) 
was “responsible for guiding all logistical aspects of 
the meeting including: media outreach, international 
communications, website design and management, 
14 “High Level Multistakeholder Committee,” http://NETmundial.br/
hlmc/
15 “Executive Multistakeholder Committee,” http://NETmundial.br/
emc/
awareness raising, meeting venue, traveler funding 
strategy, security, and remote participation”16 and was 
composed of: 
• Two representatives from CGI.br
• One representative from ICANN
• One representative from Ministry of Justice
• One representative from the Ministry of Foreign 
 Affairs
• One representative from the Cabinet of the 
 Presidency
• One representative from 1Net 
• Co-chairs: One representative from CGI.br and 
 another from ICANN, both were already composing 
the groups above.
The Council of Governmental Advisors (CGA) was 
composed of all government representatives who 
 participated and contributed to the meeting.
Finally, the meeting was chaired by the Secretary for IT 
Policy for the Brazilian Ministry of Science, Technology 
and Innovation, Professor Virgílio Fernandes Almeida, 
who is also a representative in the CGI.br. One 
representative from each stakeholder group (civil 
society, academy, technical community and private 
sector) were also appointed by professor Virgílio to co-
chair the meeting with Professor Virgílio. Fadi Chehadé, 
CEO and President from ICANN served as the chosen 
representative from the technical community.
The processes of selecting non-governmental 
international representatives from the different 
stakeholder groups for the High-Level and the 
Executive committee was particularly a challenge. 
While the organizing  committee of the event opted to 
use 1Net17, a newly created forum, as a platform to 
channel names, each stakeholder group had a different 
set of processes for soliciting these nominations from 
within their own  communities and networks. This 
nomination process is particularly difficult, considering 
the challenges of  ensuring both legitimacy and 
representation, challenges that forced organizers 
to answer questions such as: What are the criteria 
for eligibility? What should  the limits be for each 
constituency? Should people be  selected by voting? If 
so, who would be able to vote?  After elected, is there 
a proper accountability procedure? In face of this 
challenges, each stakeholder group came up with their 
own particular process to fulfill their respective seats in 
the multistakeholder committees. 
16 “Logistics and Organizational Committee,” http://NETmundial.br/
loc/
17 1net, http://1net.org/
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Figure 1: Hierarchy of NETmundial Committees
Source: NETmundial website: http://NETmundial.br/hlmc/
The Online Consultations 
Inspired by the participatory experience of Brazil’s 
Marco Civil legislation, in preparation for the event, 
the secretariat organized two phases of online 
consultations. 
In the first phase, contributors from all stakeholder 
groups could submit ideas and references on the 
two main tracks of the meeting: principles and the 
roadmap. The organizers received 180 contributions18 
from 46 different countries, sent by representatives of 
civil society, the private sector, academy and the global 
technical community.
According to the organizers, civil society submitted 31% 
of the contributions for the first phase, while private 
companies were accountable for 23%, government 
institutions for 15%, academic community for 11% and 
the technical community for 8%. 
In terms of contributions received by country in the first 
phase, the United States submitted 31 contributions, 
Brazil sent 16, the United Kingdom and India sent 7 
each, Switzerland, France and Argentina sent 6 and 
Japan and Sudan, 4. Tunisia, Spain, Russia, Nigeria, 
New Zealand, Germany all sent 3 contributions each, 
Yemen, South Korea, South Africa, Senegal, Poland, 
Mexico, Kenya, Italy, Iran, China, Canada, Belgium and 
18 Contributions can be viewed via this .zip file: http://content.
NETmundial.br/contributions-pdf.zip
Australia sent 2 each, Zimbabwe, Uruguay, Ukraine, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Sweden, Portugal, Norway, 
Mauritius, Malta, Malaysia, Kuwait, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Denmark, Republic of Congo, Colombia, Bulgaria and 
Austria were accountable for 1 contribution each. 
All of these contributions served as the basis for the 
elaboration of the NETmundial draft outcome document 
by the EMC.19 Then the EMC forwarded this document 
to the HLC for initial draft approval. However, while this 
draft was circulating internally between the EMC and 
the HLC, the EMC’s version was leaked by Wikileaks. 
A version very similar to this leaked draft was then 
published and submitted for comments in the second 
round of consultations.20 
The commenting tool was customized based on 
“Commentpress,”21 an open source wordpress plugin 
for social texts.  To engage in the commenting, visitors 
did not have to create an account, but needed to provide 
a full name, email address and self-identify with one 
of the stakeholder groups. The goal was to enabled 
visitors to comment and see all the other comments 
submitted paragraph-per-paragraph. So, just as with 
the consultation process for Marco Civil, visitors were 
19 NETmundial. “NETmundial draft outcome document,” last modi-
fied April 14, 2014. http://document.netmundial.br/net-content/
uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-draft-outcome-document_
April_14.pdf
20 NETmundial. “NETmundial Comments,” http://document.NET-
mundial.br/
21 CommentPress. “Welcome to CommentPress,” http://future-
ofthebook.org/commentpress/
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Figure 2: Commenting Platform for the Second Phase  
Source:  http://document.NETmundial.br/ 
able to engage in an online debate and critique on each 
and every paragraph, ultimately turning the document 
into an interactive conversation with a wide variety 
of stakeholders across the globe. This conversation 
could also be reported on and quantified. As a result, 
between April 15th and 21st, the document received 
1370 comments according to Figure 3. 
It is easy to note that the section on principles received 
more then 60% of the comments (832 comments) 
as compared with the section on the roadmap (498 
comments). Commentors self-identified as civil society 
and private sector were the most active contributors in 
both phases of the preparation process. 
Figure 3: Comments Per Stakeholder 
N/A ACADEMIA TECHNICAL COMMUNITY GOVERNMENT PRIVATE SECTOR CIVIL 
 SOCIETY
TOTAL
Introduction 1 3 1 10 2 23 40
Principles 59 55 78 62 221 357 832
Roadmap 20 39 41 75 119 204 498
Total 80 97 120 147 342 584 1370
A complete spreadsheet in open format with all the 
comments per paragraph, by name and stakeholder 
group is available for download in the references 
session of the NETmundial platform.23 
In the section on principles, the most commented 
paragraph was #13 about  an “enabling environment 
for innovation and creativity,” where discussions were 
raised on whether to address or not address Intellectual 
Property Rights in the text.  Additionally, many (83 
individuals) commented on the title, stating that Human 
Rights principles are central for Internet Governance 
principles. Paragraph 15, about the Multistakeholder 
concept had 55 comments and paragraph 5, on  Privacy, 
had 53 comments.24
23 NETmundial. “References,” http://www.NETmundial.org/refer-
ences/
24 NETmundial. “NETmundia Draft Outcome Document Public 
Consultation: final report on comments,” last modified April 22, 
2014, http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NET-
mundialPublicConsultation-FinalReport20140421.pdf.
Group in the Second Phase22 
22 NETmundial Draft Outcome Document Public Consultation: final report on comments with a note that all commentators sectors are self-
declared; there was no validation system to verify the authenticity.
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In the section on the roadmap, paragraph 35, on internet 
surveillance, had the  most comments (32), followed 
by paragraph 32 (29 comments), addressing whether 
there is a need to “continue work pursuing international 
agreements on topics such as jurisdiction and law 
enforcement assistance to promote cybersecurity 
and prevent cybecrime,” or if there should be other 
instruments more appropriate for addressing the topic, 
for some, involving multistakeholder participation.25 
Some comments also delt with issues regarding 
terminology, particularly attempting to address the 
 differences between “cybercrime,” “cyber attacks,” 
“cyber espionage,” “cyber warfare” and so on. 
There were additional topics that provoked 
controversies amongst the commenters; paragraph 
16, regarding whether “consideration should be given 
to the possible need for mechanisms to consider 
emerging topics and issues that are not currently 
being adequately addressed by existing Internet 
governance arrangements” (26 comments); paragraph 
6, on roles and responsibilities of the stakeholders 
(26 comments); paragraph 2, on characteristics for 
the internet governance framework (24 comments); 
paragraph  8, on the selection of representatives 
per stakeholder group at multistakeholder Internet 
governance processes (19 comments); paragraph 27, 
on  the IANA transition and, finally, paragraph 7, on 
Enhanced Cooperation (19 comments).26 
The Plenary Sessions
Plenary session of NETmundial started with a 
remarkable moment for digital rights in Brazil: the 
sanction of Marco Civil by President Rousseff. After 
more then 4 years of debate, the text had just been 
approved a day before in the National Senate. This 
historical event fueled the themes of the president’s 
an opening speech, where she reiterated the themes 
from her statement at the UNGA, and reaffirmed that 
surveillance activities and intrusive online acts “are 
not  acceptable,  were  not  acceptable  in  the  past 
and remain unacceptable today, in that they are an 
affront against the very  nature  of  the  Internet  as  a 
democratic,  free,  and  pluralistic platform.” Finally, she 
called for a “change in the current state of affairs and 
for an ongoing consistent strengthening (…) efforts to 
ultimately protect basic human rights.” 
Participants 
According to the organizers, the event had 1229 
participants from 97 countries. From that number, 
38.5% were government representatives, 18.1% were 
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
participants self-identified as civil society, 14.4% as 
private sector, 12.4% as technical community, 9.8% as 
academia and 6.8% from other.27 
It is important to note that the organizers of the event 
held a period of “expression of interest” in which 
potential attendees were supposed to register on 
the platform. As such, the NETmundial Executive 
Secretariat was able to collect information regarding 
the expected meeting attendance and potentially foster 
more participation from certain stakeholder groups 
or regions in order to reach a better overall balance 
in representation. For that same reason, at least until 
the final arrangements, attendance of government 
representatives was limited to 2 representatives from 
each delegation, or 3, in the case of a nation bringing a 
representative at the Ministerial Level. 
With 221 participants, of course, Brazil was the biggest 
delegation, followed by the USA, 110 participants, 
and both Argentina and France had 30 participants. 
Belgium, Germany, Russia, Switzerland and India were 
the next largest delegations, all between 15 and 21 
participants. In terms of representation per region, 378 
of the participants were from Latin America, 200 from 
Europe, 166 from North America, 133 from Africa, 128 
from Asia and 33 from Oceania.28 
In order to account for those unable to travel to Brazil, 
the Logistics and Organizational Committee issued 
a call for hubs to convene remote participatory, local 
meetings to simultaneously watch and intervene in 
the plenary of NETmundial. Proposals were analyzed 
by the LOC according to “geographical coverage, 
adequacy of infrastructure, personnel provision and 
necessary costs”. In total there were 33 official hubs, 
spread over 30 cities in 23 countries, all with real 
time interaction with the event. The meeting was also 
broadcast online for those willing to watch. Those web 
channels were available in English, Spanish, French, 
Chinese, Russian, Arabic and Portuguese, while live 
scribing was available in English.
27 Presentation from Prof Virgilio Almeida at ICANN, London on 
June, 23, 2014.
28 Presentation from Prof Virgilio Almeida at ICANN, London on 
June, 23, 2014
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Rules of Engagement
Unlike the usual diplomatic meeting, NETmundial had 
an innovative dynamic for interaction with the floor in 
the plenary sessions. Every participant, government 
representatives included, had to queue for the 
 microphone according to their respective stakeholder 
group. There was one microphone per group: one for 
civil society, one for government, one for business and 
another for the academic and technical community. 
Interventions would rotate, one per stakeholder group 
for a maximum two minute intervention, timing that was 
then reduced to 1:30.
In addition to the interventions from participants in Brazil, 
the right to intervene would also rotate for a two minute 
interaction to one of the remote participation hubs that 
was capable of making real time video communications 
(bidirectional hubs) and for additional interventions 
from the unidirectional hubs, capable only of voice 
interaction. Individuals not participating through hubs 
were also able to make voice interventions, competing 
with the slot of unidirectional hubs. Therefore, one full 
round of interactions was composed of six slots, four 
for the microphones in São Paulo and two for remote 
participation. 
After the opening ceremony and welcome remarks, 
the meeting agenda was divided into two kinds of 
working sessions: one on principles and another on the 
roadmap, which were respectively interspersed and 
structured according to the draft outcome document. 
This structure allowed for each of the two sessions 
to convene twice, once per day, and to receive inputs 
directed to a particular part of the draft outcome 
document.   
Each working session started with a briefing of the Draft 
Outcome Document, which was under consultation in 
the plenary along with a short analysis of the comments 
that were received on the online platform. Unfortunately, 
due to time constraints, organizers were only able to 
provide a report on the statistics of the most commented 
parts of the second phase, with no substantial report 
summarizing or analyzing the  comments’ arguments.29 
Thus, the chairs of each session provided this analysis 
and then receive inputs from the participants, according 
to the rules of interaction in the floor. All the transcripts 
of the interventions were also made available online.
Drafting Committees
Every working session in the plenary had two chairs30, 
one permanent and one rotating, as well as five advisers. 
Two of the five advisers for each working session were 
29 NETmundial. “Final report on comments of the Draft Outcome 
Document is available,” http://NETmundial.br/blog/2014/04/22/
final-report-on-comments-of-the-draft-outcome-document-is-
available/
30 http://netmundial.br/agenda/
Figure 4: Stage Layout for the Plenary Sessions
Source:  NETmundial Executive Secretariat
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previously selected – occasionally with some level of 
controversy - by their respective stakeholder groups 
to compose the EMC. While the other three advisors 
in each session were one representative from the UN 
system and two government representatives, one of 
them was always from the Brazilian government. The 
criteria of selection for the chairs was unclear: Two of 
them were previously selected by their constituencies 
as representatives from academia for the HLC and 
the EMC, while the other three chairs were not picked 
from any committee previously established. All the 
stakeholder groups were represented in the working 
sessions for the roadmap, while a representative from 
academia was missing in the working sessions on 
principles.
Chairs and advisors formed the so-called drafting 
committees, which were meant to convene by the end 
of each respective working session for re-drafting a 
new version of the corresponding part of the text that 
was debated in plenary. Drafting sessions were open 
to all participants, but theoretically only chairs and 
advisors would be allowed to speak. Practically, that 
was not the case. Several observers started to interact 
with the chairs and advisors of the drafting committee, 
a process that might be natural in other diplomatic 
environments. However, in that particular context, 
it threatened the goal for balanced representation 
during discussions about the document. This perfectly 
exemplifies the complex and delicate challenges that 
organizers face   when working towards an open, 
participative and inclusive multistakeholder process 
from beginning to end. 
The impacts that such changes in the meeting 
dynamics had on the content of the final statement of 
NETmundial are to be evaluated in the next chapters of 
this book. Nevertheless, in terms of process, it is fair to 
say that such a move could spoil the whole process, as 
multistakeholderism can only work if there is an equal 
balance in discussions and decision making between 
stakeholder groups. If the observers in the room ended 
up having more power and influence over the final 
document than the discussions and suggestions made 
throughout the plenary and online consultation process, 
than the system could be considered faulty. A small 
technical problem also contributed to these issues, as 
some of the transcripts from the other sessions were 
not available for the advisors and chairs during the 
drafting negotiation. 
Adoption of the NETmundial 
Multistakeholder Statement
Once the drafting session was over the final text 
was introduced for consideration by the High Level 
Committee in the same room. This session was open 
for observers as well. However, unlike the previous 
session, the only speakers were the representatives of 
the committee.
There was some dissent, particularly focusing on the 
fact that the final version of the draft did not address 
net neutrality nor have a clear roadmap for the future 
evolution of the internet ecosystem. Other stakeholders 
also expressed hesitation about the aspects of the 
IANA transition and some questioned the validity of 
a multistakeholder approach. Nevertheless, the room 
was also feeling the pressure to end such a dedicated, 
innovative and even brilliant process on good and 
celebratory terms. Therefore, the HLC decided that it 
was time to take  the text to the plenary session to be 
approved. 
Back in the plenary, the chair of the meeting quoted 
the process as “a  milestone  in  the  history  of internet 
 governance” and presented the document as some-
thing that “cannot  be  construed  as  legally  binding. It  is 
a broad  convergence  of  ideas,  perceptions, sugges-
tions, and  visions coming from different stakeholders 
in different parts of the world.”31 Then he proposed that 
the document should be called,  the “NETmundial Multi-
stakeholder Statement and  approved by acclamation.” 
The document was approved with standing ovation by 
the plenary. 
Concerns about the process and the final documents 
were raised by government representatives from 
Russia, India, Cuba and by a joint statement from some 
civil society representatives. Each of these statements 
raised some issues with the content of the document 
and questioned the final drafting process and the lack 
of clarity on how the comments were incorporated.32
Conclusions
NETmundial process was remarkable in that it served 
as an experimental model, moving towards an open, 
transparent and participative multistakeholder internet 
governance process. However, it is just a first step in 
the long road progressing towards  the development of 
truly democratic and inclusive  decision making internet 
31 NETmundial. “References,” http://www.NETmundial.org/refer-
ences/
32 Transcriptions of sessions: NETmundial Closing Session: http://
www.NETmundial.org/references/
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governance bodies. As such, we can highlight many 
lessons learned and raise important questions to be 
addressed for improvement:
Favorable aspects
• The international political context facilitated the 
development of such an inclusive and open 
event due to the  recent revelations of pervasive 
monitoring and surveillance and the accompanying 
erosion of  trust by internet users around the world;
• Previous experiences with multistakeholder 
processes and online open consultations 
internationally and in Brazil helped to pave the way; 
• Legitimacy was partially created through 
multistakeholder committees with representatives 
appointed by each stakeholder group through their 
own processes;
• Usage of technology to prepare and comment 
on a reference document and to ensure remote 
participation from different parts of the globe was 
vital for wider engagement;
• There were great efforts to make each level of the 
preparation process open and transparent;
• There was a great deal of innovation in processes 
and procedures to improve multistakeholder 
mechanisms;
• Organizers constantly measured and monitored 
the preparation process in order to fix any issues 
with inclusion and transparency;
• NETmundial served to demonstrate the potential 
and viability of a multistakeholder approach for 
internet governance. However, the process and 
methods for balancing power relations still need 
improvement;
• The extensive documentation of each of the stages 
makes it easier to find points for improvement and 
to replicate the experience.
Unresolved questions about procedures  
• How do we work to empirically categorize and 
quantify the level of openness, inclusion and 
participation in a meeting? To what degree is 
democracy quantifiable? 
• How do we verify that the contributions have been 
taken into account and that innovative processes 
are not just a placebo for participation?
• How do we seek to improve methods for 
multistakeholder decision making procedures? To 
what degree should full consensus be needed to 
 approve a text? 
• What can be the impact of a text that has been 
approved by acclamation?
• How do we adapt the format and organizational 
innovations from NETmundial to other internet 
governance foras?
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A Perspective from the                               
Technical Community
Markus Kummer
This paper draws on an essay I wrote for a publication 
published as an input into NETmundial1 as well as a 
contribution ISOC submitted to the IGF preparatory 
process.2 It reflects a presentation I gave on the 
“NETmundial effect.”3  The paper conveys my personal 
opinions and should not be interpreted as representing 
the official position of the Internet Society. It is written 
from the prspective of someone who was intimately 
involved in the process – first representing a government 
during the World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS), then working for the United Nations, first 
as head of the Secretariat of the Working Group on 
Internet Governance (WGIG) and subsequently the 
Internet Governance Forum (IGF), and lastly, for a non-
governmental organization, the Internet Society. I was 
also one of the Co-Chairs of NETmundial.
The year 2014 was a crucial one for internet gover-
nance. The international community will have to reflect 
on what kind of internet we want and how we want to 
answer many open questions related to its governance. 
The disclosures last year of pervasive government 
 surveillance programmes marked a seismic shift in 
the IG landscape, and the large-scale nature of these 
 programmes made internet users realize that the 
chain of trust—essential to the good functioning of the 
 Internet—had been broken. This realization created a 
sense of urgency to review current IG arrangements 
and to  rebuild users’ trust in the internet, its function, 
and how it fits into society. This was the underlying 
theme at the 2013 IGF meeting, as the general agree-
ment was that the IGF was the ideal place to pursue 
these discussions and that the multistakeholder for-
mat was the only way forward. Reviewing current IG 
arrangements and rebuilding user trust was also the 
1 “Stakes are High: Essays on Brazil and the Future of the 
Global Internet.” Produced by Internet Policy Observatory. The 
 Annenberg School of Comunications at University of Pennsyl-
vania. http://globalnetpolicy.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/
StakesAreHigh_BrazilNETmundial_final.pdf
2 Internet Government Forum. “IGF 2014 – Producing Tangible 
Outcomes on Best Practices.” http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/
images/2014/IGF2014/IGF-2014Request-for-Public-Input.v3.pdf
3 Annenberg-Oxford Media Policy Summer Institue.
underlying theme of NETmundial, which in turn en-
dorsed the multistakeholder approach and confirmed 
the importance and relevance of the IGF.
In this regard, NETmundial was a watershed 
moment. Undoubtedly a success, NETmundial was a 
celebration of the multistakeholder model, showcasing 
stakeholders’ ability to collaborate and move towards 
a common understanding on critical issues. Perhaps 
the most encouraging aspect of NETmundial was that 
governments accepted that other stakeholders had as 
much to say as they did and that their voice counted as 
much as the voices of governments.
The meeting, however, did not fall from the sky. 
NETmundial built upon many years of internet 
governance history. In order to fully understand 
its true impact, it is worth looking back on how the 
multistakeholder discourse evolved.
The Evolution of a Concept 
and a Term – “Multistakeholder 
Cooperation” 
When the concept of holding a World Summit on the 
Information Society (WSIS) emerged, the framework 
was based on tradional UN summits. The United 
Nations General Assembly (GA) set the parameters 
for the World Summit of the Information Society 
(WSIS) in 2002. By adopting Resolution 56/183,  the 
GA designed the Summit as an intergovernmental 
process, but at the same time invited “non-
governmental organizations, civil society and the 
private sector to contribute to, and actively participate 
in the intergovernmental preparatory process of 
the Summit and the Summit itself.”4 This invitation, 
extended to non-governmental statekholders, created 
expectations that the intergovernmental process was 
not equipped to meet. The WSIS I preparations in 
4 United Nations General Assembly. 2012. Resolution adopted by 
the General Assembly. http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/
resolutions/56_183_unga_2002.pdf
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2002 and 2003 were contentious, as many developing 
countries were suspicious of accepting new actors. 
Negotiations, to a large extent, focused on procedural 
rules and on how governments would interact with 
nongovernmental participants. By and large, the 
process was government-driven. In decisive moments, 
the nongovernmental participants were sent out of the 
negotiations. I chaired some of the negotiating groups 
on behalf of the host country government – Switzerland 
– and, at the request of some member states, had to 
comply with the rules of procedure, sending out all 
participants who did not belong to a governmental 
delegation. It was evident then that nongovernmental 
actors brought more expertise to the negotiating table 
than the diplomats who were negotiating the texts. The 
diplomats, however, who were very skilled at their own 
game, found it easier to negotiate and compromise 
behind closed doors, where they reached a satisfactory 
compromise on language relating to human rights and 
designed a process to deal with internet governance.
By asking the Secretary General of the United Nations 
to set up a Working Group on Internet Governance 
(WGIG), WSIS changed the dynamics of the process. 
The WGIG terms of reference called for a process that 
involved all stakeholders without any reference to any 
intergovernmental process. WGIG worked according 
to Chatham House Rules, and all its members partici-
pated as equals, in their individual capacity. All their 
meetings were preceded by consultations open to all 
interested stakeholders, which, like WGIG itself, had 
no rules of procedure or any particular protocol. Partici-
pants were able to speak on a “first come, first served” 
basis in a broad-based and transparent process that 
allowed community input into the WGIG deliberations. 
This was in stark contrast to the WSIS procedures, 
which followed traditional intergovernmental protocol, 
with governments speaking first and all the other actors 
at the end. WGIG also allowed the technical commu-
nity to manifest itself – usually in the form of nonprofit 
organizations responsible for the day-to-day running 
and management of the internet. 
WGIG was a milestone for the UN. It set new standards 
for open and inclusive multistakeholder cooperation 
with a minimum of procedure and formalities and, from 
2005 onwards, set the benchmark for openness and 
inclusiveness. WGIG influenced WSIS II in Tunis in 
2005 in terms of procedure and substance: 
• In terms of procedure, gone were the negotiations 
behind closed doors. While the process remained 
essentially intergovernmental, other stakeholders, 
in particular those representing the technical 
community, were regularly asked to comment and 
provide a reality check for the intergovernmental 
negotiations. They were not, however, entitled to 
ask for the floor; they were only able to speak when 
invited by the Chair to provide their comments.
• In terms of substance, the WGIG report provided 
the main input into the Tunis negotiations. By and 
large, WSIS II endorsed the WGIG Report, its 
working definition of internet governance, its list 
of issues, and its assessment that “the existing ar-
rangements for Internet governance have worked 
effectively.”5 Above all, WSIS II picked up the pro-
posal by WGIG to set up a “new forum for policy 
dialogue” – the Internet Governance Forum (IGF).
The IGF built on the format of the WGIG’s open 
consultations, providing a platform for all stakeholders 
to take part on equal footing. Perhaps its biggest 
achievement was that it was able to create a sense 
of community, a place where all participants felt 
comfortable discussing delicate issues. 
WGIG also introduced the term “multistakeholder,” 
which had been rarely heard or used in the context 
of the internet before. In the discussions on internet 
governance during the first phase of WSIS, the term 
typically used to describe the existing arrangement was 
“private sector leadership,” in line with the language 
used in the setting up of the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). The WGIG 
then consolidated the use of the term “multistakeholder,” 
and the WGIG Report itself uses it eleven times, 
identifying the need for a “global multi-stakeholder 
forum to address Internet-related public policy issues.” 
Finally, it was via WGIG that the term found its way into 
the outcome document of WSIS II – the Tunis Agenda 
for the Information Society. 
Building on the WGIG model, the IGF created a plat-
form for policy dialogue in which all stakeholders took 
part on equal footing. The Secretary General appointed 
an Advisory Group consisting of all stakeholders, also 
taking into account the newly identified stakeholder 
group of the “academic and technical communities.” 
The Advisory Group soon became known in popular 
parlance as Multistakeholder Advisory Group, or by its 
acronym MAG. From February 2008 onwards, all UN 
press releases officialized the name and its acronym.
By 2008, the concept of multistakeholder cooperation 
was well established in IG circles and had spread 
to Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs). From 
the OECD Ministerial Meeting on the Future of the 
5 Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, Para 55 (2005). http://
www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html
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Internet Economy in Seoul6 to the Council of Europe 
Ministerial Conference in Reykjavik in 20097 to the 
2011 G8 Deauville Declaration—all supported the 
“multistakeholder model for Internet governance.”8 
The OECD in 2011 also adopted Principles for 
Internet Policy Making with the stated objective of 
establishing a “framework to ensure the continued and 
innovative growth of an open Internet economy through 
multistakeholder co-operation.” 9 In 2013, the term was 
also picked up by the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) in its World Telecommunication/ICT 
Policy Forum (WTPF), where member states were 
asked to consider a draft opinion on “Supporting 
Multistakeholderism in Internet Governance.” 
While there is no generally accepted definition of its 
meaning, the term “multistakeholder” was seen as a 
key ingredient of the internet model by this time. The 
US government, when announcing its intention to 
transition its stewardship of the IANA functions, elevated 
“supporting and enhancing the multistakeholder 
model” to one of the four principles that should guide 
the process.10
NETmundial was able to build on the ground laid by 
WGIG, WSIS and the IGF. The IGF created the spirit 
of cooperation among stakeholders that paved the way 
for taking things a step further and moving towards 
a rough consensus on principles to advance internet 
governance. 
Moving Toward             
“Rough Consensus”
NETmundial’s methodology was part of its success. 
Compared to traditional intergovernmental cooperation, 
which is based on consensus and equal treatment of all 
participants, any contribution will be taken on board, 
regardless of its quality or relevance, and the agreement 
of all participating governments is needed to finalize a 
text. This leads to what is known in diplomatic jargon 
as a “Christmas tree approach,” because the tree gets 
loaded with decorations as every delegate adds his 
or her pet subject to the text. The consensus principle 
6 OECD Ministerial Meeting on the Future of the Internet Econo-
my, 17-18 June 2008, Seoul.
7 1st Council of Europe Conference of Ministers responsible 
for Media and New Communication Services, Reykjavik, 29 
May 2009. MCM(2009)011.
8 G8 Summit of Deauville – 26-27 May 2011.
9 “OECD High Level Meeting - The Internet Economy: Generating 
Innovation and Growth.” 
Paris, 28-29 June 2011, http://www.oecd.org/internet/innovation/
10 NTIA Office of Public Affairs, “NTIA Announces Intent to Transi-
tion Key Internet Domain Name Functions,” NTIA Press Release 
(March 14, 2014). http://www.ntia.doc.gov/press-release/2014/
ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-internet-domain-name-
functions
allows an opinionated and skillful delegate to hold the 
rest of the international community hostage.
NETmundial chose the opposite approach. The São 
Paulo meeting was different from intergovernmental 
meetings in which governments usually agree on 
the smallest common denominator and one or two 
governments can block progress.The draft text that 
was submitted to the meeting reflected the input from 
an open multistakeholder process. The team that put 
together the draft  focused on commonalities and 
ignored outliers. In the end, not everybody agreed with 
everything, but most participants could live with what 
was contained in the outcome document. The final 
outcome document – the NETmundial Multistakeholder 
Statement – was accepted as being “good enough” by 
most participants. It was noteworthy that only three 
governments disasscociated themselves from the 
statement, mainly because they did not find their input 
represented in the text and/or because they found 
the process that led to its adoption not sufficiently 
transparent and lacking appropriate rules of procedure. 
Clearly, there was no consensus in the classical in-
tergovernmental sense – it was more like the “rough 
consensus” the internet community is familiar with, pio-
neered by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). 
The notion of “rough consensus” was developed by the 
Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF). It is part of its 
cyberlibertarian vision of the world, best embodied in 
David D. Clark’s famous words, “We reject: kings, pres-
idents and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and 
running code.”11  The concept of “rough consensus” 
is central to the IETF’s mission. The way to achieve 
“rough consensus” is described by the IETF as follows: 
Working groups make decisions through a 
‘rough consensus’ process. IETF consensus 
does not require that all participants agree, 
although this is, of course, preferred. In gen-
eral, the dominant view of the working group 
shall prevail. (However, “dominance” is not to 
be determined on the basis of volume or per-
sistence, but rather a more general sense of 
agreement). Consensus can be determined by 
a show of hands, humming, or any other means 
on which the WG agrees (by rough consensus, 
of course). Note that 51% of the working group 
does not qualify as “rough consensus” and 99% 
is better than rough.12 
This is in line with what happened at NETmundial. 
11 In a presentation given at the 24th meeting of the Internet Enigi-
neering Task Force (IETF).
12 IETF. “IETF Working Group Guidelines and Procedures,” Sep-
tember 1998, https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2418.txt,
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NETmundial as an inspiration 
for strengthening the IGF
NETmundial was not able to provide answers to all open 
questions and concerns, but it was an important step 
forward. The meeting was a signal that the community 
is seeking to fulfill its commitment toward a better 
understanding of the different dimensions of internet 
governance, with its most important outcome being an 
endorsement the multistakeholder model of internet 
governance, and produced an outcome based on the 
aforementioned  “rough consensus.” The NETmundial 
Multistakeholder Statement identified solid principles 
and values that, while not new, confirm the value of 
the open, interoperable internet as a “global resource 
which should be managed in the public interest.”13 The 
value of these principles lies in the fact that they were 
approved by a large multistakeholder gathering.
In the second section, “The Roadmap for the Future 
Evolution of Internet Governance,” NETmundial 
reaffirms the very nature of the IG framework as “a 
distributed and coordinated ecosystem  involving 
various organizations and fora.” It builds on WSIS and 
the Tunis Agenda and notes that “this model should 
be further strengthened, improved and evolved.” 
In Section II, on “Issues dealing with institutional 
improvements” the NETmundial Multistakeholder 
Statement, while leaving open the question whether 
there is a need for any new institution or mechanism,14 
leaves no doubt that it considers the IGF part of the 
solution. It pays considerable attention to the IGF 
and identifies “a need for a strengthened Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF) and urges implementation 
of the recommendations by the UN CSTD15 working 
group on IGF improvements by the end of 2015. 
The main thrust of the recommendations calls for 
outcomes, intersessional acitivities and more financial 
and structural stability, concluding that “a strengthened 
IGF could better serve as a platform for discussing 
both long standing and emerging issues with a view 
to contributing to the identification of possible ways to 
address them.” 16
13  Internet Governance Principles, preamble.
14  “Consideration should be given to the possible need for 
mechanisms to consider emerging topics and issues that are 
not currently being adequately addressed by existing Internet 
governance arrangements”, NETmundial Multistakeholder 
Statement, “Roadmap”, II.2.
15 The Commission on Science and Technology for Development 
(CSTD) is a subsidiary body of the United Nations Economic 
and Social Council (ECOSOC). The Commission has been 
mandated by ECOSOC to serve as the focal point in the UN 
system-wide follow-up to the outcomes of the World Summit on 
the information Society (WSIS).
16 “Roadmap”, II. 3
In Section IV, the NETmundial Multistakeholder 
Statement identified further points for discussion and 
recommended that net neutrality – one of the most 
controversial issues dealt with at NETmundial – should 
“be addressed at forums such as the next IGF.”
Section V’s “Way Forward” also includes reference to 
the IGF, noting that it is expected “that the NETmundial 
findings and outcomes will feed into other processes 
and forums, such as the post 2015 development 
agenda process, WSIS+10, IGF, and all internet 
governance discussions held in different organizations 
and bodies at all levels.” As a landmark meeting 
in 2014, NETmundial’s decision to identify the IGF 
as an appropriate forum to further discuss internet 
governance policy issues such as net neutrality 
reaffirms the relevance of the IGF. 
In a kind of symbiosis, NETmundial built on the 
groundwork laid by the IGF, and is now revealing a path 
forward for the IGF by preparing it to take the next steps 
towards convergence and the resolution of several 
complex issues. The NETmundial Multistakeholder 
Statement wording, pointing to outcomes and 
intersessional work, provides a solid foundation on 
which to build. 
The IETF as a Role Model for 
the IGF to Produce Policy 
Outputs 
During the planning process for this year’s IGF 
meeting, the Internet Society suggested adopting a 
policy development process inspired by the IETF’s 
approach to the development of internet protocols and 
informational documents. Key to the IETF methodology 
is the principle of voluntary adoption and “rough 
consensus.” IETF standards are not mandatory; the 
market and internet users eventually decide on their 
adoption.  
No model will translate entirely, but the IETF could 
serve as an example for how the IGF might evolve, 
especially with respect to the development of Internet 
protocols and informational documents. 
The IETF is the internet’s premier standards-developing 
organization and shares some characteristics with the 
IGF insofar as it is not a membership organization 
and is open to all interested participants. In “The Tao 
of IETF: A Novice’s Guide to the Internet Engineering 
Task Force,” it states that “The IETF is really about its 
participants. Because the IETF welcomes all interested 
individuals, IETF participants come from all over the 
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world and from many different parts of the Internet 
industry.”17  The same document also explains that 
“The IETF makes voluntary standards that are often 
adopted by Internet users, but it does not control, or 
even patrol, the Internet.”
New ideas are typically first tested in a Bird of a 
Feather (BoF) session. Derived from the adage ‘birds 
of a feather flock together’, the IETF process has those 
proposing new ideas to create working groups and, 
once a consensus is reached, move forward. These 
key concepts – or parts thereof - could be adapted and 
transferred to the IGF in order to produce non-binding 
policy outcomes. The advantage of the IETF model is 
that it provides options to the community in terms of 
how they address an issue with a variety of documents, 
ranging from Informational to Experimental and Best 
Current Practice (BCP). The IGF community could 
explore these various choices and, through trial and 
error, find the most suitable policy approach.
The concept of documentation related to best practices 
will be tried out in the forthcoming Istanbul meeting 
in an attempt to provide tangible outputs. In the past, 
the IGF tried to promote best practice sessions and 
organize Best Practice Forums. Unfortunately, due to 
lack of resources, these sessions were not documented 
sufficiently. Internet users have many questions. While 
there may be answers, they may not be well understood 
or widely known, and they need to be documented. The 
IGF can be a place to publicize possible solutions to 
problems addressed in the IGF context. 
Istanbul could be the starting point for developing 
intersessional work on substantive issues, building on 
the work of existing Dynamic Coalitions and possibly 
creating new ones. The latter would mostly work 
online, and meet physically during the IGF preparatory 
meetings as well as the annual IGF. Ultimately, the 
IGF would have to develop a process that allows for 
adoption of documents by rough consensus, which 
would not be binding, but open to voluntary recognition 
and adoption by all stakeholders, and the meeting 
structure would need to be adapted accordingly and 
introduce Bird of Feather meetings (BoFs), revived 
Best Practice Forums and provide a framework for 
Dynamic Coalitions. 
The IGF mandate is sufficiently flexible to allow for this 
kind of approach to evolve over the years. The Istanbul 
meeting should be the starting point for such an evo-
lution, which would make the IGF more relevant and 
encourage multidisciplinary, collaborative, global, and 
17 IETF. “The Tao of IETF.” Created 2 November 2012. http://www.
ietf.org/tao.html
regional policy development on pertinent issues and 
the sharing of best current practices, building on volun-
tary principles and standards for interoperable global 
policy solutions.  
Conclusion
The IGF has proved its worth as a “go-to place” where 
the community shares experiences and exchanges in-
formation, and is well-positioned to build on the output 
from NETmundial and lay the roadmap for rebuilding 
online trust. Freed from the constraints of negotiations 
and decision-making, it is the appropriate forum for 
unencumbered and frank discussion of controversial 
issues. 
While the Tunis Agenda18 allowed for the possibility of 
making recommendations, the first years of the IGF’s 
existence would have been too fragile to allow for a 
robust discussion on consensus-building. As the IGF 
evolved, the quality of the dialogue progressively 
matured, and in Bali, the IGF was ready to move 
discussions towards convergence. The agenda for the 
2013 meeting was guided by the attempt to make the 
IGF more responsive to the broader policy discourse 
defining the internet governance space, and now is the 
time to move the IGF toward more tangible outcomes, 
as recommended by NETmundial and the CSTD 
Working Group on Improvements to the IGF.19 
The 2014 IGF Istanbul meeting should be the starting 
point for such an evolution. The IGF is best placed to 
take these discussions forward. It provides protection, 
legitimacy, and credibility to the multistakeholder 
model, since it is the only truly open and inclusive 
multistakeholder platform under the UN umbrella. It 
has ‘soft power’, which relies to a large extent on the 
legitimacy and authority of the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations as the convenor of the IGF.
There is also a sense of urgency: the IGF needs to 
demonstrate that it is able to renew itself and adapt 
to a changing internet governance landscape. The 
Istanbul meeting is, therefore, an opportunity the IGF 
cannot afford to miss. The meeting needs to provide 
the basis for strengthening the IGF and taking the 
discussion from NETmundial forward on the long 
path toward strengthening international consensus on 
multistakeholder internet governance and creating a 
new chain of trust in the internet itself.
18 “Identify emerging issues, bring them to the attention of the 
relevant bodies and the general public, and, where appropriate, 
make recommendations.” Tunis Agenda, Para 72 (g).
19 United Nations General Assembly. 2012. Report of the Working 
Group on Improvements to the Internet Governance Forum. 
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/a67d65_
en.pdf 
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A Perspective from the Private Sector: 
 Ensuring that Forum Follows Function
Vint Cerf, Patrick Ryan, Max Senges, Richard Whitt
In this chapter we share our perspectives as private 
sector stakeholders and participants in the development 
of the IGF over the last 10 years. We begin by stressing 
the role private enterprise has and wants to play in 
the internet’s development. Notwithstanding the sine 
qua non condition of the private sector providing 
the internet’s infrastructure and services, we lay out 
our argument for IG as a shared responsibility of 
governments, civil society and the private sector. In 
the second half of the chapter we list why participation 
at the IGF is beneficial for companies, followed by an 
analysis of opportunities to strengthen the IGF as an 
institution and enhance its impact in the short term. 
We then close our chapter with a proposal meant to 
improve the long-term utility and effectiveness of the 
IGF by developing its three core functions: (1) identify 
emergent and continuously evolving issues; (2) frame 
them as modular and solvable challenges; and (3) 
document, track and archive the developing solutions.
By all measures, the private sector cares a great 
deal about internet governance, seeking both 
entrepreneurial opportunities and the chance to 
contribute to future internet developments. One of 
the ways that Google looks at the size of the internet 
is through the number of unique World Wide Web 
uniform resource locators (URLs). In 2008, the Web 
Search Team published what was (then) a significant 
milestone: the indexing of 1 trillion unique URLs.1 
Amazingly, since that time, the number of unique URLs 
has grown to 60 trillion.2 In addition to the organic 
growth of the internet among the existing users, another 
five billion people worldwide have yet to come online.3 
 Assuming modest growth of content to match users, 
there will be significantly more than 200 trillion unique 
1 Jesse Alpert & Nissan Hajaj, “We knew the web was big,” Of-
ficial Google Blog, Jul 25, 2008 available at http://goo.gl/RtmG
2 Google does not regularly publish these statistics, however, 
we consulted with the Web Search Team and 60 Trillion is the 
estimate as of this writing.
3 David P. Reed, Jennifer Haroon, and Patrick S. Ryan, “Tech-
nologies and Policies to Connect the Next Five Billion,” January 
13, 2014. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, Vol. 29, 2014, 
(forthcoming), available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2378684.
URLs by 2020.  Of course, URLs are not demonstrative 
of the value of the internet, but it is one metric of 
growth. Where is the fuel for this growth?  Although the 
origins of the internet may be found in the university 
and government sectors, the internet is now financed 
almost entirely by the private sector.
While this growth takes place, a tussle is afoot to 
control abuse of the internet’s current and potential 
infrastructure and facilities. As governments and civil 
society rightfully strive to ensure privacy, security and 
safety for internet users, at the same time governments 
in all corners of the world are making it difficult for 
entrepreneurs to continue to provide globally consistent 
platforms and experiences for users. In Europe, for 
example, the European Court of Justice’s ruling created 
a new right of action for internet users to request that 
user content be removed from search engine indices.4 
In Turkey, the host country for this year’s Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF), a fiery battle about online 
freedom of expression has been taking place. A study 
from Dalberg Consulting illustrates the tension well. 
The popular Turkish website Ekşi Sözlük estimates 
that the cost of compliance with local rules regarding 
website content equals 15 percent of total operating 
revenue, which includes the costs of engaging in more 
than 250 lawsuits in 14 years.5 The website’s founder, 
Sedat Kapanoğlu, warns that “a business of Twitter or 
Facebook’s size and scale could never happen in Turkey 
until the legal system is changed to be more conducive 
to these types of businesses.”6 As another example, 
the Thai website operator of 212cafe.com closed the 
business and exited the market because of locally 
imposed criminal sanctions, even though his website 
was merely a platform for user-moderated discussion.7 
4 See David Drummond, “Searching for the right balance,” Official 
Google Blog, Jul. 11, 2014, available at http://goo.gl/0EuHUc
5 Dalberg Consulting, “Open for Business? The Economic Impact 
of Internet Openness,” Report, March 2014, at p. 37, available 
at http://goo.gl/hGgY9s 
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid., at p. 5.
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These are just a few examples of ongoing internet 
governance challenges and the impact that they have 
on business. It is crucial that the private sector joins 
forces with other internet stakeholders to level the 
global governance playing field. In this chapter, we 
argue that all stakeholders should jointly design and 
implement a governance ecosystem that allows all 
actors to contribute to internet growth while protecting 
individual rights and varied cultural expectations. 
No single stakeholder should drive the future of the 
internet; instead, interdependent cooperation is key.
The Internet Governance Forum has been in operation 
since 2006 and has met annually at the invitation of a 
host country. A multi-stakeholder advisory group (MAG), 
led by a chairman appointed by the UN Department 
for Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA), organizes 
the annual meeting, deciding among proposed topics 
which will be on the agenda. A variety of formats allow 
issues to be articulated and various perspectives to be 
shared.  In the following sections, we will provide an 
overview of the value of the IGF, and in the second 
half, we will look at its functionality and propose areas 
for improvement.
Looking at the Internet and 
its Governance Holistically
The internet is a “network of networks,” along 
with the hosts and the devices on the “edge” that 
interconnect with each other through the network. 
It is an organic arrangement of computers and 
underlying communications platforms bound by 
common protocols and standards. This arrangement 
is transnational in scope and thus not linked to any 
particular physical location or nationality. From the end 
user’s perspective, the resulting network is simple, 
general, and adaptable. However, four fundamental 
architectural components of the internet—end-to-end 
intelligence, layered structure, agnostic protocols, and 
voluntary interconnection—interact in highly complex 
and dynamic ways. In particular, the different internet 
layers (physical networks, software protocols, user 
applications, and content/services) exist independent of 
each other, yet rely on carefully calibrated interactions. 
Because the internet as a network is unaware of the 
contents of any particular packet, it is largely insensitive 
to applications that use its packet delivery capacity for 
end-to-end communication. The consequence is that 
new applications can be developed without changing 
the internet’s underlying communication services.8 
8 See, e.g. Richard S. Whitt, “A Deference to Protocol: Fashioning 
a Three-Dimensional Public Policy Framework for the Internet 
Age,” 31 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 689, 
754-56 (2013) (describing the fundamental design attributes of 
These fundamental design attributes can work together 
seamlessly, resulting in an open internet that brings 
numerous economic, social, and personal benefits. 
These benefits include enabling innovation, spurring 
economic growth, providing a free flow of information, 
and empowering human rights and sustainable, 
human-centered development. However, the internet 
also poses governance challenges for policymakers 
and other stakeholders, stemming from undesirable 
online behavior and undesirable offline behavior 
brought online.
The concept of internet “governance” is not always 
well-understood.  One way of looking at governance 
is through the technical lens, where the basic idea is 
that the software-derived protocols, standards and best 
practices that make up the core of the internet’s operation 
need continual innovation, revision and promulgation. 
For more than forty years, an assortment of technical 
standards bodies, volunteer organizations, policy-
making institutions, and influencers like the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF), the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) have taken on this 
mission. Because these groups have open participation, 
employ “bottom-up,” transparent processes, and rely 
on consensus-based approaches to decision-making, 
they are recognized as “multistakeholder” institutions 
that act as good stewards of the internet. Moreover, the 
fact that technical experts from diverse backgrounds 
are making decisions about something as vast and 
complex as the internet in an open and cooperative 
manner helps to preserve its overall utility.  In addition 
to these questions of technical standards, governance 
can include conventions for behavioral norms, legal 
standards of practices, cooperation regarding criminal 
behavior, and the protection of users from harm. This is 
why we argued before that many institutions share the 
responsibility and stewardship for internet governance9.
Some 90 percent of the total investment in the internet’s 
content, services and infrastructure layers comes from 
the private sector. Nonetheless, the biggest obstacle 
standing in the way of healthy incentives for further 
investment in an open internet—and the resulting 
user benefits—is the potential for inconsistent and 
unpredictable actions by individual government 
bodies. While mostly well-intentioned, “top-down” 
government actions typically lack multistakeholder 
input and processes that are hosted and facilitated by 
participatory institutions. These government actions can 
the Internet and how they interact to produce an open platform).
9 See Vinton G. Cerf, Patrick S. Ryan and Max Senges, “Internet 
Governance Is Our Shared Responsibility,” I/S: A Journal of Law 
and Policy for the Information Society, 10 ISJLP 1 (2014) avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2309772
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also cause unintended side effects on the technology 
and business level, as they tend not to be well informed 
by an engineering-based understanding of how they 
will impact the internet’s core design elements.
 
Joining Together for a 
 Common Goal
Given the complexity of the internet ecosystem, it is 
crucial that the private sector collaborate with other 
stakeholders, namely civil society, the technical 
community and governments to evolve the framework 
for internet governance. Together, we must jointly design 
and implement a governance ecosystem that enables 
the efficient and effective engagement of many actors 
to contribute to the internet’s organic growth while 
maintaining a balance that protects individual rights, 
safety and different cultural expectations. No single 
stakeholder should drive the internet’s future; instead, all 
stakeholders should cooperate to preserve the layered, 
end-to-end, interconnected nature of the open internet. 
In this way, solutions to future challenges can be built 
successfully at the appropriate layers of the internet.10 
All stakeholders share a common interest in 
championing the internet stewardship described 
above. Because government institutions have a unique 
capability to unduly affect the operation of the internet, 
they should balance the interests of internet users 
and their own core missions to protect their citizens 
from harm. Governments should acknowledge the 
legitimacy of the internet’s multistakeholder governance 
framework, including its inclusive processes and expert 
participants, and limit the use of their own authority to 
actions that protect the interests of their citizens in 
ways that do not conflict with that framework.
The good news is that we already see a viable 
framework emerging. At the 2014 NETmundial in 
Brazil, participants embraced the concept of internet 
governance as a shared responsibility, one that all 
stakeholders must jointly design and implement. 
Transnational solutions for a global, interdependent 
internet call for multistakeholder institutions and 
processes built on broad technical foundations. These 
processes encourage open participation and typically 
lead to best-practice outcomes in much faster, less 
costly, more adaptable, and ultimately more effective 
ways than traditional national and international 
legislative and judicial processes. Herein, government 
bodies and international organizations can still operate 
within the scope of their institutional mandates, 
enacting their core missions and contributing their own 
particular perspectives.
10 Id.
Even more established is the IGF, which is the 
body designated to help ensure proposed internet 
governance solutions are based on best practices. 
For years, the IGF has been convening transnational 
annual meetings with nearly 2,000 stakeholders 
in attendance, along with regional meetings with 
thousands more in attendance. Notably, the regional 
meetings are self-organized events without any funding 
or support from the United Nations.  One approach 
is for the IGF to become a global clearinghouse and 
deliberation space tasked with (1) identifying emergent 
internet governance challenges, (2) framing them so 
that experts from all relevant institutions can cooperate 
in developing and implementing innovative solutions, 
and (3) assuring that the progress and discourse 
are archived and available for analysis. This option 
would allow those institutions to devise solutions while 
maintaining existing systems and processes for those 
who still wish to use them. In this way, solutions can 
be fashioned in the appropriate global technical bodies, 
even as other institutions remain in place. A good 
example of this approach is ICANN’s Uniform Domain-
Name Dispute-Resolution Policy.11 The IGF is already 
starting to operate in the multistakeholder spirit by self-
organizing the national and regional collaborations 
mentioned above.
An effective, representative deliberation space might 
be structured in a couple of ways. David Clark has 
proposed a “tussle” approach that would inform the 
choice of design principles and features, along with the 
institutions selected to host the various debates. Clark 
posits that the internet’s structure should facilitate “tussle 
space boundaries” so stakeholders can determine 
the best places in the network for control decisions to 
be made.12  Another proposal would use a “modular 
governance” scheme, where internet technical bodies 
and businesses would collaborate with government 
and civil society experts.13 In both cases, perceived 
challenges would be addressed by expert groups from 
relevant institutions at the appropriate internet layers. 
Similarly, the IGF could provide experimental zones 
for actors to discuss governance policies and allow 
for natural alignment on all levels (local, national, and 
regional).  For internet policymaking, it is clear that 
form (and forum) should follow function, not the other 
way around.  
11 Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy, ICANN, 
available at http://goo.gl/z5gqu8.
12 David D. Clark et al., “Tussle in Cyberspace: Defining Tomor-
row’s Internet,” SIGCOMM ‘02 (2002).
13 See Whitt, “A Deference to Protocol” (citing work by Olivier M.J. 
Crepin-Leblond).
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Incentives for Private Sector 
Engagement at the IGF
The IGF provides an important mechanism for 
interaction among individuals and institutions with a 
stake in internet evolution and governance. Because 
the internet is a complex technological network that 
mirrors the social, political, and business contentions 
of the offline world, it is important to design and operate 
a forum in which emerging issues can be (1) identified 
and deliberated, (2) framed or dissected in a way that 
enables relevant stakeholders to implement solutions 
outside the IGF, and (3) reported back and discussed 
by stakeholders both at home and in subsequent IGF 
meetings. These internet stakeholders each bring 
unique perspectives on critical interests such as privacy, 
security and surveillance and copyright. Although 
the private sector provides much of the funding and 
innovation for the internet’s growth, it is vital that all 
stakeholders—private, public, and government—have 
a forum where their voices can be heard.  Below we 
have included a short list of some of the salient benefits 
private sector stakeholders can reap by participating in 
the IGF.
Engage at scale. Private enterprise can reach 
multiple stakeholders in one place, saving time 
and travel costs. The abundant opportunities for 
meaningful networking and relationship building at 
the IGF have been documented repeatedly, and 
an effective “initiation” into the internet governance 
community is one of the benefits most often cited by 
new IGF participants.  There’s no other place where 
an executive, engineer, lawyer or lobbyist can reach 
so many influential people (1,500 to 2,000 in a typical 
IGF) on a global scale within the course of a week. 
Promote a transnational multistakeholder Internet 
governance ecosystem. By participating in the IGF, 
companies can promote a governance ecosystem 
that maintains the transnational nature of the internet 
while ensuring that stakeholders from around the world 
contribute their technological, legal, entrepreneurial 
and policy expertise. This role seems particularly 
valuable to the private sector as inter-governmental 
institutions like the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) continue to assert their place, together 
with other initiatives that are relatively closed  to the 
private sector (or are invitation-only) like the London 
process.14 In addition, top-down national and regional 
internet mandates, like Europe’s recent moves toward 
data localization, threaten to disrupt the transnational 
14 See Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “The London Process Arrived in 
Budapest,” Circle ID, Oct. 13, 2012, available at http://goo.
gl/0IhgRr (describing the London Process)
nature of the internet, as well as thwart the spread of 
progress and the level playing field that the internet 
creates.15 The IGF can be used to address and 
remedy dangerous developments that we believe 
can lead to continued fragmentation of the web and 
deceleration of progress through bureaucratization. 
 
Encourage cooperation and alliances. The non-bind-
ing nature of the discussion at the IGF allows competitive 
interests to be set aside in order to pursue broader 
shared policy goals. For example, ICC BASIS provides 
a mechanism for collaboration between internet compa-
nies like Google, Facebook and Microsoft and traditional 
infrastructure firms like AT&T, Verizon and Telefonica.16  
There is also increasing multistakeholder collaboration 
among quasi-governmental groups like the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
conveners like the World Economic Forum (WEF), and, 
increasingly, new organizations that address internet 
matters in a regional way, like the Broadband Internet 
Technical Advisory Group and the Internet Corporation 
for the Assignment of Names and Numbers (ICANN).17 
Pursue policymaking tech-transfer and knowl-
edge sharing. The unprecedented speed with which 
information can spread is at the root of the internet’s 
success. The IGF is (and should be) the place where 
policy  challenges and proposed solutions are openly 
 evaluated and optimized based on stakeholder feed-
back. A good example is the promotion of best practices 
in the area of child protection. Child protection experts 
may have specialized venues and institutions, for 
 example, but it’s the added value of IGF expertise from 
 technical, business and policy organizations that allows 
for the promulgation of the most effective solutions.18 
Misunderstanding the cultural expectations of 
the “next 5 billion.” The IGF is the space for inter-
net dialogue among a heterogeneous participant mix, 
including thought leaders from developing nations. 
In fact, part of the IGF mission is to enable knowl-
15 Patrick S. Ryan, Sarah Falvey and Ronak Merchant, “When the 
Cloud Goes Local: The Global Problem with Data Localization,” 
Computer, Vol. 46, No. 12, Dec. 2013, available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=2370850
16 The International Chamber of Commerce launched the Busi-
ness Action to Support the Information Society (BASIS) as a 
direct response to the WSIS and to support policy matters that 
arise from activities such as the IGF.  See ICC BASIS, “About 
BASIS,” available at http://goo.gl/4yAvEo
17 For an overview of various organizaitons in the ecosystem, see 
Vinton G. Cerf (Chair) et al., “ICANN’s Role in the Internet Gov-
ernance Ecosystem,” Final Report of the ICANN Strategy Panel, 
May 23, 2014, available at http://goo.gl/6AkznX.
18 See Google’s Thoughts on IGF Reform in 2013, submitted to 
the United Nations IGF, February 14, 2013, http://www.intgovfo-
rum.org/cms/2013/contributions/contributions/Google%20copy.
pdf.
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edge sharing and relationship building among actors 
 committed to using the internet to empower citizens 
and leapfrog economies.
This brief list above reinforces the fact that participation 
in and support for the IGF are worthwhile endeavors 
for private sector stakeholders. But the IGF is still a 
young institution, and internet governance remains a 
complex challenge. In the following section, we outline 
proposals regarding ways to strengthen the IGF.
Short and Mid-term IGF 
 Improvements
In spite of the promise that the IGF brings to the private 
sector, the IGF needs to do many things in order to re-
main a viable organization. Below, we have outlined a 
few points that we think the IGF should address.
Document the MAG mandate. The IGF relies mostly 
on the establishment of the IGF in the Tunis Agenda 
and on a “Project Document” in its work.19 The only 
written mandate of the IGF’s Multistakeholder Advisory 
Group (MAG), the IGF’s program committee, is found 
in a 2006 press release.20 The MAG creates the 
agenda for the annual conference and does not (and 
should not) bear many other management or oversight 
responsibilities for the broader functioning of the IGF. 
Yet, even if there is a generally accepted practice about 
what the MAG’s mandate is, there is a need, and an 
opportunity, to capture the MAG’s roles, responsibilities 
and expectations.  At a minimum, such an exercise could 
be part of a Web of Affirmation of Commitments that 
helps let all stakeholders know what the expectations 
are of the MAG vis-a-vis other stakeholders in the IGF 
and within the governance community, generally.21 
Promote a culture of learning. Many believe that 
the strength and resilience of Silicon Valley and the 
companies based there comes from embracing missed 
expectations, shortcomings and past experiences as 
opportunities for learning. As Susan Wojcicki (YouTube’s 
Senior Vice President) explained, “[P]eople remember 
your hits more than your misses. It’s okay to fail as long 
as you learn from your mistakes and correct them fast.”22 
 Like the private sector, the IGF is far from infallible. 
19 United Nations Funds-In-Trust Project Document, U.N. Docu-
ment GLO/11/X01 Apr 1, 2011, available at http://goo.gl/s48kQx
20 Secretary-General Establishes Advisory Group to Assist Him 
in Convening Internet Governance Forum, U.N. Document 
SG/A/1006, PI/1717, May 17, 2006, available at http://goo.gl/
a4XpkK
21 For a description of the Web of AoCs, see Cerf, ICANN, cited 
supra.
22 Susan Wojcicki, “The Eight Pillars of Innovation,” Think With 
Google Newsletter, July 2011, available at http://goo.gl/UYoOyl
However, the IGF culture has not yet developed into 
one that acknowledges and learns from its mistakes 
and then subsequently sets courses for improvement. 
One example that reinforces this point is the way IGF 
host countries are selected and the manner in which 
Host Country Agreements (HCAs) are executed. 
The UN takes the (reasonable) position that the host 
country should cover all IGF meeting costs. However, 
those costs vary from meeting to meeting, are hard 
to document and predict, and there are opportunities 
to handle these expectations more transparently and 
in advance. In 2013, the IGF community experienced 
a dangerous near-miss when the host country, 
Indonesia, sought additional financing for the event.23 
 
Although the community stepped up to provide the 
support needed, this experience demonstrated the 
value in transparent financial-planning efforts. There 
are some relatively easy things that can happen to 
course-correct for the future: for instance, the execution 
of the HCA could take place simultaneously with the 
selection of the country, not (as is often the practice) a 
few days before the event begins.
Implement transparency mechanisms. The IGF 
has the opportunity to be an example for open and 
transparent governance, and there are ways that 
the multistakeholder community can contribute to 
the IGF’s vision in ways that do not yet happen. 
This can be a missed opportunity. For example, in 
2012, the UN’s Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs (DESA) cancelled the search for an execu-
tive director because of lack of funding for the role.24 
 The cancellation of the position contrasted with the 
opening of the requisition and the job posting, which 
was public. Although the MAG and donor community 
cannot substitute for the leadership that the UN brings, 
there are opportunities that could be explored for great-
er involvement of the community in certain aspects of 
the IGF’s leadership. For example representatives 
from each stakeholders group could work with the UN 
Secretariat in organizing and developing the capacity 
and growth of the IGF itself, beyond the work of the 
program committee. This would unleash and empower 
other areas of the community to take on broader, lon-
ger-term initiatives, such as fundraising and capacity 
building of the IGF as an institution.
23 Shreedeep Rayamajhi, “IGF 2013 Cancelled by Indonesia,” 
Internet Governance Diplomacy, Jul 25, 2014, available at http://
goo.gl/mpVaJ1
24 Marília Maciel, “Report of the CSTD Working Group on the 
improvements to the Internet Governance Forum,” Center for 
Technology and Society Fundação Getulio Vargas, May 21, 
2012, available at http://goo.gl/71lQHr
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Improvements for Long-term 
Utility and Effectiveness  
After reviewing the mandate25 of the IGF again, we see 
the following three clearing house functions as central 
to developing the IGF as *the* transnational platform 
for facilitating governance of the internet with optimal 
utility for all stakeholders and high effectiveness in 
facilitating the search for solutions that balance the 
interests of all stakeholders.  
1. Identify Issues
The IGF should help to find significant problems 
that arise in the current practices of users, com-
panies and governments.26 The IGF workshop 
proposals and selection process already address 
this function and also at the workshops themselves 
emergent phenomena are discussed and defined. 
Especially the workshop proposal process should 
be made more transparent and collaborative, and 
also the workshops could benefit from a more 
structured and participatory approach, rather than 
hosting panels of experts who debate and share 
their perspectives. 
2. Frame Challenges
The process of identifying the issues already 
triggers the stakeholders to frame challenges and 
define the problematic phenomena.27  In the second 
function the problem is analyzed by the experts 
attending the IGF and stratified ideally into modular 
challenges which are maximally independent 
when it comes to the (1) core technical functions,28 
(2) the content and services realm as well as matters 
of human rights.29 Another task for workshop 
participants is to identify the institutions which 
hold the relevant mandates needed to address the 
problems. Two features of this approach make it 
adequate to the IGFs role as a non-decision making 
platform tackling a wide variety of continuous and 
emergent challenges: The work is carried out by 
25 See Mandate of the IGF as set out in Paragraph 72 of the Tunis 
Agenda, adopted on November 18, 2005,  available at  http://
www.intgovforum.org/mandate.htm
26 Ibid., g) of the IGF mandate states “Identify emerging issues, 
bring them to the attention of the relevant bodies and the gen-
eral public.”.
27 Ibid., d) of the mandate states: “Facilitate discourse between 
bodies dealing with different cross-cutting international public 
policies regarding the Internet and discuss issues that do not fall 
within the scope of any existing body.”
28 See Richard S. Whitt, “A Deference to Protocol: Fashioning a 
Three-Dimensional Public Policy Framework for the Internet 
Age,” 31 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 689, 
754-56 (2013) (citing work by Olivier M.J. Crepin-Leblond).
29 The provision of fundamental freedoms and rights serves as 
normative compass for stakeholders attempting to solve chal-
lenges on all layers.
institutions that have the mandate or voluntary 
interest to deal with a challenge. Each institution 
can decide in what constellation of collaborators it 
wants to address which problem. The setup hence 
(i) allows for competing or parallel approaches 
and (ii)  positions the IGF as facilitator rather than 
responsible for finding solutions to the various 
persistent challenges and constantly emerging 
issues.
3. Document/Track
At the end of each IGF workshop, leaders give 
an update about the progress and results of the 
workshop topic.30 For example, documenting 
developments of new and updated framing of 
issues, new groups of stakeholders working on 
solutions, and any perspectives on agendas coming 
up for the next year. This subsequently allows for 
identifying and making work that happens between 
IGFs transparent.  It is important in this context to 
distinguish between documenting the activities (and 
processes), tracking the progress (using metrics 
and methods used by the stakeholders working 
on the challenges) and archiving the evolution 
of the issues addressed in a way that makes it 
accessible. Especially the archiving function can 
position the IGF as an accountability mechanism 
by documenting the activities of the institutions 
identified as relevant to address an issue.
The following illustration depicts the flow of the three 
functions of the IGF platform in a sequential manner. 
Importantly “Identify issues” is complemented by a sub-
function which is to “Report back to the community”, i.e. 
informing what progress has been made over the year 
between the IGF conferences. This function can be 
done mostly via the channels of the 3rd function (Docu-
ment/Track) and feeds into the first function, namely to 
identify what the persistent or newly emergent issues 
are.  
We believe the IGF has the mandate and potential to 
serve these core functions and thereby stay a neutral 
non-decision-making platform dedicated to bringing all 
relevant institutions and experts together and facilitat-
ing the coordination of partners so that they can address 
the challenges relevant to them. These core functions 
do not exclude the other important functions the IGF 
serves - like capacity building or promoting universal 
access - as outlined by its mandate. We simply focused 
on these three areas as they seem at the heart of the 
30 See footnote 26; Inter alia “Promote and assess, on an ongoing 
basis, the embodiment of WSIS principles in Internet gover-
nance processes” and “Facilitate the exchange of information 
and best practices, and in this regard make full use of the ex-
pertise of the academic, scientific and technical communities.”
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potential value generated by the IGF; especially taking 
stewardship and accountability of all stakeholders into 
consideration, while allowing for maximal freedom to 
form groups that seek solutions within their mandate 
but outside the IGF. 
Conclusion
In the past decade, the IGF has proven itself as one 
of the most important global fora for the private sector 
to engage in meaningful policy debates that affect 
the growth and future of the internet.  In order for the 
IGF to remain relevant, however, it must continue to 
learn, develop and grow, and to establish an ability 
to (1) identify emerging issues, (2) frame these 
issues as modular and solvable challenges, and (3) 
document/track and archive the developments.  With 
a program in place that accomplishes these goals in 
an open, transparent manner, the IGF can become the 
clearinghouse for internet governance and establish 
itself as a permanent part of the ecosystem. 
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interest to deal with a challenge. Each institution 
can decide in what constellation of collaborators it 
wants to address which problem. The setup hence 
(i) allows for competing or parallel approaches 
and (ii)  positions the IGF as facilitator rather than 
responsible for finding solutions to the various 
persistent challenges and constantly emerging 
issues.
3. Document/Track
At the end of each IGF workshop, leaders give 
an update about the progress and results of the 
workshop topic.30 For example, documenting 
developments of new and updated framing of 
issues, new groups of stakeholders working on 
solutions, and any perspectives on agendas coming 
up for the next year. This subsequently allows for 
identifying and making work that happens between 
IGFs transparent.  It is important in this context to 
distinguish between documenting the activities (and 
processes), tracking the progress (using metrics 
and methods used by the stakeholders working 
on the challenges) and archiving the evolution 
of the issues addressed in a way that makes it 
accessible. Especially the archiving function can 
position the IGF as an accountability mechanism 
by documenting the activities of the institutions 
identified as relevant to address an issue.
The following illustration depicts the flow of the three 
functions of the IGF platform in a sequential manner. 
Importantly “Identify issues” is complemented by a sub-
function which is to “Report back to the community”, i.e. 
informing what progress has been made over the year 
between the IGF conferences. This function can be 
done mostly via the channels of the 3rd function (Docu-
ment/Track) and feeds into the first function, namely to 
identify what the persistent or newly emergent issues 
are.  
We believe the IGF has the mandate and potential to 
serve these core functions and thereby stay a neutral 
non-decision-making platform dedicated to bringing all 
relevant institutions and experts together and facilitat-
ing the coordination of partners so that they can address 
the challenges relevant to them. These core functions 
do not exclude the other important functions the IGF 
serves - like capacity building or promoting universal 
access - as outlined by its mandate. We simply focused 
on these three areas as they seem at the heart of the 
30 See footnote 26; Inter alia “Promote and assess, on an ongoing 
basis, the embodiment of WSIS principles in Internet gover-
nance processes” and “Facilitate the exchange of information 
and best practices, and in this regard make full use of the ex-
pertise of the academic, scientific and technical communities.”
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A Perspective from Civil Society
Jeremy Malcolm
Along with the International Criminal Court, the Mine 
Ban Treaty1 and the Disability Convention,2 the Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF) is another global governance 
innovation that would likely not have happened but for 
civil society’s intervention.3 This is no coincidence as 
civil society had the most to gain from the establish-
ment of a forum that could amplify its voice in global 
public policy development processes.
When civil society organizations wish to influence pub-
lic policy developments in the area of Information and 
Communication Technologies (ICTs), as in other areas, 
they start from a very weak and under-resourced posi-
tion. According to statistics compiled by the Center for 
Responsible Politics, last year, US-based technology 
companies spent over $141 billion on lobbying activi-
ties, with the assistance of no fewer than 1,124 paid 
lobbyists. Compared to this, the resources available to 
civil society are a veritable drop in the ocean.4
Faced with this reality, the idea of a relatively central-
ized forum on transnational internet-related public 
policies, to which all stakeholders would have equal 
access, and which would be structured to incorporate 
deliberative democratic processes that would privilege 
the best ideas rather than the deepest pockets,5 was 
1 Paul van Seters, “Critical mass: the emergence of global civil 
society,” in Approaching Global Civil Society, ed. James W. St. 
G. Walker and Andrew S Thompson, vol. 5, Studies in inter-
national governance (Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2008), 
25–37.
2 Janet Lord, “Mirror, Mirror on the Wall: NGO Legitimacy and 
Accountability in Human Rights Standard Setting,” Seton Hall 
Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations (2004): 93–
110.
3 WSIS Civil Society Plenary, “Much More Could Have Been 
Achieved: Civil Society Statement on the World Summit on the 
Information Society,” 2005, https://www.itu.int/w sis/docs2/tunis/
contributions/co13.doc, 7.
4 Aggregated statistics of the budgets of non-profit public interest 
groups in the technology sector are not available, but by way 
of example, the 2012 program expenditure of the largest such 
group in the United States, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
came to $3.5 million and at time of writing, it has 58 staff: 
see http://www.charitynavigator.org/index.cfm?bay=search.
summary&orgid=7576 and https://eff.org/about/staff.
5 Philip Pettit, “Debating Deliberative Democracy,” in Deliberative 
Democracy, the Discursive Dilemma, and Republican Theory, 
ed. James S Fishkin and Peter Laslett (London: Routledge, 
2003), 138–162.
naturally appealing to civil society. So too for many 
developing country governments, which have also ex-
perienced difficulties in engaging in global public policy 
processes in the ICT sector.6
Civil Society’s Vision for an 
Internet Governance Forum
While of course civil society is diverse and often in-
ternally conflictual, when recommendations for the 
establishment of an Internet Governance Forum were 
first developed by the Working Group on Internet Gov-
ernance (WGIG) in 2005, they were broadly welcomed 
by civil society stakeholders, albeit with a few reserva-
tions about whether the new body should be linked to 
the United Nations.7 The proposal’s positive reception 
ought not to have been surprising, since representa-
tives from civil society and academia were indeed 
amongst WGIG’s most active participants. The relevant 
recommendation from WGIG’s report stated: 
The WGIG identified a vacuum within the con-
text of existing structures, since there is no global 
multi-stakeholder forum to address Internet-related 
public policy issues. It came to the conclusion that 
there would be merit in creating such a space for 
dialogue among all stakeholders. This space could 
address these issues, as well as emerging issues, 
that are cross-cutting and multidimensional and 
that either affect more than one institution, are not 
dealt with by any institution or are not addressed in 
a coordinated manner.8
Responding to the proposal, the Civil Society Internet 
Governance Caucus (IGC) remarked that: 
The forum should not by default have a mandate 
to negotiate hard instruments like treaties or con-
tracts.  However, in very exceptional circumstances 
6 Panos Institute, “Louder Voices: Strengthening developing 
country participation in international ICT decision-making,” 
2002, http://www.panos.org.uk/?lid=324. 
7 IGC, “Initial Reactions to the WGIG Report,” 2005, http://www.
itu.int/wsis/docs 2/pc3/contributions/co23.doc, 3.
8 WGIG, “Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance,” 
2005, http://www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf, 10. 
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when the parties all agree that such instruments 
are needed, there could be a mechanism that al-
lows for their establishment.  Normally, the forum 
should focus on the development of soft law in-
struments such as recommendations, guidelines, 
declarations, etc.9 
Accordingly, later in November of that same year, 
the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) 
resolved to establish such an Internet Governance Fo-
rum with a mandate based closely on what WGIG had 
suggested, including several paragraphs that would – if 
realized – be key to advancing civil society’s ability to 
effectively advocate for ICT policies and practices that 
serve the public interest:10
a) Discuss public policy issues related to key 
elements of Internet governance in order to 
foster the sustainability, robustness, security, 
stability and development of the Internet; 
b) Facilitate discourse between bodies dealing 
with different cross-cutting international public 
policies regarding the Internet and discuss 
issues that do not fall within the scope of any 
existing body; 
c) Interface with appropriate inter-governmental 
organizations and other institutions on matters 
under their purview; 
d) Facilitate the exchange of information and best 
practices, and in this regard make full use of 
the expertise of the academic, scientific and 
technical communities; 
e) Advise all stakeholders in proposing ways 
and means to accelerate the availability and 
affordability of the Internet in the developing 
world; 
f) Strengthen and enhance the engagement of 
stakeholders in existing and/or future Internet 
governance mechanisms, particularly those 
from developing countries; 
g) Identify emerging issues, bring them to the 
attention of the relevant bodies and the 
general public, and, where appropriate, make 
recommendations; 
h) Contribute to capacity building for Internet 
governance in developing countries, drawing 
fully on local sources of knowledge and 
expertise; 
9 IGC, “Initial Reactions to the WGIG Report,” http://www.itu.int/
wsis/docs2/pc3/contributions/co23.doc, 3. 
10 WSIS, “Tunis Agenda for the Information Society,” para 72. 
i) Promote and assess, on an ongoing basis, 
the embodiment of WSIS principles in Internet 
governance processes; 
j) Discuss, inter alia, issues relating to critical 
Internet resources; 
k) Help to find solutions to the issues arising from 
the use and misuse of the Internet, of particular 
concern to everyday users; 
l) Publish its proceedings. 
All stakeholders welcomed those paragraphs that al-
lowed for the general exchange of information and 
best practices amongst stakeholders – such as para-
graphs (a), (d), (e), (h), (j) and (k) – and these are the 
paragraphs that were best realized in the IGF as it 
took shape since its first meeting in Athens in 2006. 
But it was the remaining paragraphs, less well realized 
to date, that could have a more direct impact in facili-
tating civil society policy advocacy at the global level. 
These paragraphs can be approximately grouped into 
the following classes of coordination, discussion, docu-
mentation and participation.  
Coordination 
There are a plethora of internet governance institu-
tions; 41 of them were reviewed in one recent study,11 
but there are undoubtedly dozens more whose prin-
ciples, norms, rules, decision-making procedures and 
programs help to shape the evolution and use of the 
internet. In any case, there are far too many such insti-
tutions than civil society has the capacity and resources 
to adequately engage with.
Paragraphs 72(b) and (c) offer a solution, promis-
ing a coordination mechanism that can intermediate 
between diverse institutions, processes and stakehold-
ers; they also provide a venue for the discussion of 
issues that do not yet have a natural institutional home 
elsewhere. This incorporates what is often described 
(as elsewhere in this volume) as a clearinghouse or 
observatory function.
Discussion 
As alluded to above, there are some issues that do not 
already have an appropriate institutional home, and the 
IGF has a mandate to fill that gap by providing a forum 
for discussion of those issues. This flows from para-
graph 72(b) and (g), which overlap with the classes 
directly above and below. 
11 Norbert Bollow, “Consumers in the Information Society: Access, 
Fairness and Representation,” in Public Interest Representation 
in the Information Society, ed. Jeremy Malcolm (Kuala Lumpur: 
Consumers International, 2012), 181–214. 
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Documentation 
Paragraphs 72(g) and (l) make clear that these discus-
sions need not merely be abstract, but should result in 
tangible outputs, such as recommendations on emerg-
ing issues, that could be transmitted to all appropriate 
bodies and to the public for further action as appropri-
ate. 
Participation 
Finally, while the coordination function and the discus-
sion and documentation of outputs from the IGF are all 
very important, there will always be limits to the extent 
to which diverse institutions will meaningfully integrate 
the inputs that they may receive through such mecha-
nisms into their existing processes. For example, even 
if the IGF were to establish an interface with a body 
such as the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU), and develop a recommendation on an emerging 
internet issue that the ITU could play a part in imple-
menting, the ITU has no procedures in place to accept 
that recommendation or to act upon it. At the same 
time, the ITU does not allow all stakeholders to par-
ticipate in its work on an equal footing, even if those 
stakeholders had the resources and capacity to do so.
This is where paragraphs 72(f) and (i) of the IGF’s 
mandate play a part, as they aim to ensure that all oth-
er internet governance institutions and processes – not 
just the IGF itself – also comply with the WSIS process 
criteria of being multilateral, transparent, democratic 
and inclusive,12 and, in particular, that they facilitate the 
engagement of stakeholders from developing coun-
tries. 
The IGF’s Delivery of This 
 Vision
This leads very naturally to the question, has the IGF 
taken advantage of the latent potential that its mandate 
offers it? In short, it has not. From the outset, the IGF’s 
mandate has always been interpreted in a very restric-
tive manner by an over-large and, until recently, rather 
stagnant Multi-stakeholder Advisory Group (MAG) 
dominated by stakeholders who do not require the IGF 
to meet the same needs that civil society does, and 
who in some cases may have regarded the IGF as a 
threat. The MAG, in turn, was led by a Chair and as-
sisted by a Secretariat who could fairly be said to be 
more deferential to governmental sensitivities than to 
those of civil society (and naturally so, since they are 
staff of the United Nations after all).
12 WSIS, “Tunis Agenda for the Information Society,” para 29. 
This led to a now very firmly embedded culture where-
by the IGF’s leadership firmly resists innovation, and 
is inclined to compromise and back down in the face 
of reservations about proposed changes that are ex-
pressed from any quarter. Since 2006, the evolution of 
the IGF’s structures and procedures to allow it to fully 
carry out its mandate has been so incremental as to be 
positively glacial, and even as tumultuous events take 
place in the landscape around the IGF (some of these 
referred to below), it remains far from certain that these 
will be effective to rouse the IGF from its self-imposed 
state of lethargy.
Examples of this abound, and to avoid simply offering a 
grab-bag of these, only four will be given here, roughly 
corresponding to the areas identified as gaps above. 
These are not exclusive, and in particular, do not cover 
issues such as funding mechanisms, which have also 
widely been recognized as an important gap, but which 
are well covered elsewhere in this volume.13
Coordination 
Before the IGF’s mandate was last renewed in 2010, 
a formal enquiry was held as to the desirability of its 
renewal. Sixty-eight percent of respondents expressed 
the opinion that the IGF’s renewal should be con-
ditioned on it adopting improvements to its format, 
function and operations. According to the UN Secre-
tary General’s notes of that enquiry, among “the most 
significant concerns expressed by stakeholders” was 
that “the Forum had not provided concrete advice to 
intergovernmental bodies and other entities involved in 
Internet governance,” and that as a result, “the contri-
bution of the Forum to public policymaking is difficult to 
assess and appears to be weak.”14
In response, a multistakeholder working group of its 
Commission on Science and Technology for Devel-
opment (CSTD) was established to consider possible 
improvements to the IGF, and the report of that work-
ing group was eventually delivered in March 2012. Its 
first recommendation was that the IGF should “develop 
more tangible outputs,” and it went on to explain how 
the IGF could begin to do this: 
To focus discussions, the preparation process of 
each IGF should formulate a set of policy ques-
tions to be considered at the IGF, as part of the 
overall discussion. The results of the debates on 
these questions, with special focus on public pol-
13 ECOSOC, “Report of the Working Group on Improvements to 
the Internet Governance Forum,” 2012, 4-7. 
14 United Nations Secretary-General, “Continuation of the Internet 
Governance Forum,” 2010, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/
groups/public/documents/un/unpan039400.pdf, 5, 9.
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icy perspectives and aimed at capacity-building, 
should be stated in the outcome documentation.15
This recommendation was implemented by a very 
peculiar method. A notice was posted on the IGF’s 
website calling for suggestions from stakeholders on 
policy questions that could be covered at the next IGF 
meeting in Bali.16  All 49 of the suggestions that were re-
ceived by the stated deadline were then simply passed 
on to session organizers with a note saying “the follow-
ing questions were received by the Secretariat and the 
IGF discussions should seek to address them as time 
permits.”17 Needless to say, this did not result in any 
tangible outputs being received from the IGF by any 
other internet governance institutions, yet for the 2014 
meeting the same exercise has been repeated.18
Discussion 
As to the discussion of emerging issues, surprisingly, 
while the IGF is thought of as a forum where anything 
can be discussed, this is not the case. The first evi-
dence of this was the exclusion of the topic of “critical 
Internet resources” from the agenda of the IGF’s first 
meeting on the grounds that it was deemed too contro-
versial for inclusion. This was so baldly at odds with the 
paragraph of the IGF’s mandate that explicitly called 
upon it to discuss such issues19 that stakeholders were 
able to succeed in having this omission rectified for 
the IGF’s second meeting.20 Yet the same mistake was 
made again during a February 2007 open consulta-
tion meeting at which the then MAG Chair purported 
to issue a moratorium on the discussion of the issue of 
“enhanced cooperation” at the IGF – which was finally 
overturned at the 2008 Hyderabad meeting, following 
further dissent from stakeholders who considered the 
IGF an eminently suitable venue for the discussion of 
that topic, controversial or not.21 Similarly, there have 
been several upsets involving the UN Secretariat 
removing printed material and posters deemed exces-
15 ECOSOC, “Report of the Working Group on Improvements to 
the Internet Governance Forum,” 4.
16 Internet Governance Forum, “Public Input – Shaping 
the discussions,” http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1353&Itemid=442.
17 Internet Governance Forum, “Policy Questions to be addressed 
by the 2013 IGF,” http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/images/
Policy%20Questions%20to%20be%20addressed%20by%20
the%202013%20IGF.pdf.
18  Internet Governance Forum. “Call for Public Input – Contribute 
Policy Questions,” http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/1885-call-
for-public-input.
19 WSIS, “Tunis Agenda for the Information Society,” para 72(j).
20 Jeremy Malcolm, Multi-Stakeholder Governance and the 
Internet Governance Forum (Perth: Terminus Press, 2008), 386.
21 Jeremy Malcolm, “Arresting the Decline of Multi-Stakeholderism 
in Internet Governance,” in Consumers in the Information 
Society: Access, Fairness and Representation, ed. Jeremy 
Malcolm (Kuala Lumpur: Consumers International, 2012), 166.
sively critical of particular governments, yet until 2014, 
there was no written policy to explain the standards 
that were being enforced.22 
Documentation 
The IGF’s failure to address discrete policy questions 
that could form useful inputs into other internet gov-
ernance processes has already been observed. The 
ability to include written recommendations is an impor-
tant way of addressing this deficit.
To this end, one key such reform for which various civil 
society groups and networks have been continuously 
advocating since 200623 is the establishment of work-
ing groups (or the reconstitution of dynamic coalitions, 
which emerged as a weak substitute for the same) that 
would be formally linked with the IGF and could work 
intersessionally to produce draft outputs that could be 
considered by the IGF in plenary session at its annual 
meeting. But alongside this, and equally important, 
would be reforms to those plenary sessions, to give 
them the capacity to consider inputs by such working 
groups, in order that if a rough consensus were devel-
oped around them, they might become a non-binding 
recommendations of the IGF.24
Proposals for session formats that could, indeed, lend 
themselves to that function – such as the (progressive-
ly less ambitious) speed dialogues that were proposed 
for the second meeting in Rio de Janeiro, moderated 
debates for the third meeting in Hyderabad, and round-
table sessions for the fourth in Sharm el Sheikh – were 
in each case cancelled by the MAG before the meeting 
in question took place.25
Participation 
The IGF’s mandate to strengthen and enhance the en-
gagement of stakeholders in other internet governance 
mechanisms has been partially implemented, to the 
extent of allowing other institutions to hold open forum 
events at the IGF. But there has been no ongoing as-
sessment of their embodiment of the WSIS process 
principles, as paragraph 72(i) requires.
22 Since then, the standards offered by the Secretariat are found 
at http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/frequently-asked-questions-
2014?tag=Distribution%20of%20Materials.
23 MMWG, “Internet Governance Forum Input Statement,” 
2006, http://www.intgovforum.org/contributions/Internet%20
Governance%20Forum%20Input%20Statement1.pdf. 
24 Malcolm, Multi-Stakeholder Governance and the Internet 
Governance Forum, 444-449. 
25 Jeremy Malcolm, “One step forward, two steps back,” 2009, 
http://igfwatch.org/disc ussion-board/one-step-forward-two-
steps-back.
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In any case, before the IGF might monitor and assess 
the performance of other institutions in the internet 
governance regime, it should ensure that its own struc-
tures and processes fully embody the WSIS process 
principles. As this would require the IGF to be multi-
lateral, transparent, democratic and inclusive, it might 
be considered incongruous that the stakeholder repre-
sentatives in the IGF MAG are still not selected directly 
by their stakeholder groups. Instead these representa-
tives are selected by the UN Secretariat in what has 
been described as a “black box” process, whereby 
nominations from civil society groups are invited, and 
these are assessed by unknown persons against a set 
of criteria that has never been made public. While it is 
suggested that one of the criteria would see one third 
of the MAG rotating out of office each year,26 nonethe-
less until the most recent MAG appointments in 2014, 
there were still representatives who had not rotated off 
the MAG since their initial appointment in 2006. Mean-
while, civil society representatives who enjoyed wide 
support within their constituencies, and who had been 
nominated year after year, were still being refused a 
position on the MAG for reasons that remain obscure.27 
The CSTD Working Group on IGF Improvements 
discussed this issue also, and recommended that “pro-
cess of selection of MAG members should be inclusive, 
predictable, transparent and fully documented,” though 
it did not go so far as to remove the UN Secretariat 
from the role of making the final selection.28
The sum of the above shortcomings, and others, is that 
for those within civil society who expected that the IGF 
might help them gain a firmer foothold in internet-relat-
ed public policy development, rather than simply being 
a conference for the exchange of views and informa-
tion, the IGF has been rather a disappointment.29
26 Internet Governance Forum. “MAG Renewal 2014,” http://www.
intgovforum.org/cms/125-igf-2014/preparatory-process/1459-
mag-renewal-2014.
27 In conversation with the author, one governmental MAG 
member remarked that to her knowledge, no government that 
wished to participate in the MAG had ever had its representative 
refused, and she was surprised that civil society’s experience 
was any different.
28 ECOSOC, “Report of the Working Group on Improvements to 
the Internet Governance Forum,” 5. 
29 A Turkish civil society organization, the Alternative Informatics 
Association, will be hosting an “Internet Ungovernance Forum” 
alongside the 2014 IGF on September 4-5. In announcing 
this, they explained, speaking of the IGF, “It is highly probable 
that this meeting will be a sterile and ‘good’ forum where 
corporations, governments, and other organizations will only 
talk again without any concrete actions or decisions. For this 
reason, we will organize an alternative forum during this event.” 
See: https://iuf.alternatifbilisim.org/.
Impetus for change
If the IGF needed shaking up, the CSTD Working Group 
on IGF Improvements was evidently not sufficient for 
the task – given that few of its recommendations have 
yet been implemented. However, pressure for change 
has continued from other quarters, including most no-
tably the NETmundial Global Meeting on the Future of 
Internet Governance, held on 23-24 April 2014. Incon-
veniently, for those resisting change to the IGF (and 
notwithstanding that it, too, was imperfectly executed), 
the NETmundial meeting showed just how easily and 
quickly some of the reforms for which civil society had 
been advocating for could in fact be implemented.
Additionally, a range of other policy bodies, fora, and 
think tanks have emerged either themselves assuming 
some of the functions that the IGF has let languish, or 
else recommending that the IGF should step up to the 
plate and deliver according to its mandate. Returning 
to the four classes of gaps that were identified above 
as unfilled by the IGF, these external initiatives and rec-
ommendations include the following:  
Coordination 
The European Commission’s proposed Global Inter-
net Policy Observatory (GIPO) is self-described as a 
“clearinghouse for monitoring Internet policy, regulatory 
and technological developments” that would “increase 
expertise and understanding among all actors, includ-
ing countries, NGOs and interest groups which may 
have so far been marginalized in Internet debates and 
decisions.”30 While disclaiming any attempt to duplicate 
the IGF, these are functions that lay within the IGF’s 
original mandate that it has failed to satisfactorily ex-
ecute.
Similarly, the NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement 
notes that “Internet governance discussions would 
benefit from improved communication and coordina-
tion between technical and non-technical communities, 
providing a better understanding about the policy 
implications in technical decisions and technical impli-
cations in policy decision-making,”31 and recommends 
that “Periodic reports, formal liaisons and timely feed-
backs are examples of mechanisms that could be 
implemented to that end.”32
30 European Commission. “Commission plans guide through 
global internet policy labyrinth,” http://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/en/news/commission-plans-guide-through-global-
internet-policy-labyrinth.
31 NETmundia. “NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement,” 
Paragraph 2.I.8, http://netmundial.br/wp-content/
uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf.
32 Ibid, paragraph 2.II.4.
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Discussion 
While the IGF was never intended or expected to hold 
a monopoly on multistakeholder discussions of inter-
net policy issues, nonetheless it is telling that newer 
bodies such as the Conference on Cyberspace (spe-
cializing in security issues),33 the Stockholm Internet 
Forum34 and the Freedom Online Coalition35 (both on 
internet freedom) have discerned a sufficient lacuna in 
what the IGF offers that these separate initiatives were 
warranted.
In parallel, there are other institutions and processes 
that have called on the IGF to take certain discussions 
forward. One of these is the ITU, which held its World 
Telecommunication/ICT Policy Forum (WTPF) in 2013, 
and ran out of time to finish deliberating upon a pro-
posed opinion tabled by Brazil, whereupon the IGF was 
suggested as a venue to continue the deliberations. Al-
though a civil society coalition presciently suggested a 
NETmundial-like process by which this could occur, the 
suggestion was not taken up.36
Similarly, NETmundial itself suggested that the IGF 
would be an appropriate venue for ongoing discus-
sions of net neutrality,37 and such discussions are 
indeed scheduled for a main session at the 2014 IGF 
meeting, but are yet to be held at press date. It also 
recommended, more generally, “The IGF should adopt 
mechanisms to promote worldwide discussions be-
tween meetings through intersessional dialogues.”38
Documentation 
Apologists for the IGF’s failure to produce non-binding 
soft law outcomes have long declared that by reason 
of the IGF’s open composition, such a feat would be 
impossible.39 NETmundial comprehensively demon-
strated otherwise, by concluding a comprehensive set 
of recommendations using a participatory rough con-
sensus process, in a short period of time, utilizing online 
and offline contributions and a fairly loosely constituted 
structure of multistakeholder committees. NETmun-
dial also suggested that the IGF could improve its 
33 Government of the Netherlands. “Netherlands to host 
international Cyberspace Conference in 2015,” http://www.
government.nl/news/2013/10/18/netherlands-to-host-
international-cyberspace-conference-in-2015.html.
34 Stockholm Internet Forum, http://www.stockholminternetforum.
se/.
35 Freedom Online, http://www.freedomonline.ee/.
36 Best Bits. “Proposal for a mutl-stakeholder opinion on 
operationalizing the role of Government in the multi-stakeholder 
framework for Internet Governance,” http://bestbits.net/igf-
opinions/.
37 NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement, paragraph 2.IV.
38 NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement, paragraph 2.II.3(d).
39 Malcolm, Multi-Stakeholder Governance and the Internet 
Governance Forum, 423-424. 
own outcome orientation, stating “Improvements can 
be implemented including creative ways of providing 
outcomes/recommendations and the analysis of policy 
options.”40
A report to the French Senate issued this July takes 
note of this embarrassment and proposes a decisive 
yet perilous response: to augment the IGF with a new 
intergovernmental council that would presumably be 
less averse to making recommendations, while lever-
aging the existing legitimacy that the IGF draws from its 
UN character and its multistakeholder composition.41
Meanwhile the NETmundial recommendations have 
already begun to influence other processes – exactly 
what civil society activists had long hoped that recom-
mendations emanating from the IGF would be able to 
do.42 
Participation 
The NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement recogniz-
es the long-held civil society position that stakeholders 
should select their own representatives to internet 
governance processes such as, implicitly, the IGF’s 
MAG,43 and also affirms that “All of the organizations 
with responsibilities in the internet governance eco-
system should develop and implement principles for 
transparency, accountability and inclusiveness,”44 but 
without referring to the IGF’s existing mandate to as-
sess such implementation. 
How has the IGF responded to these challenges? 
Perhaps most notably, it has established for the 2014 
meeting a series of Best Practice Forums on a set of 
five defined topics, together with associated electronic 
mailing lists, discussion boards and web conferenc-
es.45 A summary booklet on each Best Practice session 
is one of the intended outcomes to be published after 
40 NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement, paragraph 2.II.3.(a).
41 Catherine Morin-Desailly, “Rapport d’information fait au nom de 
la MCI sur la gouver-nance mondiale de l’Internet,” 2014, http://
www.senat.fr/notice-rapport/2013/r13-696- 1-notice.html.
42 For example, UN Human Rights Council resolution A/HRC/
RES/26/13 which takes note “of the Global Multi-stakeholder 
Meeting on the Future of the Internet Governance, held in 
São Paulo on 23 and 24 April 2014, which acknowledged, 
inter alia, the need for human rights to underpin internet 
governance and that rights that people have offline must also 
be protected online” : see http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOC/LTD/G14/059/67/PDF/G1405967.pdf?OpenElement. 
Another example is the report of the Panel on Global 
Internet Cooperation and Governance Mechanisms at http://
internetgovernancepanel.org.
43 NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement, paragraph 2.I.3.
44 NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement, paragraph 2.II.1.
45 Internet Governance Forum. “Best Practice Forums – Open Call 
to join IGF Best Practice Forums Preparatory Process,” http://
www.intgovforum.org/cms/open-call-to-join-igf-best-practices-
forums-preparatory-process.
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the IGF 2014 meeting. Although the same will not con-
stitute recommendations of the IGF, they can be seen 
as an attempt to produce more concrete, easily com-
municable outcomes from IGF discussions.
Additionally the IGF has instituted a number of ba-
sic improvements to its online presence, including 
– bizarrely for the first time, despite many earlier 
suggestions – an opt-in mailing list for all those who 
register to attend the 2014 IGF meeting, and a calen-
dar of events in an open format that can be accessed 
using calendaring software. Although such a calendar 
(amongst other functions such as blogs, wiki, feed ag-
gregator and chat) had also been made available from 
2007 to 2013 on the independent IGF Community Site, 
the IGF Secretariat has generally spurned such offers 
of community support, preferring to keep its web pres-
ence closed and refusing to offer access to its data or 
to offer reciprocal links.46
As the end of the second term of the IGF’s mandate 
draws near, are these modest changes too little, too 
late? Perhaps a sign is found in the approach of the 
current MAG chair, Jānis Kārkliņš, to the observed 
shortcomings of the IGF described here. In a call 
for submissions in advance of the Istanbul IGF, he 
describes how “some sceptics of the IGF have sug-
gested that no actions have been taken and that no 
decisions are made at the IGF – that it is just a “talk 
shop.” He aims to “dissipate those doubts” by scout-
ing for evidence “about concrete decisions or actions 
that have been taken as a result of engagement during 
the current mandate of the IGF.”47 Does this approach, 
essentially a public relations exercise, do justice to the 
criticisms made of the IGF, or can it rather be seen as 
trivializing them?
Outcome-Driven Reform for 
the IGF
By now the IGF has become well and truly ossified in 
roughly the same format that it took nine years ago – be-
fore the Snowden leaks, before the Anti-Counterfeiting 
Trade Agreement (ACTA) or the Stop Online Piracy 
Act (SOPA), before the Arab Spring and its aftermath, 
even, surprising as it may seem, before Twitter. Today, 
civil society needs the IGF more than ever before – but 
46 The successor to the IGF Community Site, Friends of the 
IGF at http://www.friendsoftheigf.org/ has reportedly also 
struggled to obtain access to IGF data. For full disclosure, the 
IGF Community Site was principally maintained by the author, 
though he has no direct involvement with Friends of the IGF.
47 Internet Governance Forum. “Call for Information,” http://www.
intgovforum.org/cms/125-igf-2014/preparatory-process/1621-
call-for-information.
it doesn’t need the IGF that we have; it needs the IGF 
that we were promised.
The MAG has proved that it will not drive the IGF’s 
reform. Structurally moribund, it is far too large, con-
tains too many underqualified and inactive members 
in the name of diversity and inclusiveness, and has no 
shared vision for the IGF. Although the Tunis Agenda 
says nothing of the MAG’s duties or powers, a major-
ity of its members take the view that it is, and should 
remain, nothing but a programme committee for the 
IGF’s annual meeting. This presupposes such basic te-
nets as that the IGF should even be primarily an annual 
meeting – tenets that ought to be open to question.
If not the MAG, then will the UN Secretariat facilitate 
the transformation of the IGF into a body that fulfils the 
promise that WGIG foretold? Clearly not. Even grant-
ed the limited resources to which the Secretariat has 
access, it has placed many roadblocks in the path of 
the community members, from within and outside the 
MAG, who have attempted to ameliorate the IGF’s 
shortcomings, for example, by improving its dismal 
web presence, or streamlining the process by which 
donations can be received.48
How, then, will the IGF’s reform be effectuated? The 
solution lies in the fact that we are presently at a very 
key moment for the IGF and the broader internet gov-
ernance ecosystem. On 16 September this year, during 
the 69th Session of the UN General Assembly and 
shortly following the IGF’s ninth meeting in Istanbul, 
member states will decide whether or not to renew the 
IGF’s mandate for another 5 years. With rather impec-
cable timing, the previous day is the deadline for a draft 
evaluation report on the IGF that has been commis-
sioned by the UN from an independent consultant.49 
If the IGF is to be reformed, it will only be if sufficient 
pressure is applied through these external channels. 
Concerned stakeholders from civil society – and with-
out the intermediation of the MAG – need to reach out 
to the evaluator50 and to their representatives at the 
United Nations, to explain why and how the IGF should 
be reformed if its mandate is to be renewed.
48 After years of inaction by the UN Secretariat, this July the 
Internet Society took matters into its own hands by establishing 
an independent foundation to receive funding for the IGF: see 
http://www.internetsociety.org/news/internet-society-establish-
association-support-internet-governance-forum.
49 See http://workspace.unpan.org/sites/Internet/Documents/
UNPAN92733.pdf.
50 For your convenient reference – since this fact is not disclosed 
anywhere on the IGF website – it is Edward M. Roche, and his 
contact details are easily found through a Web search.
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This paper takes the normative position that it would 
be useful to adjust the balance of power in global inter-
net public policy development, currently dominated by 
industry lobbyists and by governments who have been 
captured by powerful interest groups, so as to relatively 
amplify the voices of less powerful civil society stake-
holders. If that position is accepted, then the outcomes 
required to strengthen the IGF along these lines flow 
accordingly. They may include:  
Coordination 
In cases where a process or institution external to the 
IGF exists to deal with a given global internet-related 
public policy issue, the IGF should provide a coordi-
nating mechanism to direct stakeholders towards it. 
But more than just signposting is required in order to 
fulfil the IGF’s mandate to “strengthen and enhance” 
the engagement of stakeholders in other bodies. It will 
frequently also be necessary to actively facilitate the 
engagement of stakeholders, particularly those from 
developing countries. This will range from capacity 
building, through to the collection, synthesis and de-
livery of messages from IGF stakeholders who are 
unable to participate directly. The latter is especially 
important in the case where the stakeholders’ incapac-
ity to participate is because the external institution does 
not comply with the process criteria of multistakeholder 
participation, transparency and inclusion (see below 
under “Participation”). 
Practically, this would typically involve the development 
of one or more messages from the IGF to the external 
institution (see below under “Documentation”), and for 
the establishment of a liaison function that would allow 
the IGF, as a proxy for its stakeholders, to deliver those 
messages to the target institution in whatever way ef-
fectively meshes with its own internal processes. The 
liaison function would also close the feedback loop, 
ensuring that the reception of the messages and any 
actions taken in response are effectively conveyed 
back to the IGF.
Discussion 
In cases where there is a perceived need for the devel-
opment of globally-coordinated internet-related public 
policy principles and where no suitable existing forum 
to develop these principles exists (in other words, for 
“orphan issues”), the IGF can provide a legitimate 
home for their discussion, and in appropriate cases 
where a consensus can be developed, for the develop-
ment of standalone soft-law recommendations. There 
is no good reason why these discussions ought to be 
limited to a single annual meeting; rather, they should 
be carried out intersessionally, through a continuous 
process that offers online and offline users equivalent 
opportunities to participate. Rather than hoarding its 
information, the use of open data formats by the IGF 
would also help to facilitate broader public engagement 
and enrich discussions that currently take place within 
quite a narrow community of interest. The experiment 
of the NETmundial meeting offers some useful lessons 
for the IGF in this regard. 
Documentation
To be useful to external institutions and to the broader 
public, the lessons learned and agreements reached 
at the IGF must be distilled into the form of short writ-
ten messages. These may include recommendations 
where appropriate, such as the high-level principles 
that were agreed to at NETmundial. In order to produce 
such outputs, supportive structures and processes for 
the IGF must be crafted accordingly. To preserve the 
grassroots character of the IGF, it should be possible 
for proposals for outputs to be initiated from a range of 
sources, including workshops, self-organized dynamic 
coalitions, formally-appointed working groups, and 
even bodies external to the IGF, though only proposals 
that had gone through an inclusive, multistakeholder 
process would be eligible for consideration by the IGF 
as a plenary body, if the group that initiated the pro-
posal choose to proceed down that route.
The benefit in having a message or recommendation 
issued by the IGF as a whole is that considerable moral 
weight could attach to the fact that it had been con-
sidered by a large and inclusive global community of 
stakeholders, and has reached a rough consensus. To 
get to that point requires a well-designed procedure, 
one possible example of which was given in the “IGF 
multi-stakeholder opinions” proposal cited above.51 But 
aside from certain essential elements – such as bal-
anced briefing materials, and strong facilitation that 
compensates for power imbalances – many other vari-
ants of democratic deliberation could work just as well. 
There has not however yet been an IGF main session 
that reached this standard; they have been treated just 
like large workshops (and even scheduled to overlap 
with smaller ones), so that the IGF community has nev-
er had the opportunity to deliberate as a plenary body.
The third and final step in finalizing a message or rec-
ommendation from the IGF requires an assessment of 
whether a proposal has reached consensus, perhaps 
along with wordsmithing of a final text.52 In practical 
51 “Proposal for multi-stakeholder opinion.” BestBits.net. http://
bestbits.net/igf-opinions/
52 For those for whom the IETF (Internet Engineering Task 
Force) serves as a comforting analogy, the initiation of a 
proposed recommendation at the IGF would follow a similar 
course to the development of a proposal at a BOF (Birds of a 
Feather meeting) and thence a Working Group of the IETF ; 
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terms this task requires a much smaller, yet also mul-
tistakeholder group – perhaps an evolved version of 
the MAG, though given the observed problems of that 
group, the task would be more appropriately given to 
a new body within the IGF, such as what I have de-
scribed as a Multistakeholder Internet Policy Council.53 
To ensure buy-in from all stakeholders (and recogniz-
ing that the IGF would only have soft power anyway, 
which powerful stakeholders could override at will), 
each stakeholder group within this council would have 
to approve a recommendation from the IGF in order to 
formalize it. If that standard cannot be reached, then 
the subject matter of the recommendation is perhaps 
not suitable for reaching such a broad multistake-
holder consensus, and instead should be promulgated 
through a narrower group or by other mechanisms.
Participation
As described above, the IGF’s coordination role aims 
to provide a stop-gap means of allowing stakeholders 
to participate in internet-related public policy devel-
opment, even if the other institutions with authority in 
those areas do not yet allow for such participation di-
rectly. But in the longer term, part of the IGF’s mission 
is to act as a neutral body to promote and assess the 
compliance of other internet governance institutions 
with the WSIS process criteria54 – or perhaps in a slight 
gloss upon the IGF’s mandate, with the NETmundial in-
ternet governance process principles – in order to bring 
them up to that common standard.
This does not mean that every institution must become 
a mirror image of the IGF itself. Since the concept 
of fixed roles for stakeholder groups was debunked 
at NETmundial, the multistakeholder coordination 
process should include an analysis of what are the ap-
propriate stakeholder groups to take responsibility for a 
given issue, and what are the appropriate roles of those 
stakeholder groups in dealing with that issue. In some 
cases this might mean that even an intergovernmental 
body – say, in the area of state security – may still com-
ply with the process principles even if other stakeholder 
groups are limited to a consultative role. In other is-
sue areas – intellectual property enforcement, perhaps 
– it may be that full equality between the stakeholder 
groups is a more reasonable standard. Since this as-
sessment will be a vexed political process, it is also 
its discussion by the plenary body is akin to the circulation of 
an Internet Draft for comment within the full membership of the 
IGF ; and its formalization by an executive body such as the 
MAG is like the approval of a Proposed Standard by the IESG 
(Internet Engineering Steering Group).
53 Jeremy Malcolm, “My proposal to the CSTD Working Group on 
Enhanced Cooperation,” 2013, http://igfwatch.org/discussion-
board/one-step-forward-two-steps-back.
54 WSIS, “Tunis Agenda for the Information Society,” para 29.
important for it, like the conclusion of messages from 
the IGF, to be conducted on a multistakeholder basis 
and actively facilitated.
Conclusion
The IGF as it exists today is essentially just an annual 
internet conference, not dissimilar from many others, 
where stakeholders can exchange information and 
best practices. This is a valuable function, but hardly a 
unique one. In contrast, there are other elements of the 
IGF’s mandate, summarized under the four headings 
given above, for which there are no contenders else-
where in the internet governance regime – or, for the 
most part, in any other regime of global governance. 
This may account, in part, for the IGF’s reluctance to 
embrace these untested paragraphs of its mandate.
Yet for civil society, it is these forgotten paragraphs 
that could make the biggest difference. Internet-related 
public policy questions that are today decided through 
the uncoordinated actions of large companies and the 
governments they lobby are frequently poorly thought 
out, overreaching, and human rights-infringing. By 
contributing its evidence-based, globally-networked, 
human rights centered and public interest oriented 
perspective, organized civil society could improve the 
effectiveness and fairness of internet-related laws and 
policies globally. 
The IGF could help to make this happen if it provided 
a forum to work towards the achievement of a rough 
consensus on disputed policy issues through multi-
stakeholder deliberation, and actively facilitated the 
transmission of the outcomes of these deliberations 
into diverse policy processes. The mandate for the IGF 
to do this exists now, and the structures and process-
es for it to do so are relatively easily implemented, as 
NETmundial served to illustrate. But after nine years of 
waiting and hoping, will the required reforms finally be 
put in place over the term of the IGF’s next mandate… 
or will the forum be remembered as a missed oppor-
tunity?
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Institutionalizing the Clearinghouse 
 Function
William J. Drake and Lea Kaspar
The NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement includes 
the suggestion that, “It would be recommendable to 
analyze the option of creating Internet governance 
coordination tools to perform on-going monitoring, 
analysis, and information-sharing functions.”1 This 
provision elicited little comment during the online public 
consultation, the civil society coordination session 
held on the eve of the meeting, or the main sessions 
of the NETmundial itself.  Perhaps this was because 
the statement seems anodyne and unremarkable, or 
because attention was fixed on designing the principles 
and pronouncing on matters like surveillance. 
Whatever the reasons, the lack of engagement was 
unfortunate because this is one of the provisions that 
could actually help to stimulate new and concrete 
measures to improve the global internet governance 
ecosystem.  As such, it would have been useful to have 
had an inclusive initial discussion of the matter.
The notion that the ecosystem lacks sufficient 
mechanisms for the ongoing monitoring, analysis, and 
sharing of governance related information is hardly 
new.  Civil society actors raised this concern a decade 
ago, during the first phase of the World Summit for the 
Information Society (WSIS) process, when people were 
trying to imagine ways to fill holes in the institutional 
architecture of the time—a discussion that fed into the 
proposal to create the Internet Governance Forum 
(IGF).  But in the end, the idea drifted off the collective 
radar.
This situation may now be changing.  There is renewed 
interest in establishing a mechanism, or mechanisms, 
to promote action-enabling information and knowledge 
management, and there are nascent proposals that 
could be resourced and acted upon.  For example, 
the European Commission (EC) has sponsored a 
feasibility study for the construction of a Global Internet 
Policy Observatory (GIPO) that would employ so-called 
1 The NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement, Sao Paulo, 24 
April 2014, p. 10, para. 4, http://netmundial.br/wp-content/up-
loads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf.
“big data” technologies to gather and serve policy 
relevant information.2 In addition, the report of the 
Panel on Global Internet Cooperation and Governance 
Mechanisms suggests the need to develop new and 
strengthen existing mechanisms to, “encourage the 
development of sustainable, searchable databases and 
observatories so that existing processes and potential 
partners are more easily discoverable by those 
seeking to address a problem,” and to “map issues to 
existing [distributed governance] groups and provide 
assistance in the implementation of existing [distributed 
governance] groups’ solutions.”3   These ideas could be 
taken up in the context of the NETmundial Initiative.
Accordingly, this chapter sketches some initial 
considerations that could help render the somewhat 
abstract concepts in play more concrete and tractable. 
We outline a set of programmatic elements that could 
be addressed in a coordinated manner in order to help 
empower governments and stakeholders to pursue 
effective solutions to governance challenges arising 
at different levels of social organization, e.g. national, 
regional, or global. 
What should we call this ensemble of activities? 
Labelling a subject facilitates its discussion, but none 
of the obvious choices seem satisfactory.  The term 
“observatory” is sometimes employed, e.g. by the 
EC’s GIPO project, but our concern is with more than 
observing.  “Knowledge bank” is another term that has 
currency in global policy circles, but this too could be 
understood to refer to a passive repository rather than 
an active on-demand provider of analysis, relationship 
management, and so on.  So for now we will use 
2 The European Commission, “Feasibility Study on Using Auto-
mated Technologies to Support Policy-Making,” 11 June 2014, 
available at, http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/feasibil-
ity-study-using-automated-technologies-support-policy-making.
3 “Report by the Panel on Global Internet Cooperation 
and Governance Mechanisms,” p. 23, available at  http://
internetgovernancepanel.org/sites/default/files/ipdf/XPL_
ICAN1403_Internet%20Governance%20iPDF_06.pdf.  William 
Drake served as an advisor to the panel.
FILLING THE GAPS
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another familiar term—the “clearinghouse” function. 
A clearinghouse connotes a third party that serves as 
a repository and connection facilitator where supply 
meets demand.  The term seems to best encompass the 
range of program elements of interest here, although 
it does carry some semantic baggage from the world 
of finance and implementations in other global policy 
arenas, and it may not translate well across languages. 
Hence our use of the term is provisional, pending a 
better suggestion.
Why speak of institutionalizing the clearinghouse 
function rather than just “the clearinghouse”?  Because 
there are various ways in which the function could be 
institutionally embodied and performed, so it is better at 
this stage to focus on what could be usefully done and 
remain open minded about exactly who might do it and 
where.  Beginning from the latter issue could plunge 
the topic into the usual heated binary argument about 
the merits of creating new organizations and distract 
attention from the full consideration of new informational 
activities.  A decade ago, when the Working Group on 
Internet Governance (WGIG) debated the possibility 
of institutionalizing new dialogue space, it began by 
discussing “the forum function” and only later came to 
the consensus view that this would best be embodied 
in an IGF.   We adopt a similar stance here, and briefly 
take note of the pros and cons of different forms that 
could follow from the function.
The Challenge
As we have mentioned, the notion that the ecosystem 
lacks sufficient mechanisms for the ongoing 
monitoring, analysis, and sharing of governance-
related information emerged during the first phase 
of the WSIS process.  It was integrally related to an 
important conceptual shift that was underway at the 
time, namely the growing recognition that internet 
governance involved much more than the collective 
management of names, numbers, root servers and the 
like—the logical infrastructure that came to be known 
as “critical internet resources,” in IGF-speak.  This new 
understanding was subsequently embodied in the so-
called “broad” working definition of internet governance 
first advanced in the WGIG Report and subsequently 
included in the Tunis Agenda: “Internet governance is 
the development and application by Governments, the 
private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, 
of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making 
procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution 
and use of the Internet.”4  If internet governance included 
4 “Report of the Working Group on Internet Governance,” June 
2005, http://www.wgig.org/docs/WGIGREPORT.pdf, p. 10.  
The definition was in important respects a game changer for 
arrangements pertaining to not only the physical and 
logical infrastructures but also their use for information, 
communication and commerce, then the range of 
issues and institutions involved was extensive.  How 
then could governments and stakeholders track and 
respond to all these developments, or assess their 
conformity with relevant international norms?
An initial idea was included in the civil society declara-
tion adopted at the Geneva WSIS summit in December 
2003.  The declaration called for the establishment of 
an independent and truly multistakeholder observatory 
committee that would, inter alia, “map and track the most 
pressing current developments” in governance and 
“assess and solicit stakeholder input on the con formity 
of such decision-making with the stated  objectives of 
the WSIS agenda….”5  In March 2004, while consider-
ing the possibility of an IGF-like arrangement, one civil 
society participant suggested at the UN’s Global Forum 
on Internet Governance in New York:
But if agreement cannot be reached on a 
multistakeholder process to promote dialogue 
and consensus (embodied, as necessary, in 
soft law), there could be a more minimalist 
and presumably digestible alternative.  
This would be to create a multistakeholder 
mechanism restricted to the monitoring, 
analytical, and information-sharing functions.  
By tracking developments across the Internet 
governance terrain, drawing attention to gaps 
and generalizable lessons, and providing the 
sort of multi-perspective assessment that 
is often lacking in more narrowly mandated 
arrangements, such a mechanism could enrich 
the dialogue and provide helpful inputs into other 
processes tasked with actual decision making.  
It would be especially useful to non-dominant 
stakeholders like developing countries, CSOs, 
and SMEs that already have difficulties 
monitoring and assessing governance 
processes, but other stakeholders could find it 
to be value-adding as well.  A small, nimble, and 
well-connected secretariat supported by virtual 
the WSIS and helped to establish the rationale for an IGF in 
which the full range of governance issues could be addressed 
holistically.  See, William J. Drake, “Conclusion: Why the 
WGIG Process Mattered,” in, Drake, ed., Reforming Internet 
Governance: Perspectives from the UN Working Group on 
Internet Governance (New York: United Nations Information and 
Communication Technologies Task Force, 2005), pp. 249-265, 
available at www.wgig.org/docs/book/WGIG_book.pdf.
5 WSIS Civil Society Plenary, “Shaping Information Societies for 
Human Needs,” Civil Society Declaration to the World Summit 
on the Information Society, 8 December 2003, p. 22, available 
at, http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/geneva/civil-society-declaration.
pdf.  This section of the declaration was drafted by William 
Drake and Wolfgang Kleinwächter.
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networks of organizations and individuals could 
perform these tasks effectively.6
In its July 2005 response to the WGIG report’s 
recommendation to create the IGF, the civil society 
Internet Governance Caucus argued that the IGF could 
perform, inter alia, the following functions:
• Systematic monitoring of trends;
• Comparative, cross-sectoral analysis of 
governance mechanisms, with an eye 
toward “lessons learned” and best practices 
that could inform individual and collective 
institutional improvements;
• Assessment of horizontal issues applicable 
to all arrangements, e.g. the promotion of 
transparency, accountability, inclusion, and 
other principles of “good governance”; 
• Identification of weaknesses and gaps in the 
governance architecture, i.e. “orphaned” or 
multidimensional issues that do not fall neatly 
within  the ambit of any existing body;
• Identification of potential tensions between 
separately developed mechanisms, and 
possibly efforts to promote enhanced 
coordination among them7
In sum, these early formulations saw a need for 
the ongoing monitoring, aggregation, analysis and 
dissemination of information about internet governance 
decision-making; encouraged the identification of 
generalizable patterns and lessons learned via 
holistic and comparative assessments of institutions’ 
performance; noted the possibility of gaps in the 
governance architecture and related “orphan issues;” 
considered that such information sharing would be of 
particular use to developing countries and other non-
dominant actors; and maintained that these activities 
should be pursued in a non-negotiating organizational 
setting, whether the IGF or some small expert body, 
that could provide input to decision-making bodies.
The WGIG report suggested and the Tunis Agenda 
established a holistic mandate for the IGF that included 
the exchange of information and best practices, 
as well as the ongoing promotion and assessment 
of the WSIS principles’ embodiment in internet 
6 This presentation was expanded and published as, William 
J. Drake, “Reframing Internet Governance Discourse: Fif-
teen Baseline Propositions,” in, Don MacLean, ed., Internet 
Governance: A Grand Collaboration  (New York: United Nations 
Information and Communication Technology Taskforce, 2004), 
p. 158, available at, http://tinyurl.com/wjdrake-reframing-2004.
7 GLOCOM on behalf of the WSIS Civil Society Internet Gover-
nance Caucus, “Initial Reactions to the WGIG Report, 19 July 
2005,” Document WSIS-II/PC-3/CONTR/23-E, 1 August 2005, 
at, www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/pc3/contributions/co23.doc, p. 10.
governance processes.  But there was no possibility 
of a political consensus to endow the forum with the 
sort of Secretariat capacities that would be needed 
to pursue or facilitate these or the other informational 
activities suggested above in a systematic manner.  In 
the absence of further elaboration of the concept and 
champions among politically salient actors, the notion 
that some form of clearinghouse function might be 
institutionalized in the IGF or elsewhere drifted well off 
the governance agenda.
In the period since the IGF’s launch in 2006, the 
global infosphere has grown exponentially.  The array 
of information resources on internet governance 
issues and institutions is continuously expanding as 
new actors and voices engage, the policy challenges 
increase in number and complexity, and the internet 
touches ever more deeply on political, economic, 
and sociocultural concerns across all levels of social 
organization. We are quickly moving from an age of 
seeming scarcity to something like a massive “data 
commons” about internet governance.8 Even for 
dedicated and experienced governance mavens, 
finding one’s way through the resulting information 
overload in order to track developments of interest 
can be a daunting task.  For newcomers to the field 
or people with other responsibilities that preclude living 
and breathing internet governance, the challenge is 
even greater and potentially vertigo-inducing. Relying 
on conventional search engines and pointers from 
colleagues, for example, to identify, organize and then 
assess and make use of the most relevant information 
on any given topic often does not suffice.
The challenge can be particularly daunting for 
governments and stakeholders from developing 
countries, especially the UN-recognized Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs).   An LDC minister or her 
subordinates who are seeking to engage effectively in 
global governance arrangements, or who are seeking 
solutions to spam, network security or a host of other 
issues on which sufficient domestic institutional 
capacity is lacking, may be hard pressed to gather the 
information or construct the relationships with sources 
of expertise that would be needed. For them and many 
other users, ploughing through endless blogposts, 
press stories, organizational reports, scholarly papers 
and the like could fail to yield a clear direction on policy 
choices and result in nothing more than being confused 
at a higher level of complexity.
Such concerns have helped to fuel the calls over 
8 The term is from, World Economic Forum, Big Data, Big Impact: 
New Possibilities for International Development (Geneva: WEF, 
2012), available at, http://www.weforum.org/reports/big-data-
big-impact-new-possibilities-international-development.
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the past decade for intergovernmental organizations 
(IGOs) to play a much greater role in internet 
governance.  Of course, the push during the first phase 
of WSIS by many members of the Group of 77 (G-77) 
for the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to 
take over functions performed by the US government 
and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN), and subsequently for the creation 
of a new UN-based entity such as India’s proposed 
Committee for Internet-Related Policies were not 
merely about problems of knowledge and relationship 
management.  Questions of political power, preferred 
models of state-society relations and governance 
were obviously driving forces.  Nevertheless, some 
G-77 members have often argued that they cannot 
adequately discharge their public policy responsibilities 
unless intergovernmental bodies offer the sort of on-
demand and routine access to knowledge and expertise 
that they provide in other global policy arenas.
This argument especially has been made with regard 
to so-called “orphan issues” that do wholly fall under 
existing intergovernmental mandates. Which issues 
actually are “orphans” and fall into gaps in the 
governance architecture has been the subject of long-
running dispute. As Samantha Dickinson recounts in 
her chapter in this volume, the UN’s Working Group 
on Enhanced Cooperation (WGEC) established a 
Correspondence Group in which she and Lea Kaspar 
volunteered to aggregate issues identified by members 
in order to arrive at an evidence-based consensus 
identifying such gaps.  While the WGEC was unable to 
complete this work, it is hoped that UN staff will bring 
it to fruition.
In the meantime, consider an example that is often 
cited as an orphan issue: network security. While 
there is no UN agency with a comprehensive mandate 
to manage infrastructure security, there are in fact a 
plethora of governance activities underway in technical 
and policy bodies at the national, regional and global 
levels.   While these may not provide solutions to every 
issue, they do effectively address many of them. But 
it may not be easy for a government or stakeholder to 
access, assess and compare all these activities, or to 
construct a network of relationships that would facilitate 
the development of viable solutions. This is where a 
coordinated clearinghouse function could help.
Possible Elements 
How would one perform holistic, on-going monitoring 
and analysis of governance issues, policies and 
institutions? How could we organize and disseminate 
information and facilitate relationships in order to 
promote decision-making?  In exploring these questions, 
it would be useful to consider not only the unique 
properties of the internet governance ecosystem, but 
also experiences with varyingly similar initiatives that 
have been undertaken in other complex global policy 
arenas, such as health and the environment, finance 
and development, and international peace and security. 
In these and other fields there have been experiments 
with innovative technological and analytical tools and 
organizational models, including crowdsourcing, expert 
networking, and the use of open data.   
The following presents a set of elements that could 
collectively constitute a clearinghouse function, 
drawing in particular on experiences in the climate 
change arena. Although nominally somewhat 
modular, they would probably best be developed or 
addressed in an integrated manner due to their various 
interdependencies.  
Human/Machine Balance.  A meta-design question 
that informs all aspects of such projects is the balance 
between human intervention and machine processing. 
The most familiar approach of course relies on analysts 
for the collection, classification, storage, and analysis of 
content, but new projects like the EC’s GIPO proposal 
opt instead for the automation of such tasks.  A priori, 
one would think that a blended model would be more 
resource-intensive but also yield the greatest value with 
respect to analysis and relationship management.  But 
there is plenty of room for experimentation with different 
approaches at many points along the continuum.
Definition of Scope.  A foundational question to be 
tackled is the scope of the issues and institutions 
to be covered.  If we take as a starting point the 
aforementioned “broad definition,” the range and 
diversity of internet governance activities that could 
be covered is rather daunting.  There are various 
solutions that could be considered to make the task 
more tractable.  For example, one could imagine a 
clearinghouse function that is focused on one or a few 
bounded issue-areas; a specific level of social analysis 
(e.g. national, regional, or global); or a particular 
institutional form (e.g. multistakeholder or multilateral). 
In addition, these varying dimensions could be paired 
in different configurations, e.g. a focus on national-level 
approaches to privacy and data protection.  
Clearly, the most demanding option would be to pur-
sue an omnibus approach to the internet governance 
landscape. This would require fairly elaborate taxon-
omies and categories for gathering, organizing and 
 cross-referencing information resources, and probably 
some prioritization of certain topics while also encom-
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passing less systematic and structure resources on 
others.  Many research programs and observatories 
on internet governance or other policy areas, such as 
international trade, foreground particular issues but 
also encompass items on other aspects of the field as 
opportunities and events warrant, and some cycle in 
and out lead topics over time. But the complexity of 
the challenges involved is substantial, as efforts else-
where have demonstrated.  For example, early in the 
field’s development, several climate change groups 
raced to create the “one stop shop” for information only 
to find that they were too broadly framed to be really 
effective. An evolution ensued toward differentiated 
platforms filling specific niches for targeted audiences. 
Coordination, perhaps among federated platforms, 
could be a way to blend specialization with a holistic 
analytical overlay, although there is the associated 
risk that competition for resources and recognition and 
 organizational turf considerations could detract from 
the effort.
User needs assessment.  What is the nature of 
the demand, and the real and tangible governance 
problems in need of solutions?  Requirements and 
constraints may vary considerably across governments 
and stakeholders, so it is imperative to “know thy user.” 
Moreover, their needs may evolve, even in the course 
of a project, so the solutions offered must be flexible 
and adaptable to changing parameters or resources 
could be wasted. An agile approach would be needed 
to attain the holy grail of “disciplined execution along 
with continuous innovation.”9 Lessons could be drawn 
from policy arenas such as climate change, where 
experience demonstrated the benefits of building 
responsiveness to evolving user needs, tastes, and 
trends into projects. Drawing on user preferences, 
profiles, and past behavior to tailor content, as search 
engines do, might be helpful.10
Information identification, gathering, and verifi-
cation. One challenge, especially given the potential 
broad scope of a holistic approach, would be to con-
solidate diverse data sources that may be neither 
compatible nor comparable. Data may be quantitative 
or qualitative, or variable in length and quality. This 
could pose a serious impediment when attempting to 
provide an integrated overview of any issue area. The 
9 Steve Denning, “The Best-Kept Management Secret On The 
Planet: Agile, Forbes 9 April 2012, available at http://www.
forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2012/04/09/the-best-kept-man-
agement-secret-on-the-planet-agile/.
10 The lessons from climate change referenced here are based on 
interviews carried out by Rebecca Zausmer for Global Partners 
Digital with the convenors of knowledge-sharing platforms 
weADAPT and the Adaptation Learning Mechanism (ALM), and 
on research concerning other platforms and initiatives. 
technical challenges of aggregating and drawing on di-
verse sources could significantly impact the affect the 
scope, analysis and dissemination of information. In 
addition, decisions would be needed on data collection 
and management options such as levels of automa-
tion, verification modalities, frequency of updates, data 
collection tools, degree of user interaction, reliance on 
external and expert inputs, and the level and type of 
oversight. There also could be a need to generate origi-
nal content, particularly where relevant information is 
not well documented and readily available.
Centralized vs. distributed information manage-
ment. Across the various platforms and organizations 
in the climate change arena, the oversight function is 
often separated from the content management and cre-
ation function in order to optimize the activities. Many 
organizations have small management/oversight struc-
tures engaged in decision-making, development of the 
platform/portal, sourcing funding, and developing rela-
tionships. Content management and editorial oversight 
vary between a tight gatekeeper model and a more 
distributed model involving key partners. Although in 
some cases thematic streams are managed by groups 
specialized in the given theme, there is always an ele-
ment of editorial oversight for quality control purposes.
Analysis of events and trends. If users are unable to 
link the information provided to real world needs, the 
preceding activities of collecting and organizing content 
would be useless. This activity would require, inter alia, 
accessing information about existing arrangements; 
identifying, observing and following trends; identifying 
issues and potential solutions; and mapping and 
visualizing information according to set criteria in 
order to yield fact-based, neutral, and well-structured 
content. Providing such services in an optimal manner 
would seem to require human expertise.
Descriptive statistics can be used to map and 
summarize certain types of information. Organizations 
such as the World Bank and the ITU provide good 
examples of how statistical resources can be employed 
to uncover trends across a wide variety of topics. 
These examples of wide-ranging, but relatively static, 
monitoring platforms should be explored alongside 
more narrow and dynamic services such as Scout,11 
which allows users to follow developments around 
specific pieces of national legislation in almost real 
time. With advancements in statistical modelling, users 
have an ever growing list of options at their disposal 
to describe the relationships between events and to 
predict future developments. 
11 Scout. “About.” https://scout.sunlightfoundation.com/about
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The clearinghouse function also could provide a basis 
for comparative institutional assessments and the 
identification of good practices worth replicating. Users 
would need to be able to analyze the status of existing 
arrangements by employing reliable data and analytical 
tools and benchmarks. However, as demonstrated by 
the recent experience of the WGEC, devising broadly 
accepted benchmarks in the absence of agreed 
upon definitions or principles can be difficult. A way 
around this could be to look at how principles such as 
transparency, accountability, and inclusive participation 
are or are not operationalized in comparable domains of 
activity, rather than trying to establish firm benchmarks 
applicable across all governance arrangements. 
After all, the levels of openness or transparency in 
cybersecurity may need to be different from those in 
dealing with, for instance, child online protection.   
 
Dissemination. Easy access, usability, and outreach 
efforts are equally important. Information must be 
presented in user-friendly and even customizable 
formats. In some cases, this could require a coordinated 
effort by data scientists, designers, topic experts and 
end users. Ideally, iterative feedback loops would be 
incorporated throughout the process of developing the 
appropriate user interface(s). Furthermore, it would be 
important that any technical or design elements take 
into account internet access constraints in developing 
countries, as well as the needs and requirements of 
poor and marginalized communities.  One can imagine 
a wide variety of informational products using different 
media, from simple data sets to issue briefs, in-depth 
reports, and graphical and video representations to 
name a few.
Trust and buy-in. It would be imperative to work 
closely with partners, contributors and users in order 
to ensure sustainability. This is an important lesson 
from the experiences of the climate change knowledge 
sharing platforms weADAPT and the Adaptation 
Learning Mechanism (ALM). To get people to use and 
contribute, a sense of ownership is essential and an 
effective outreach strategy to the community of users 
is necessary. Of particular importance, given the often 
disputatious nature of the internet governance arena, 
are credibility and neutrality.  As relevant, differing 
opinions and interpretations could be presented 
alongside each other in a fair manner with pointers to 
additional external resources supporting the respective 
positions.
Relationship Management. Sometimes it will be 
enough to simply provide users with information or 
analysis, and sometimes more will be needed in 
order to facilitate capacity development and decision-
making.  In the latter cases, a core element of the 
clearinghouse function could be to help users access 
existing or construct new transnational policy networks. 
For probably every internet governance issue there 
are experts and experienced practitioners scattered 
around the world and working in different organizational 
settings who would be willing to help governments 
and stakeholders forge locally relevant approaches to 
the challenges they face.  Such distributed networks 
could be assembled on an ad hoc, temporary basis 
or as standing groups that are available as needed. 
These horizontal assemblages could complement 
more conventional sources of technical assistance and 
expertise, such as is provided by vertically organized 
consultancies, business associations, civil society 
groups, and multistakeholder and intergovernmental 
organizations. In parallel, a clearinghouse could assist 
users in constructing platforms for public input and 
contributions, promoting transparency and citizen 
inclusion.  
Institutionalization Options
We turn now to the knotty question of how the function 
could be institutionalized as a standing component of 
the global internet governance ecosystem.  Of course, 
if one is of the view that a convincing case for doing this 
has not been and cannot be made, then the following 
options will be of little interest.  But if one believes 
that with proper elaboration there could be something 
here worth exploring further, the question of where the 
function might be housed inevitably must be addressed. 
We briefly outline five options:
Status Quo+.  If the prospect of constructing a new 
 organization cannot attract sufficient support, the 
 global community could try to approximate the function 
by committing more resources to enabling groups that 
are already on the scene.  Communities of expertise 
like the Internet Society, the Global Internet Gover-
nance Academic Network, and the new Network of 
Centres; capacity development programs such as the 
various schools of internet governance and the Diplo 
Foundation; organizations like the various technical 
community bodies, consultancies, think tanks, and 
academic  research centres and observatories; civil 
society and private sector organizations and associa-
tions; national, regional and global technical assistance 
programs and development banks; dialogue forums 
like the national, regional and global IGFs—these and 
other entities could simply be encouraged to “step 
up their game” with respect to the kinds of informa-
tion resources and relationships they already provide 
to varying degrees.  This could be the path of least 
 resistance, but there are reasons to wonder whether, 
absent some rather demanding coordination efforts, 
this would really come close to helping users like LDC 
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governments work their way through the cacophony to 
focused and locally viable decision-making.
Intergovernmental Organization. IGOs already 
provide some of the elements described above within 
the constraints of their respective mandates.  Some 
would undoubtedly welcome the expanded mandates, 
resources and staffing that a systematically coordinated 
clearinghouse function would require.  And for many 
G-77 governments, this could be the preferred solution 
that would inspire the highest level of trust and buy-
in.  But there would be some significant barriers to 
overcome with this option, e.g. a view of governments 
(or even particular government ministries) as their 
primary clientele; variable and sometimes poor 
relations with the nongovernmental actors that are 
often best positioned to provide certain kinds of 
information and expertise; commitments to suboptimal 
governance models; the possibility of politicization and 
bureaucratization unduly constraining the functions’ 
performance; focused mandates that could not easily 
encompass many of the more pressing issues; and 
the political inability to facilitate cross-organizational 
assessments of governance performance.
A New Multistakeholder Organization.  Over the 
years, when a functional need has been identified, the 
global internet community has proven able to create 
new and sustainable entities that operate in a fairly 
transparent, accountable and inclusive manner.  It is 
easy to forget that not so long ago we did not have 
ICANN or all the Regional Internet Registries, internet 
service provider associations, network operator 
groups, internet exchanges, security entities, standards 
processes, root server operators and so on.  Given 
this track record, one would think it possible to create 
a lean but expert organization that would complement 
and effectively interface with the others, as well as with 
potential users.  Such an organization also could take 
on the role, addressed by Anriette Esterhuysen in her 
contribution to this volume, of providing models, good 
practices, lessons learned and so to help interested 
governments establish multistakeholder processes at 
the national or regional level.  
The NETmundial Initiative could get the ball rolling. 
During the six month boot-up phase in which the World 
Economic Forum (WEF) will serve as the convening 
platform, a working group could be constituted to flesh 
out the concept and define a sustainable organizational 
model.  Transparent and inclusive online consultations 
could be held to solicit input from diverse stakeholders 
and experts worldwide, and contacts could be initiated 
with potential users, such as developing country 
governments, to undertake a needs assessment.     
A global community of supporters could be constructed 
to guide the execution of the project after the WEF’s 
convening role is concluded. And the WEF could 
use its 2015 annual meeting to bring together high 
level political and industry leaders and encourage 
commitments of financial and other support. The 
NETmundial Initiative’s Steering Committee could 
oversee the project.
A major challenge here would be to obtain and 
sustain the buy-in of developing and transitional 
country governments that are not used to working in 
a multistakeholder setting and may be more strongly 
inclined toward an intergovernmental formulation.  The 
sort of riotous debate and factionalism that sometimes 
mars multistakeholder processes ideally would be 
tempered somewhat to increase the comfort levels of 
governments and other potential partners who are not 
used to the culture.  Even then, a historically nurtured 
and sometimes deeply embedded lack of trust in 
some quarters could pose a serious challenge unless 
forward-looking, first-moving client governments had 
good experiences and encouraged others to abandon 
their reluctance.
The IGF.  A fourth option would be to return to the sort of 
vision civil society participants advanced a decade ago 
and perform the function within the IGF.  This could entail 
developing an expert grouping within the secretariat that 
would engage in networked collaboration with people 
from the IGF community.  There are arguably natural 
synergies between the dialogue and clearinghouse 
functions that could be exploited, e.g. by pairing face 
to face with online activities. As Wolfgang Kleinwächter 
has argued, “With regard to the clearinghouse function, 
the dialogue among various governmental and non-
governmental organizations and institutions can clear 
the air with regard who has to do what. It could lead 
to a more enhanced and developed division of labour 
where institution can spin a web of interactions.…12 
Moreover, the IGF provides a pre-established global 
multistakeholder platform that could be rapidly 
leveraged to ramp up outreach and promote inclusion. 
And in at least some circles, it would provide greater 
legitimacy and continuity with prior long-running global 
processes.
On the other hand, the organizational culture, budgetary 
rules and political constraints of the United Nations 
could make it difficult to organize an innovative and 
independent activity with significant multistakeholder 
12 Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Multistakeholderism and the IGF: 
Laboratory, Clearinghouse, Watchdog,” in, William J. Drake, ed., 
Internet Governance: Creating Opportunities for All---The Fourth 
Internet Governance Forum, Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt, 15-18 
November 2009  (New York: The United Nations, 2010), p. 91.
Page 54
BEYOND NETMUNDIAL: THE ROADMAP FOR INSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE ECOSYSTEM AUGUST 2014
participation.  The IGF itself has already faced many 
challenges in this respect, and one would not want 
the project to become a political football or bargaining 
chip in the General Assembly, or to be interfered with 
in terms of staffing, project management, finances, 
etc.  Moreover, if legitimacy and political support are 
thought to be an argument in favor of placing it under 
the IGF umbrella, it is worth bearing in mind that there 
are many G-77 governments that already choose not to 
engage seriously with the IGF.
Mixed.  The final option would be to combine the 
last two models, by establishing an independent 
multistakeholder clearinghouse with its own financial 
supports and community control, but develop some sort 
of working relationship with the IGF.  This might square 
the circle and provide the benefits of both approaches 
while attenuating their potential downsides.  The 
modalities of cooperation would take some work to 
hammer out, but depending on various factors this 
could prove doable.
Conclusion
Our discussion clearly provides more questions than 
answers, and is intended only to be a suggestive 
appetizer.  Further research and analysis will be 
needed to flesh out the concept in greater detail, 
including by drawing on similar endeavors in other 
global policy spaces. Also needed would be a focused 
and inclusive global dialogue about ways to improve 
the circulation of knowledge and information and the 
facilitation of policy networks in the global internet 
governance ecosystem.  Whether the ensemble of 
activities here referred to as the clearinghouse function 
could help to provide a solution is a question that could 
be taken up in an expanded NETmundial Initiative and 
other venues.  In the meantime, the authors of this 
chapter have organized a workshop on the subject to 
be held during the IGF at Istanbul in September 2014.13 
There a group of expert panellists will consider such 
questions as:
• Is the status quo sufficient, or is there a compelling 
case for institutionalizing the clearinghouse 
function in some manner?
• If one believes that in principal this is worth 
exploring, what elements of the function most need 
to be thought through and clarified in order to make 
it a viable project?
13 Workshop 153, “Institutionalizing the Clearinghouse Function,” 
Thursday, 4 September 2014, information available at, http://
sched.co/1mJ0A2M.  As with all IGF workshops, a transcript 
of the discussion will subsequently be available from the IGF 
website.
• How do we assess the relative costs and benefits 
of the five models above?  Which ultimately seems 
like the most promising path forward?  Or is there 
another, better model to consider?
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Global Mechanisms to Strengthen    
Democratic Practices in National 
 Multistakeholder Efforts
Anriette Esterhuysen
Taking the NETmundial statement as its starting 
point, this chapter unpacks the concept of 
multistakeholderism and explores the interrelationships 
between multistakeholder participation at global and 
national levels, with a view to identifying mechanisms 
that can strengthen and sustain multistakeholder 
internet policy-making where it matters most: the 
national level. Stronger and more sustained national 
level multistakeholder participation will, in turn, inform 
regional and global processes and help address the 
current gaps in participation and influence between 
stakeholder groups, and between people from 
developing and developed countries. 
Unpacking the 
 “Multistakeholder Approach” 
to Internet Governance
The idea that policy processes should be inclusive is 
not new. Devolution of power to the local level and public 
participation has been part of broader discussions on 
deepening democracy for a long time. What gives the 
notion of multistakeholder policy in the context of the 
internet an extra “edge” are six interlinked factors:
The internet is inherently ‘multistakeholder.’  The 
internet is not developed, controlled, or managed 
by any one stakeholder group and depends on both 
public and private investment and network and 
telecommunications infrastructure. The influence 
that different stakeholders have on the character of 
the internet changes over time as a result of wider 
changes in, among other things, modalities of access 
(for example, the change from fixed line to mobile 
access, or cloud-based services). While these changes 
do not make the internet any less multistakeholder, it 
affects the power, and interests of stakeholders in ways 
that should be addressed by internet governance and 
regulation.
The internet is a global public resource.  In this 
author’s view, the internet should be regulated as 
if it were a global public good.1 What began as a 
seemingly elitist new way of communicating and 
sharing data developed mostly in US academic and 
military institutions has evolved into a truly global 
public resource. Governments around the world are 
increasingly concerned with being able to exercise 
control over the internet’s use and governance.
Divides in power and influence continue to 
characterize internet development, use, and 
governance.  In spite of its dynamism and increasing 
ubiquity, issues of power and control, and access 
and exclusion continue to present challenges which 
affect internet users and which play themselves out 
in internet policymaking. This relates in particular to 
the real and/or perceived dominance of the richer and 
more powerful parts of the world in developing and 
benefiting from the internet, as well as the emergence 
of large global internet companies and monopolies. 
The ‘digital divide,’ itself an extension of existing social 
divides in the offline world, produces vast differences 
in availability, quality, and affordability of access to the 
internet, among and within countries. Divides also exist 
in the internet’s governance and development. Even 
when changes in this configuration of power take place, 
e.g. through the increasing influence of companies and 
platforms based in China, the general playing field is 
not leveling.
Internet users – and those not yet connected – 
matter.  Unlike in, for example, traditional telephony, 
internet users are not mere consumers. They shape 
1 While the internet does not meet conventional criteria for being 
a global public good, this does not prevent public policy and 
regulation from approaching the internet as an entity that has 
many of the qualities of a public good. It is worth noting that it 
is mostly the lack of effective public policy and regulation that 
prevents the internet from conforming to traditional definitions of 
a public good, such as being ubiquitous and universally available.
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the internet, generate content, use it as a workplace, a 
social space, for learning and for political expression and 
participation. They are stakeholders in its governance, 
and they include people and institutions from across 
the world and multiple sectors. Moreover, the impact 
of the internet touches on so many aspects of daily life 
that those who do not yet have access have as much, 
if not more, at stake in its governance as those who use 
it on a daily basis. Those without access are doubly 
disempowered due to the conditions linked to their 
lack of access, such as their gender, class, social or 
geographic location, as well as by not having access to 
what has become a critical enabler of human rights and 
the primary medium for expression and participation.
Internet policy is not just about the internet.  The 
internet does not exist in a parallel dimension. It is part 
of social, economic, cultural, personal and political 
life. Mapping of internet related public policy reveals a 
complex and vast ecosystem of issues, mechanisms 
for policy making, and forums for standards setting and 
dialogue.2 From health, to education, to trade, to human 
rights, internet-related policy responses are taking place 
in all these spheres and more. Public policy issues that 
relate to the internet are not finite. They will emerge 
and change over time. Some will stand out as priorities 
at certain times, as does the protection of personal 
privacy at present. What is important to recognize is 
that these issues are so diverse, and require so many 
different areas of expertise that it would not be feasible 
to centralize decision-making about them. A common 
weakness among internet governance specialists 
from all stakeholder groups is that they see public 
policy through an internet lens, rather than internet 
governance through a public policy lens.
Global internet governance is not just about global 
issues.  It is often not possible to make a clear ‘global’ 
vs ‘national’ demarcation among these issues. There is 
an unspoken, and often spoken, notion that ‘national’ 
issues do not belong in global governance discussions. 
Global multistakeholder internet governance insiders 
tend to underestimate the complexity, and importance, 
of the national space.3 Many actively try to posit the 
global space as an alternative to the national. This 
is particularly convenient for multinational internet 
2 David Souter, “Mapping internet rights and freedom of 
expression,” Global Information Society Watch 2011: Internet 
Rights and Democratization (Goa: APC & Hivos, 2011), p. 55. 
 http://www.giswatch.org/mapping-democracy/freedom-
expression/mapping-internet-rights-and-freedom-expression.
3 A study by Souter and Kerretts on Kenya done for the Internet 
Society in May 2012 illustrates this complexity. “Internet 
Governance in Kenya – an Assessment,” is available at http://
www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/ISOC%20study%20
of%20IG%20in%20Kenya%20-%20D%20Souter%20%26%20
M%20Kerretts-Makau%20-%20final.pdf
companies for whom the regulatory burden of having 
to comply with multiple national regimes would have a 
huge cost. The two levels, however, are fundamentally 
interlinked. Global policies on investment in 
infrastructure affect access availability at the local level. 
Enforcement of rules to prevent copying of content of 
text books or journals published in one country, affects 
access to knowledge of people living in many others. 
Most global internet governance spaces have tended 
to separate ‘global’ and ‘local’ in ways that have made 
participation for stakeholders from developing countries 
very challenging. The global level has been defined in 
ways that have been quite alienating to people who 
are trying to come to grips with internet governance. 
Put simply: they are made to feel that internet policy 
issues that matter to them are not important enough 
to be discussed at the global level. And, if they want 
to participate in global discussions, they are under 
pressure to show knowledge and interest in issues that 
are often quite remote to them, such as “the state of 
the IPV6 transition” or whether the IGF is, or is not, 
an example of “enhanced cooperation in internet 
governance.”
These factors have contributed to a rather uncertain 
terrain – or internet governance ecosystem—made up 
of a mix of old and new institutions and of top-down and 
bottom-up processes. Participation in it is still relatively 
limited in terms of the number, range and diversity of 
people and institutions who are actively engaged. Yet 
it is a very contested space, particularly with regard to 
finding governance solutions that enable the internet’s 
growth as a public resource, while also containing 
the power of governments (who often want to restrict 
content and monitor user behavior) and corporations 
(who usually prefer as little regulation as possible, or 
in the case of the traditional large rights holders, who 
would like to maximize enforcement of intellectual 
property rights) to influence its governance in ways that 
serve their own particular interests.
The application of the multistakeholder principle 
has tended to be quite simplistic, with stakeholders 
clustered into four or five groupings: governments, 
business, civil society, the technical community (with the 
academic community sometimes being clustered along 
with the technical community), and intergovernmental 
organizations. Internet users are either ignored, or 
seen to be represented by civil society, or, in some 
cases, represented through the rather vaguely defined 
device of ‘at-large’ internet user structures. 
This simplistic application of the multistakeholder 
principle is a direct result of the absence of systematic 
acknowledgement of the differences in power, 
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capacities, and resources among various stakeholders. 
This points to the greatest democratic deficit in the 
multistakeholder approach in its current form: it has 
enabled well-resourced stakeholders to dominate 
policy spaces and to influence outcomes in service 
of their own interests, while leaving end-users largely 
ignored because those that represent their interests, 
civil society and at-large structures, are simply not 
powerful enough to compete with business and 
government.
Leveraging the NETmundial 
to Strengthen Democratic 
Multistakeholder Internet 
Governance
At the level of international agreements, the NETmundial 
statement constitutes the most coherent formal 
international endorsement of the multistakeholder 
approach since the World Summit on the Information 
Society. Building on more than a decade of debate 
and dialogue, particularly at global, regional and 
national Internet Governance Forums, the NETmundial 
statement and roadmap demonstrates the potential of 
the multistakeholder approach to internet governance 
while also recognizing the challenges it has to address 
to be effective, sustainable, democratic and, most of 
all, to serve the public interest. 
The first principle in the NETmundial statement’s 
section on Internet Governance Process Principles is 
“Multistakeholder.” It states that: 
Internet governance should be built on demo-
cratic, multistakeholder processes, ensuring 
the meaningful and accountable participation 
of all stakeholders, including governments, the 
private sector, civil society, the technical com-
munity, the academic community and users. 
The respective roles and responsibilities of 
stakeholders should be interpreted in a flexible 
manner with reference to the issue under dis-
cussion.
The multistakeholder approach is not an end in itself; it 
is a means to achieve the end of inclusive democratic 
internet governance. This implies that these processes 
need to be more than just ‘multistakeholder:’ they 
need to strive actively to be democratic, and consider 
stakeholders, and their roles and interests in a dynamic 
and flexible manner. Multistakeholderism is not a 
substitute for democracy. Mechanisms intended to 
strengthen the multistakeholder approach need to start 
from this premise and explore the relationship between 
the two. 
They also need to consider the six factors identified 
above: that the internet is inherently ‘multistakeholder’ 
and a global public resource; that divides in power and 
influence continue to characterize internet develop-
ment, use and governance; that internet users – and 
those who don’t have access yet – matter; that internet 
policy is not just about the internet; and, global internet 
governance not just about global issues.
The above, together with the remaining principles for 
internet governance processes in the NETmundial 
statement, provide a checklist for deepening democratic 
practice in internet governance.4 They should guide 
mechanisms to support multistakeholder processes at 
national levels.
Mechanisms to Support 
Democratic Multistakeholder 
Internet Governance
Both the NETmundial roadmap and the report 
of the Panel on Global Internet Cooperation and 
Governance Mechanisms5 make proposals on how 
the multistakeholder model can be strengthened.6 
Recommendations have been made in other spaces 
as well, particularly at regional IGFs, but these are the 
two most recent.7 
Below I propose seven types of mechanisms: 1) 
Mechanisms for sharing information and innovation; 
2) for dialogue, networking and debate; 3) to provide 
normative frameworks and guiding principles; 4) for 
capacity building; 5) for research, monitoring and 
4 The headings of these principles are: Open, participative, 
consensus driven governance; Transparent; Accountable; 
Inclusive and equitable; Distributed; Collaborative; Enabling 
meaningful participation. Read the full section on pages 6-7 of 
the NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement (São Paulo, April, 
24th 2014) at http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/
NETmundial-multi-stakeholder-Document.pdf. The document 
also references the importance of including women in internet 
governance processes.
5 The author of this chapter was a member of this panel. http://
internetgovernancepanel.org/panel.
6 The NETmundial statement talks particularly of developing 
multistakeholder mechanisms at the national level and, at 
the global level, strengthening the Internet Governance 
Forum. The Panel identifies three types of enablers for a 
dynamically distributed and decentralized internet governance 
ecosystem: Forums and Dialogues; Expert Communities 
and Capacity Development and Toolkits. From the report 
of the panel released in May 2014 and available at http://
internetgovernancepanel.org
7 See for example the recommendations from the 2013 African 
Internet Governance Forum on “On Principles of Internet 
Governance, Multi-Stakeholder participation and Enhanced 
Cooperation” at http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/images/2014/
report%20afigf%202013.pdf
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evaluation; 6) to ensure balanced inclusion of relevant 
stakeholder groups; and 7) mechanisms directed 
specifically at governments, linked to intergovernmental 
processes and institutions. I also identify risks that 
should be considered in operationalizing these 
mechanisms.
Mechanisms for sharing information, tools and 
innovation. As there is a separate chapter in this 
volume that focuses on an information clearinghouse, 
there is no need for further discussion here. What should 
be considered is the sustainability of such a clearing- 
house. It would therefore make sense to closely link 
the information clearinghouse itself, or the coordination 
of a network of such clearinghouses, to an existing 
mechanism such as the Internet Governance Forum. 
Since governance is evolving, this clearinghouse can 
also provide access to innovation in governance and 
participation, such as on how to facilitate effective 
remote participation. Initiatives such as the Governance 
Lab at New York University can be brought into the mix 
to share new ideas and technology-enabled platforms 
for inclusive governance.
The location of this mechanism is particularly important. 
If this clearinghouse is not perceived as an honest 
broker, actors throughout the internet governance 
ecosystem will be reluctant share information with it, 
and will not fully trust the information it provides.
Multistakeholder forums and dialogues. The value 
of spaces where internet policy can be discussed 
and debated has been demonstrated by the Internet 
Governance Forum at global, national and regional 
levels. The more inclusive these dialogues are, the 
better. The IGF process needs to be strengthened, 
and the IGF secretariat needs leadership and greater 
capacity. The NETmundial roadmap points to how this 
can be achieved by implementing the recommendations 
of the UN CSTD working group on IGF improvements 
by the end of 2015.8 
Stakeholder specific forums and dialogues. For 
stakeholder groups to function effectively in a multi-
stakeholder context, they need to have the opportunity 
to examine and analyze issues among themselves. 
8 “Improvements should include inter-alia: a. Improved outcomes: 
Improvements can be implemented including creative ways 
of providing outcomes/ recommendations and the analysis of 
policy options; b. Extending the IGF mandate beyond five-year 
terms; c. Ensuring guaranteed stable and predictable funding 
for the IGF, including through a broadened donor base, is 
essential; d. The IGF should adopt mechanisms to promote 
worldwide discussions between meetings through intersessional 
dialogues.” From clause 3 in Section II of the NETmundial 
Roadmap available at, http://netmundial.br/wp-content/
uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf.
This will enable them to engage in multistakeholder 
 forums with greater confidence.
All fora, be they multistakeholder or stakeholder group-
specific, are open to capture. Stakeholder groups as 
defined in the internet governance ecosystem (business, 
civil society, government and the technical community) 
are all internally diverse. This is most noticeable in civil 
society as it is such a large group, but other stakeholder 
groups also contain multiple interests and perspectives. 
If it is worth having, the multistakeholder model must 
support the expression of diverse views within as well 
as among stakeholder communities. Caucusing, which 
tries to achieve consensus around a ‘private sector’ 
view or a ‘civil society view’ or an ‘African view’ is 
needed at times, but it risks undermining the value of 
diversity of perspectives. 
A broad normative framework and guiding prin-
ciples. Strengthening democratic internet governance 
that places the public interest and human rights at its 
core at the national level requires guiding principles 
that provide direction, and the means for holding actors 
accountable. 
The value of such principles was demonstrated by the 
Brazilian process where the multistakeholder Internet 
Steering Group (CGI.br) developed principles in 2010 
that eventually formed the basis for the Marco Civil, 
legislation that provides a civil framework for governing 
the internet. 
Building on the many efforts to agree on common 
principles for internet governance (e.g. by the IGF 
Dynamic Coalition on Internet Rights and Principles), 
the NETmundial statement outlines principles that can 
play precisely this role. What is needed now is uptake 
at national levels. Adoption by intergovernmental as 
well as multistakeholder forums, particularly at regional 
levels, can help achieve this.
Impetus is coming from intergovernmental spaces 
such as the Human Rights Council and the General 
Assembly with both spaces adopting resolutions on the 
protection of human rights on the internet, particularly 
freedom of expression and the right to privacy.
Research, learning, monitoring and evaluation. 
Support at a global level for financing national level 
research on the process and outcomes of national 
internet governance processes is critical. While it is very 
valuable for internet governance institutions to monitor 
their own performance (e.g. through using tools such 
as the code of good practice for internet governance 
developed by the Council of Europe, APC and the 
Page 59
BEYOND NETMUNDIAL: THE ROADMAP FOR INSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE ECOSYSTEM 
UN Economic Commission for Europe), there is also 
a need for external, and independent monitoring and 
evaluation. Mechanisms that enable evaluation and 
monitoring should also facilitate bottom-up feedback 
from stakeholders affected by the decisions being 
made. 
If the research, monitoring, and evaluation mechanisms 
do not include the involvement of actors who are not 
internet governance insiders, the learning that results 
is likely to be limited in its perspective and value.
Capacity building. The need for capacity building 
has been discussed extensively throughout the 
multistakeholder internet governance ecosystem. What 
is needed is a diverse range of interventions, from 
‘summer/winter’ schools, such as the European, African 
and Global South schools on internet governance, to 
distance learning as provided by the Diplo Foundation 
and Hivos. Guided support for onsite participation is 
also critical and programs, such as those provided by 
the Internet Society (ISOC), ICANN and others, all add 
value. They do not always enable sufficient analytical 
and critical thinking, and therefore the role of more 
comprehensive university-based programs are also 
necessary, as well as of online forums that enable 
debate. Coalitions and networks also provide capacity 
building for their members.
There is also need for a much more localized capacity 
building approach, which can respond more effectively 
to the subregional and national realities, institutional 
and regulatory frameworks.
Mechanisms to support capacity building need to 
avoid the notion that capacity gaps only exist in 
developing countries. Or, put differently, avoid the 
notion that the primary reason for the lack of support 
for multistakeholder processes among developing 
country governments, and that the lack of participation 
from developing country stakeholders in general, can 
be attributed to lack of knowledge and lack of capacity.
There are of course knowledge gaps, but these go both 
ways. Europe, where regional policy and regulation has 
evolved steadily over the last few decades, struggles to 
grasp the difficulties that landlocked countries in Africa 
face with regard to accessing international undersea 
cables. Internet users who have grown up with 
computers and internet access in their homes, schools, 
and workplaces find it hard to grasp reservations that 
advocates for the internet as a driver for development 
have about the dominant means of access in developing 
countries being via mobile handsets.
Mechanisms to build capacity therefore need to 
address these gaps in knowledge and understanding 
and not simply be targeted at “bringing developing 
country stakeholders up to speed.” Capacity building is 
often used as a Band-Aid, with rich countries proposing 
resources/aid for multistakeholder processes as a 
means of securing political support at international 
processes. This approach lacks legitimacy as well as 
reliability. 
If capacity and capacity building are to be defined by 
the North for the South it will only reinforce existing 
inequalities in power and will fail to strengthen 
multistakeholder processes at either national or global 
levels.
A further risk lies in not involving non-internet insiders 
in capacity building. As already stated, internet 
governance evolves so rapidly and touches on so 
many spheres, that capacity building with the goal of 
increasing participation must involve broader expertise.
Mechanisms to ensure balanced and fair inclusion 
of stakeholders. Balanced participation will always 
be hard to achieve and mechanisms to support this 
is critical. It involves identifying which communities 
are affected by a specific process and facilitating 
their participation. It also involves understanding what 
interests are at stake, and ensuring that participation 
is such that the broader public interest can be fairly 
debated and protected.
This mechanism needs to be able to provide ‘no strings 
attached’ financial support to stakeholders who do not 
have the means to participate in internet governance 
processes. It also needs to provide guidelines for 
agenda setting to ensure that less powerful stakeholder 
groups, such as civil society, are not just passive 
participants.
Here too capture is a potential risk. Most institutions (be 
they from business, government, technical community, 
or civil society) who finance participation in internet 
governance processes have some expectation, spoken 
or unspoken, that those they finance will be broadly 
aligned with their stance on contentious issues.  
Mechanisms directed at governments, and linked 
to intergovernmental processes and institutions. 
Global mechanisms to support the multistakeholder 
approach at national levels need to consider the role 
of governments, and of intergovernmental processes, 
if they are to be taken seriously and have impact. They 
need to be able to support and provide expert input into 
decision-making processes as well as encourage and 
guide behavioral change. Governments have a vital 
role in enabling policy environments and upholding 
individual human rights. This role is not trivial and 
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cannot be developed, implemented, or monitored in 
isolation from other stakeholder groups.
The multistakeholder model should not be a device 
for bypassing governments, but a means of engaging 
them (and the many people, views, and functions 
within them). Tasks such a mechanism can undertake 
include: putting multistakeholder approaches on the 
agenda of intergovernmental meetings and processes; 
leading a process of formal adoption of the NETmundial 
statement by intergovernmental bodies at regional and 
global levels; providing guidelines on governments 
consistently making their delegations to international 
events multistakeholder; and providing guidelines on 
building national, consultative multistakeholder public 
policy participation processes.
Institutionalization Options
The obvious questions are: Who establishes these 
mechanisms? Where should the be located? Should 
they be coordinated and if so how?
Like the ecosystem they will interact with, the above 
mechanisms can be decentralized and distributed. 
Many of these mechanisms exist already, in some 
form or another. A first step therefore would be to iden-
tify and document existing mechanisms, and establish 
where the main gaps are. However, even a distributed 
network of mechanisms needs some coordination to 
function effectively and respond to stakeholder needs. 
This coordination function and clearinghouse role 
needs to be respected and considered legitimate by as 
many stakeholders as possible. It should be located in 
a space that is trusted by civil society, business, the 
technical community, and by both the ‘new’ governance 
institutions and formations, and the traditional ‘inter-
governmental’ sector.
It needs to be non-aligned, particularly in the sense of 
not being dependent on an institution or entity that is 
currently seen as playing a controlling role in internet 
governance, or one with designs on playing such a role.
With its ties to the United Nations, its independence, 
and its own ‘multistakeholder advisory group’ 
appointed by the UN Secretary General, the Internet 
Governance Forum could be the ideal home for this 
clearinghouse and coordination function. Being part 
of the extended United Nations family can facilitate 
entry into spaces where governments make decisions, 
and can contribute to broader efforts to making those 
spaces more inclusive and multistakeholder. But it can 
also increase the bottlenecks inherent to bureaucracy.
Establishing any new function for supporting the 
multistakeholder approach linked to the IGF could 
contribute to the badly needed strengthening of the 
IGF (particularly at the level of political leadership, 
institutional capacity and financial sustainability). 
uEnter the NETmundial Initiative: Started by the Chief 
Executive of ICANN, and facilitated and hosted by the 
World Economic Forum (WEF), this initiative appears 
to have good intentions, but is tainted by the lack of 
transparency and inclusion around its formation. It 
could even, potentially, set in motion the strengthening 
of the IGF that is so badly needed.
Can the WEF and the NETmundial Initiative provide an 
opportunity for discussing how to build on the successes 
of NETmundial and address some of its weaknesses? 
Certainly it can, although I believe it would have been 
able to do this far more transparently and effectively if 
they located this discussion at the 2014 IGF (before, 
during or after).
Is the WEF a legitimate home for the coordination 
function of the mechanisms discussed in this 
document? While there is certainly a role for the WEF, 
and its interest in internet governance should be seen 
as positive, I do not believe it is, or can ever be, the 
appropriate location for this coordination function. 
It does not meet the criteria of being ‘non-aligned,’ 
due to its close links to business. However, it can be 
commended for the excellent work it does in facilitating 
discussion between businesses on the one hand, and 
government and civil society on the other.
Civil society has long been critical of the WEF. Even 
civil society leaders who attend WEF meetings are 
also active in the World Social Forum, the alternative 
forum which was established to challenge approaches 
to globalization and development promoted at the 
WEF. Many developing country governments also do 
not feel that they have equal voice in WEF events. The 
point is not to argue about whose world view is wrong 
or right, or to deny that the WEF does very valuable 
work. It is simply a case of acknowledging that locating 
mechanisms to support inclusive multistakeholder 
models at an organization rejected or critiqued by large 
numbers of civil society organizations and developing 
country governments around the world does not make 
sense.
Particularly among civil society and developing country 
actors, the IGF has the legitimacy that the World 
Economic Forum, where the proposed NETmundial 
Initiative will be housed, lacks. The World Economic 
Forum, however, has the institutional capacity that 
the IGF lacks. Ideally, the processes responsible for 
building on NETmundial and strengthening the IGF can 
join forces to build a sustainable, durable, transparent, 
and inclusive governance structure. 
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Conclusion
Consolidating these mechanisms and advancing them 
forward requires looking beyond the issue of resources 
and existing capacity. It is relevant, but governance 
is a long term process. Mechanisms to support 
multistakeholder models at the national level will need to 
be trusted by a wide range of people, governments, and 
stakeholder groups.  Underestimating the importance 
of securing this trust and legitimacy could harm the 
progress of multistakeholder internet governance, 
particularly in those parts of the world where it still has 
to take root. 
Anriette Esterhuysen is the executive director of the 
Association for Progressive Communications, an in-
ternational civil society network whose mission is to 
mobilize the internet for social justice and develop-
ment.
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Feet on the Ground: Marco Civil as an 
 Example of Multistakeholderism in Practice
Ronaldo Lemos
When the Snowden revelations hit Brazil, the 
government took an immediate interest. Wanting to 
respond quickly, the most comprehensive and feasible 
reaction was the so-called “Marco Civil da Internet,” a 
draft bill then under analysis in the Brazilian Congress. 
What is the Marco Civil and 
What Rights does it Set 
Forth?
The difference between the Marco Civil and other 
pending draft bills was that it was a proposal created 
by civil society at large, rather than an initiative of the 
State itself. The Marco Civil building process began 
years before the Snowden case, and was the product 
of an open and collaborative effort--one that can be 
described as a multistakeholder process. 
Passed into law in April 2014, Marco Civil sets forth 
a comprehensive “bill of rights” for the internet. The 
enactment of the new law follows closely on the heels 
of the web’s 25th anniversary and Sir Tim Berners-Lee’s 
call for a “Magna Carta” of the Internet, positioning 
Brazil as the first country to heed that call. 
From a process standpoint, as soon as it became clear 
that Brazil needed a bill of rights for the internet, it also 
became clear that the internet itself should be involved 
in drafting it. An 18 month consultation process 
followed, including soliciting contributions from a variety 
of stakeholders in a truly hybrid and transparent forum: 
internet users, civil society organizations, telecom 
companies, governmental agencies, and universities 
all provided comments publicly, so that all stakeholders 
were able to consider one another’s contributions. 
Ultimately, this process led to successfully getting a 
draft law adopted by the government and proposed for 
consideration by the Brazilian Congress. 
The final version protects rights such as net neutrality, 
privacy, and takes a strong stance against NSA-
like practices. For instance, the use of Deep Packet 
Inspection at the physical layer of the connection is 
now illegal in Brazil. The Marco Civil also protects 
freedom of expression, creating safe harbors for online 
intermediaries in Brazil, and internet platforms have to 
take down content only when served with a valid court 
order.1 
Another important principle of the Marco Civil is that 
it actually embeds multistakeholderism as a principle 
for internet governance in Brazil.2 This is important 
because it will influence the Brazilian position regarding 
internet governance at international fora, where Brazil is 
now, by law, on the side of initiatives promoting broader 
participation, and stands in opposition to the trend 
towards privileging the State’s role in implementing 
internet governance. 
In short, the Marco Civil translates the principles of the 
Brazilian Constitution to the online world. It is a victory 
for democracy, and stands in stark contrast to the 
direction of other laws that have been passed recently 
in countries such as Turkey or Russia, which expand 
governmental powers to interfere with the internet. 
Brazil’s law can serve as an example to countries willing 
to take seriously the importance of the net to facilitating 
both development and a rich and open public sphere.
The Marco Civil also includes a requirement that ISPs 
providing connectivity services and other internet 
services retain user data for a year and six months 
respectively. Although criticized by privacy activists, 
this is also significantly shorter than the five years that 
was previously proposed. It also creates a standard 
1 This safe harbor does not apply to infringement of copyright-
related materials. Copyright has been excluded from the Marco 
Civil. 
2 Article 24. The Federal, State and City Government levels must 
abide the following directives in the development of the internet 
in Brazil: I- The establishment of multi-participatory mechanisms 
for governance, which are transparent, collaborative and demo-
cratic, with the participation of government, the private sector, 
civil society and the academic community.
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that improves on the current practices of data retention 
in Brazil, which were not defined by law, but by 
agreements between law enforcement authorities and 
service providers, and because of that, quite opaque.
From start to finish, the approval of Marco Civil took 
about seven years of intense debate with numerous 
stakeholders. The support of civil society and active 
participation on the part of the Brazilian public was 
crucial. One highlight is the role of the rapporteur of 
the project, Congress Member Alessandro Molon, 
who supported the bill from the very beginning and 
gathered the technical expertise necessary to defend 
it to its successful conclusion. His dedication to the 
cause should be an inspiration to politicians dealing 
with similar issues. 
A Brief History of the Project
Marco Civil was not the product of spontaneous creation. 
It was created as part of a strong public reaction 
against the passing of a draconian cybercrime bill in 
Brazil in 2007, nicknamed “Azeredo Law,” in reference 
to a Senator called Eduardo Azeredo, rapporteur and 
lead proponent of the bill. If the bill had been passed, it 
would have established penalties of up to four years in 
jail for anyone “jailbreaking” a mobile phone, and four 
years in jail for anyone transferring songs from an iPod 
back into their computers. 
With such a broad scope (presaging SOPA and PIPA 
discussions in the United States years later), the bill 
would have turned millions of internet users in Brazil 
into criminals. Moreover, it would have been detrimental 
to innovation, rendering illegal numerous practices 
necessary to research and development. 
The Azeredo Law sparked broad public criticism, first 
from academia (including the author of this chapter), 
followed by strong social mobilization, which included 
an online petition that quickly received 150,000 
signatures online. Congress took notice of the reaction 
and postponed consideration of the bill, however, the 
question of regulation remained: If a criminal bill was 
not the best way to regulate the internet in Brazil, what 
should be the alternative? In May 2007, I wrote an 
article for Folha de São Paulo, the major newspaper 
in Brazil, claiming that rather than a criminal bill, Brazil 
should have a “civil rights framework” for the internet—
in other words, a “Marco Civil.”3 That was the first time 
the term appeared in public. 
3 Cf. Folha de São Paulo, “Internet Brasileira Precisa de Marco 
Regulatório Civil”. http://tecnologia.uol.com.br/ultnot/2007/05/22/
ult4213u98.jhtm, Maio 2007.
The idea took off, and was picked up by the Ministry 
of Justice in Brasilia. In 2008, the Ministry invited the 
group of professors I was leading then at the Fundação 
Getulio Vargas, to create an open and multistakeholder 
process for drafting the bill. It was clear from the 
beginning that the internet should be also be part of it.
Our team built and launched the platform for debate 
and collaboration of the bill, whose archives are still 
available at www.culturadigital.org/marcocivil. From the 
beginning, a list of principles was proposed: freedom 
of expression, privacy, net neutrality, rights of access 
to the internet, limits to the liability of intermediaries, 
openness, and promoting innovation, which were all 
supported in the public debate.
Each principle was then turned into law, leading to the 
creation of specific articles of the Marco Civil, which 
were then opened to new rounds of debate. The final 
draft was then embraced by the government, and 
with the support of four ministries (Culture, Science 
and Technology, Communications, and the Ministry of 
Justice) was sent to Congress on August 24th, 2011. 
The law was finally passed on April 23rd, 2014. 
The Importance of 
 Multistakeholderism:  Mapping 
the Controversies in the 
 Project
The Marco Civil political negotiation took place over 
many years and was extremely complex. Ultimately, 
the success of the project can be attributed to the 
multistakeholder process that guided the discussions 
of the bill; the transparency of each party’s position 
helped reduce information asymmetry, and facilitated 
negotiations and some necessary compromises. 
Below is a controversy map of the Marco Civil listing 
the main stakeholder interests and disputes during 
the negotiations. This is a rough and simplistic sketch 
of a much more complex reality. However, it helps 
to visualize the disputes and the ways in which the 
multistakeholder process rendered them visible and 
their negotiation feasible.
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Conclusion 
The chart attempts to illustrate the complexity of the 
Marco Civil negotiation, both in terms of the number 
of parties involved, and the variety of issues under 
debate. In terms of substance and process, the bill 
is a significant achievement for Brazil and the global 
community, and the bill represents symmetry between 
collaborative process and substantive results achieved. 
Similar efforts involving complex issues with multiple 
stakeholders can benefit from the Marco Civil lesson.
However, it is important to mention that “multistakehold-
erism,” a term nowadays more mantra than anything, 
is insufficient a concept to solve the contradictions 
and disputes involved in something like the Marco 
Civil, which required intense negotiation. Multistake-
holderism is merely a helpful (and important) point from 
which to depart. In order to achieve effective results, a 
much bigger effort is necessary, building bridges be-
tween the different stakeholders, avoiding radicalism 
and polarization, and being prepared to reach compro-
mises--one of the main lessons of the Marco Civil.
The Future of Marco Civil
The approval of Marco Civil is not the end. The bill will 
face at least two immediate challenges. The first is how 
the government will define the terms of its application 
by means of a presidential decree. Every law passed 
in Brazil is subject to further normative specification by 
means of an administrative decree. Even though the 
decree cannot change or go beyond the law itself, it can 
specify how the law is to be interpreted and applied.
The degree to which the decree will deal with net 
neutrality, privacy and other issues in practical terms 
is highly anticipated. The government stated that the 
decree itself will be subject to public consultation, 
which, at the time of writing this article, has not begun.
Marco Civil’s influence is already spreading regionally 
and beyond: interested in following Brazil’s path, other 
governments are launching their online consultation 
processes for writing their own version of Marco Civil. 
In Europe, members of the Italian parliament have 
contacted the Marco Civil’s rapporteur and also the 
Institute for Technology & Society to explore a similar 
process as well.
In sum, in a context in which even democracies like 
Turkey and Russia have started passing laws that 
expand governmental control over the internet, the 
Marco Civil presents a viable alternative. It provides 
a model, both in process and in substance, on how 
to approach internet regulation in a way that takes 
democratic values seriously into account. 
Ronaldo Lemos is the director of the Rio Institute for 
Technology & Society, and professor at the Rio de 
Janeiro State University’s Law School. He is member 
of the Mozilla Foundation Board, and the Access Now 
Board, among others. He was one of the architects of 
the “Marco Civil da Internet,” a law establishing a bill 
of rights for the internet in Brazil. Ronaldo earned his 
LL.B. and LL.D. from the University of São Paulo, and 
his LL.M. from Harvard Law School. He is currently a 
non-resident visiting scholar with the MIT Media Lab.
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A Journey Can be More Important than 
the Destination: Reflecting on the CSTD 
 Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation
Samantha Dickinson
The inclusion of the concept of “enhanced cooperation” 
in internet governance was a late night compromise on 
the eve of the World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS) Phase II in Tunisia. It was added to the Tunis 
Agenda for the Information Society1 after a series of 
preparatory meetings. The Working Group on Internet 
Governance had failed to reach agreement on the way 
forward for internet governance, particularly with regard 
to the contentious issue of the US government’s unique 
role in overseeing the Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA) function. As with so many late night 
diplomatic compromises made when participants lack 
sleep and sustenance, the use of vague language was 
used to plaster over significant political differences. 
Thus, these issues and arguments have remained 
unresolved years later with each side of the argument 
able to interpret the language in ways that suit particular 
views of the situation. Today, people cannot even agree 
which paragraphs outline and define the parameters 
of enhanced cooperation. For some, it is paragraphs 
69 to 71 (the “governments only” reading); for others, 
enhanced cooperation must be understood by reading 
the entirety of the Tunis Agenda (the “multistakeholder” 
reading).2
From WSIS to WGEC: A Short 
but Lively History
The Tunis Agenda mandated the United Nations (UN) 
Secretary-General to begin the “process towards 
enhanced cooperation” in the first quarter of 2006. The 
Secretary General in turn tasked his Special Advisor on 
internet governance, Nitin Desai, with the responsibility 
of liaising with stakeholders in order to “find common 
1 WSIS, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, 2005, http://
www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html.
2 Samantha Dickinson, William H. Dutton, Marilia Maciel, Desiree 
Miloshevic, and Vladimir Radunovic, Enhanced Cooperation 
in Governance, 2014, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2376807, pp. 2-5.
ground for further action.” However, common ground 
was not possible, and in his 2006 report, Desai 
suggested that one way forward would be for the 
key organizations involved with internet resources to 
submit annual performance reports.3 Two rounds of 
reports occurred in 2008, but these did not indicate a 
clear way forward as far as constructing a process for 
enhanced cooperation. That same year, separate from 
the UN Secretary-General’s process, but also based 
on the Tunis Agenda enhanced cooperation text, 
Member States of the International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) resolved to create a Member States-
only Dedicated Group on Internet-Related Public 
Policy Issues4 (later renamed as the Council Working 
Group on International Internet-Related Public Policy 
Issues or the CWG-Internet).5 There was a clear 
division emerging between governments supporting a 
government-only ITU procedure and other stakeholders 
who argued for a more multistakeholder process led 
by the UN Secretary-General involving a broad range 
of non-governmental and governmental organizations 
managing internet resources.Those governments that 
argued for the governments-only ITU process—sought 
to develop a mechanism to “identify, study and develop 
matters related to international Internet-related public 
policy issues”6 within a specifically ITU-related context.
In 2010, the Economic and Social Council’s (ECOSOC) 
annual WSIS resolution asked the UN Secretary-
3 Nitin Desai, Report on Consultations on Enhanced Co-
operation, 2006https://wiki.tools.isoc.org/@api/deki/
files/1481/=ReportEnhancedCoop.Edit.04.07.2008.pdf.
4 Resolution 75 (WTSA 2008): ITU-T’s contribution in imple-
menting the outcomes of the World Summit on the Information 
Society, and the establishment of a Dedicated Group on 
Internet- related Public Policy Issues as an integral part of the 
Council Working Group on the World Summit on the Information 
Society, 2008, http://www.itu.int/council/groups/wsis/pd/Feb-
2009/T-RES-T.75-2008-PDF-E.pdf.
5  ITU Council 2011, Resolution 1336: Council Working Group on 
international Internet-related Public Policy Issues, 2011, http://
www.itu.int/md/S11-CL-C-0099/en.
6 Resolution 75 (WTSA 2008), p. 3.
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General to convene open and inclusive consultations 
before the end of 2010 to:
“[Assist] the process towards enhanced 
cooperation in order to enable Governments 
on an equal footing to carry out their roles and 
responsibilities in respect of international public 
policy issues pertaining to the Internet but 
not in respect of the day-to-day technical and 
operational matters that do not impact upon 
those issues.”7 
More consultations followed in 2012, when, directed by 
UN General Assembly resolution,8 the Commission on 
Science and Technology for Development (CSTD) held 
a half-day open consultation on enhanced cooperation 
on public policy issues pertaining to the internet9 at 
the end of the annual WSIS Forum. In between the 
2010 and 2012 consultations, some governments, 
unhappy with what they perceived as years of inaction 
on enhanced cooperation, tried to add enhanced 
cooperation issues to the CSTD Working Group on IGF 
Improvements, threatening to derail that working group 
in its infancy. 
Meanwhile, the 2012 ITU Council resolved to 
open the modalities of the CWG-Internet a little by 
enabling public consultations.10 However, given that 
only Member States had access to the documents 
of the CWG-Internet, non-Member States would be 
responding blind to any such consultations. Attempts 
by some ITU Council members in 2013 to resolve this 
problem resulted in a decision that the issue could only 
be resolved by the ITU Plenipotentiary in 2014. Since 
2012, there have been two public consultations, both 
of which have received dozens of submissions, but in 
total have been discussed for less than 20 minutes at 
CWG-Internet meetings.
In late 2012, the UN General Assembly resolution, 
A/Res/67/195, requested the CSTD to establish a 
Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation (WGEC) 
to “to examine the mandate of WSIS regarding 
7 ECOSOC Resolution 2010/2: Assessment of the progress made 
in the implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the 
World Summit on the Information Society, 2010 http://www.
un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2010/res%202010-2.pdf.
8 United Nations General Assembly, A/RES/66/184: Informa-
tion and communications technologies for development, 2011, 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=%20A/
RES/66/184.
9 CSTD meeting on enhanced cooperation on public policy issues 
pertaining to the Internet, 2012, http://unctad.org/en/pages/
MeetingDetails.aspx?meetingid=61
10 ITU Council 2012, Resolution 1344: The modality of open 
consultation for the Council Working Group on International 
Internet-related Public Policy Issues (CWG-Internet), 2012, 
http://www.itu.int/md/S12-CL-C-0086/en.
enhanced cooperation, “through seeking, compiling 
and reviewing inputs from all Member States and all 
other stakeholders, and to make recommendations on 
how to fully implement this mandate.”
Embracing Multistakeholder 
Participation in the WGEC 
CSTD’s previous Working Group, which made 
recommendations on how to improve the Internet 
Governance Forum, had set a precedent for using 
the multistakeholder format for CSTD working groups, 
making it easier for the new working group to also be 
multistakeholder in composition. This was despite the 
fact that many governments would have preferred 
a governments-only composition which would have 
made it easier to avoid discussing the possibility of 
non-governmental stakeholders being involved in 
enhanced cooperation, as occurred with the ITU’s 
CWG-Internet. Having different stakeholder groups in 
the room meant that half the battle had already been 
fought: nongovernmental stakeholders would be on 
an equal footing with governments in the discussion 
and development of recommendations for further 
implementing enhanced cooperation – a situation that 
would favor a reading of enhanced cooperation as a 
multistakeholder process rather than as a government-
only one.
The precedents established by the earlier CSTD WG 
on IGF Improvements enabled WGEC to push the 
boundaries in other ways as well. Perhaps encouraged 
by the fact that the non-government members of the 
WG on IGF Improvements had been able to work 
constructively with the government members, even 
governments that had not always associated with 
supporting openness and transparency did not object 
to expanding stakeholder engagement in the WGEC 
process. During the first WGEC meeting in May 2013, 
for example, the members of the group agreed to open 
meetings to observers, pending size limitations of the 
meeting room. Observers were also able to make 
use of the virtual meeting room and live transcripts 
originally provided to enable remote WGEC members 
to participate in the meetings. In addition, observers 
had a short daily speaking slot in which they could 
make interventions on the group’s work. 
WGEC was able to push the boundaries of its 
 multistakeholder modalities, but ultimately increased 
openness and transparency did not help the WGEC 
members reach consensus on a set of recommenda-
tions about enhanced cooperation. However, despite 
not being able to achieve its original objectives, the 
other advances that the group achieved could be used 
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to a) encourage further use of more sophisticated mul-
tistakeholder mechanisms within the UN system, and 
b) encourage more evidence-based discussions on en-
hanced cooperation in the future. 
WGEC as a Potential 
Trendsetter for 
Multistakeholderism in 
Future UN-Related Internet 
Governance Processes
One of the concerns some governments and critics 
have of the multistakeholder model is that there is a 
risk that such processes could be dominated only 
by those with the resources to participate. Critics of 
multistakeholder processes in internet governance 
look at the open, bottom-up model and fear that the 
openness will perpetuate today’s inequalities: those 
with resources participate while those without rely 
on fellowships or cannot participate at all. The ITU’s 
2013 World Telecommunication/Information and 
Communication Technology Forum (WTPF-13) is an 
example of a recent event that, while trumpeted as a 
major success by those in favor of multistakeholder 
internet governance, was seen by many developing 
countries as yet another example of US business 
interests dominating a process and excluding those 
lacking the resources to attend and participate in the 
Geneva-based preparatory process for WTPF-13.11
WGEC and its predecessor, the CSTD WG on IGF 
Improvements, offer an alternative to the open, 
bottom-up model of multistakeholderism: a model of 
representative multistakeholderism. In this alternative 
model, each stakeholder group has a set number of 
seats in the process. There are two ways that the 
seats can be filled. The first method involves each 
stakeholder group directly choosing the people who 
fill those seats. This first method was recently used 
to select the members of the IANA Stewardship 
Coordination Group (IGC). However, one unintended 
consequence of this isolated selection process (without 
coordination among stakeholder groups) was that the 
IGC had a statistically large proportion of men from 
developed countries being selected for the group. The 
second method involves stakeholder groups submitting 
a list of names larger than the number of seats 
available, from which an overall coordinator of the 
process chooses a subset, usually taking into account 
11 Samantha Dickinson, Reflecting on what the Council decision 
means for the multistakeholder model, 2013, http://linguasynap-
tica.com/council-2013-multistakeholderism.
issues such as gender balance, regional diversity and 
developed/developing country representation across 
all stakeholder groups. This second method is the 
process used to select stakeholder representatives of 
the IGF Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG).
An advantage of representative multistakeholderism is 
that it can prevent any single stakeholder group from 
dominating the process. WGEC and its predecessor, 
the CSTD WG on IGF Improvements, were not entirely 
representative, with governments holding the majority 
of seats in the groups, and with intergovernmental 
organizations, civil society, business and the technical 
and academic communities each allocated five seats. 
However, given early levels of government distrust of 
the process, providing governments with a few more 
than half of the total number of seats in each working 
group probably set the right balance between respecting 
the sensibilities of an intergovernmental agency (the 
CSTD) and embracing the multistakeholder values of 
today’s internet governance world. 
Rather than attempting to suggest that all internet 
governance discussions within the UN system should 
immediately become fully open and bottom-up, it may 
be useful for nongovernmental internet governance 
stakeholders to encourage and adopt wider use of this 
representative form of multistakeholderism as a way to 
enable governments to become more comfortable and 
confident over time in interacting with other stakeholder 
groups on equal footing. The use of representative 
multistakeholderism is in itself a form of enhanced 
cooperation between stakeholder groups and may 
provide a doorway to enhanced cooperation between 
governments and other stakeholders in looser, more 
open multistakeholder processes in the future.
Other tools for multistakeholder participation long-
used in the internet technical community, such as 
live transcripts, virtual meeting rooms, and active 
use of mailing lists between and during meetings to 
distribute information were other innovations that were 
embraced by WGEC members, both governmental and 
non-governmental. The technology was not perfect 
and it was supported by a very lean secretariat, but 
the process served to convince governments that 
tools widely used by the multistakeholder internet 
governance communities can also enable governments 
to have an enriched, or dare I say it, “enhanced” form 
of participation on internet governance issues. In 
particular, the ability to read the live transcript enabled 
non-native English speakers to follow the discussions to 
a greater depth and therefore respond more effectively 
to issues.
Page 68
BEYOND NETMUNDIAL: THE ROADMAP FOR INSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE ECOSYSTEM AUGUST 2014
Using WGEC’s “Mapping 
Exercise” to Encourage 
 Evidence-Based Discussion 
of Enhanced Cooperation in 
 Future
One of the difficulties in discussing enhanced coopera-
tion over the years has been the fundamental difference 
of beliefs held by participants. Many developed coun-
try governments—particularly those in Europe and the 
USA—and members of the internet technical commu-
nity, business and civil society believe that  enhanced 
cooperation is about enabling governments to 
 participate in existing internet governance processes. 
However, a number of other governments—particularly 
those from developing countries that have felt excluded 
from internet governance decision-making—along with 
some members of civil society believe that enhanced 
cooperation is very much about governments needing 
their own forum or organization in which to participate 
in internet governance on an equal footing with each 
other, and most importantly, on an equal footing with 
the USA. Unfortunately, both sides can use the text of 
the Tunis Agenda to support their views and informa-
tion on efforts by different internet governance-related 
organizations to encourage greater participation by all 
governments has been stored in a distributed manner, 
very much like the internet itself. This has made it very 
hard to use evidence-based approaches to overcome 
the enhanced cooperation standoff. That is, until now. 
One of the achievements of WGEC was the develop-
ment of a list of examples of enhanced cooperation 
compiled by the Correspondence Group. 
The Correspondence Group had emerged organically 
as a result of attempts to make sense of the hundreds 
of pages of responses received to the first WGEC 
meeting’s questionnaire. It should be noted that at this 
point, the story of WGEC becomes personal. I was 
one of two observers to the meeting—Lea Kaspar, 
co-author of the Institutionalizing the Clearing House 
Function chapter in this book, was the other—who 
were asked by some of the group’s members to sort 
the responses about existing enhanced cooperation 
mechanisms into a more manageable form for WGEC 
members. We stayed late into the night at the second 
WGEC meeting, after the WGEC members had left, to 
complete what was originally thought to be a simple 
task. In the end, there were around 200 examples 
of enhanced cooperation that had been identified in 
the responses to the questionnaire. The examples 
included processes taking place in intergovernmental 
venues as well as in non-governmental venues. The 
Correspondence Group was established to develop 
this work further. The plan was that the final output 
of the Correspondence Group—what had informally 
been called the “mapping document”—would not 
only list existing examples but also detail gaps in the 
processes, with the aim of helping WGEC members 
use an evidence-based approach to developing the 
recommendations on how to fully implement enhanced 
cooperation.12 The Correspondence Group was open 
to any interested participant: both WGEC members and 
general interested parties. There were some additional 
contributions from WGEC members and external 
internet governance stakeholders after the second 
meeting, but Kaspar and I, in our voluntary capacity, 
performed the bulk of the work collating and organizing 
the material in a readily understandable format. Very 
much aware that we were participating as observers 
rather than WGEC members, Kaspar and I had been 
very careful to remain impartial in doing the work, and 
were constantly in contact with the Correspondence 
Group Chair and Co-chair to ensure neutrality was 
being maintained. Updated versions of the mapping 
document were submitted by the Correspondence 
Group Chair to the WGEC members’ mailing list for 
their information and approval in between physical 
meetings. 
Lack of time and the need to seek WGEC approval at 
each step in the development of the mapping document 
resulted in the document not being completed by the 
fourth and final WGEC meeting at the beginning of May 
2014. An extract of the mapping document is shown in 
Figure 1. Even in its incomplete state, however, it was 
clear to many of the WGEC members that the mapping 
document could have a life beyond the working 
group. Not only would a fully completed version of the 
mapping document assist governments in identifying 
where different internet-related public policy issues 
were being discussed and how they could participate, 
but it could also provide other stakeholders with the 
same resources. In addition, the document has the 
potential to move us beyond the decade-long political 
stalemate on enhanced cooperation and support 
an evidence-based approach to identifying where 
real change needs to happen. For this reason, it is 
possible that some governments may fear the mapping 
document, as it shows that there are, indeed, enhanced 
cooperation processes that have developed since the 
Tunis Agenda was written. However, the mapping 
document does not provide unconditional support for 
proponents of the other side of the debate either: it is 
12  CSTD, Chairman’s Summary of the Second Meeting of the 
WGEC, Final Terms of Reference for the Correspondence 
Group of WGEC, and List of Participants, 2014, http://unctad.
org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/WGEC_2013_Chair-
mans_summary_en.pdf.
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very likely that a complete map of existing enhanced 
cooperation initiatives will show a number of gaps 
existing in processes and organizations that currently 
promote themselves as fully inclusive of government 
participation. A completed mapping document should 
reveal the complexity of operationalizing enhanced 
cooperation across a wide variety of structures and 
processes and remove the binary oppositional nature 
of the last decade of enhanced cooperation debates.
Conclusion
After WGEC members agreed that they could not reach 
agreement on recommendations for fully implementing 
enhanced cooperation, the future of the group became 
a matter for the Member States to decide at the 17th 
Session of the CSTD in late May 2014. The future 
of WGEC proved to be an equally difficult issue for 
governments to decide on and the final draft ECOSOC 
resolution on WSIS outcomes13 contained no text on 
the future of WGEC. Instead, there was the possibility 
that ECOSOC could add its own explicit statement on 
the closure or continuation of WGEC. In the meantime, 
CSTD Member States did agree to recommend that 
the CSTD secretariat complete the current work on the 
mapping document, with the results to be discussed at 
the CSTD’s intersessional meeting at the end of 2014. 
Reviewing the year of WGEC’s deliberations, May 
2013 to May 2014, it was unrealistic to expect that the 
working group could develop recommendations in such 
a short period of time when most of the previous decade 
had been spent debating exactly the same issues 
without result. WGEC did make progress in other ways, 
however, that should enable future discussions to be 
13 CSTD, Draft resolution on Assessment of the progress made 
in the implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the 
World Summit on the Information, 2014, http://unctad.org/meet-
ings/en/SessionalDocuments/CSTD_2014_DraftRes_WSIS.pdf.
less divisive and more embracing of multistakeholder 
engagement. WGEC built on the precedent set by the 
earlier WG on IGF Improvements by utilizing more 
open and transparent and more multistakeholder 
processes to inform its work. Without the decision to 
have a public questionnaire, without the responses 
from stakeholders to that questionnaire, and without 
the ability for observers to become active participants 
in the process, the mapping document would never 
have been possible. The next step is to ensure that 
the mapping document, which was a serendipitous 
outcome of the WGEC process, can continue to evolve 
and be kept up to date well beyond WGEC and help to 
inform the next decade of work to enhance cooperation 
that will aim to:
“[E]nable governments, on an equal footing, 
to carry out their roles and responsibilities, in 
international public policy issues pertaining to 
the Internet, but not in the day-to-day technical 
and operational matters, that do not impact on 
international public policy issues.”14
14  Tunis Agenda on the Information Society, 2005, para 69.
Samantha Dickinson is a consultant and writer on 
internet governance issues, performing internet 
policy analysis and reporting on internet governance 
developments taking place in a wide range of forums, 
including ICANN, ITU and the United Nations General 
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The IANA Transition in the Context of 
 Global Internet Governance
Emma Llansó and Matthew Shears
On the 14th of March 2014, the National Telecommunica-
tions and Information Administration (NTIA), part of the 
United States Department of Commerce, announced 
that it was seeking to relinquish its responsibilities in 
the management of the Domain Name System (DNS) 
and to see the 1998 commitment to the full privatiza-
tion of the DNS made by the US Government finally 
fulfilled.1 The role of the US government in the man-
agement of the DNS has shaped international internet 
governance discussions for over a decade and the 
NTIA’s announcement marks the beginning of the end 
of that historic and sometimes controversial role. The 
announcement was met with general approval around 
the globe but, it should be noted, with some concern in 
domestic political circles in the US. This chapter looks 
at the challenges and opportunities facing the global 
internet community as it works towards realizing the 
transition of NTIA’s role in the coordination of the DNS.
The IANA Transition 
 Announcement
The transition announcement is a relatively straightfor-
ward document.2 It outlines NTIA’s role: administering 
changes to the root zone file and providing steward-
ship to the management of the DNS. It specifies NTIA’s 
goal: to step away from its DNS management-related 
functions and “transition key Internet domain name 
functions to the global multistakeholder communi-
ty.” And it describes the way the transition should be 
 approached: through an ICANN-led convening that 
will result in a “multistakeholder process to develop 
the transition plan.” The announcement also provides 
some key guiding principles. The transition proposal 
must: 
1 National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 
“NTIA Announces Intent to Transition Key Internet Domain 
Name Functions,” 14 March 2014, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
press-release/2014/ntia-announces-intent-transition-key-inter-
net-domain-name-functions (hereinafter “NTIA Announcement”). 
2 Ibid.
• Support and enhance the multistakeholder model; 
• Maintain the security, stability, and resiliency of the 
Internet DNS; 
• Meet the needs and expectation of the global 
customers and partners of the IANA services; and, 
• Maintain the openness of the internet.  
In addition, NTIA is also clear that it “will not accept a 
proposal that replaces the NTIA role with a government-
led or an inter-governmental organization solution.”
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications 
and Information Lawrence Strickling elaborated further 
on these principles during his testimony to Congress 
on 2 April 2014.3  In his testimony, Assistant Secretary 
Strickling noted that the “decentralized distributed 
authority structure of the DNS needs to be preserved 
so as to avoid single points of failure, manipulation or 
capture.”  He also called for the continued “separation 
of policy development and operational activities,” and 
noted that “the neutral and judgment free administration 
of the technical DNS and IANA functions” must be 
maintained.  Finally, he stated that before any transition 
takes place stakeholders must “present a plan that 
ensures the uninterrupted, stable functioning of the 
Internet and its present openness.”  
The transition announcement does, however, raise 
many questions. For example, what is the “global multi-
stakeholder community” or “global Internet  community”? 
And what does it mean for the NTIA’s role to be transi-
tioned to this community? Nor does the announcement 
specify the exact scope of the transition plan. This has 
been particularly vexing, with the early stages of the 
deliberations yielding a wide divergence of opinion as 
to what should and should not be under discussion. 
3 National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion, “Testimony of Assistant Secretary Strickling at Hearing 
on ‘Ensuring the Security, Stability, Resilience, and Freedom 
of the Global Internet’,” 2 April 2014, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
speechtestimony/2014/testimony-assistant-secretary-strickling-
hearing-ensuring-security-stability-re (hereinafter “Strickling 
Testimony”).
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Additionally, the question of NTIA’s “stewardship” role 
has been open to interpretation, with different parties 
understanding it to mean different things.
The Privatization of DNS 
Management 
To understand the import of the IANA transition 
announcement, one has to look back at the relationship 
between the United States government, the IANA 
functions, and ICANN. The management of the 
DNS evolved from its earliest days in the capable 
hands of one man, John Postel, through the process 
initiated by the US government to create ICANN and 
award the contract to this new entity, to the transition 
announcement almost a decade and a half later. 
Throughout, the US government has been a proponent 
of the “privatization” of the management of the DNS.  In 
1998, during the Clinton administration, the Department 
of Commerce published its Statement of Policy on the 
Management of Internet Names and Addresses, which 
articulated four key principles that have shaped the US 
approach to the management of the DNS ever since: 
Stability. The U.S. Government should end its 
role in the Internet number and name address 
system in a manner that ensures the stability 
of the Internet. The introduction of a new 
management system should not disrupt current 
operations or create competing root systems. 
During the transition and thereafter, the stability 
of the Internet should be the first priority of any 
DNS management system. Security and reliability 
of the DNS are important aspects of stability, and 
as a new DNS management system is introduced, 
a comprehensive security strategy should be 
developed.
Competition. The Internet succeeds in great 
measure because it is a decentralized system that 
encourages innovation and maximizes individual 
freedom. Where possible, market mechanisms 
that support competition and consumer choice 
should drive the management of the Internet 
because they will lower costs, promote innovation, 
encourage diversity, and enhance user choice 
and satisfaction.
Private, Bottom-Up Coordination. Certain man-
agement functions require coordination. In these 
cases, responsible, private-sector action is prefer-
able to government control. A private coordinating 
process is likely to be more flexible than government 
and to move rapidly enough to meet the changing 
needs of the Internet and of Internet  users. The 
private process should, as far as  possible, reflect 
the bottom-up governance that has characterized 
development of the Internet to date.
Representation. The new corporation should 
operate as a private entity for the benefit of the 
Internet community as a whole. The development 
of sound, fair, and widely accepted policies for the 
management of DNS will depend on input from 
the broad and growing community of Internet 
users. Management structures should reflect the 
functional and geographic diversity of the Internet 
and its users. Mechanisms should be established 
to ensure international participation in decision 
making.4
The US government’s commitment to the full 
privatization of the management of the DNS has been 
reaffirmed throughout its relationship with ICANN.  The 
Memorandum of Understanding between ICANN and 
the Department of Commerce has been amended and 
extended numerous times since 1998 to reflect the 
evolution of ICANN and expectations in terms of the 
performance of the management contract.  The MoU 
was replaced in 2009 by an Affirmation of Commitments 
that includes numerous review and transparency 
requirements as well as the commitment to continue to 
be incorporated in the state of California.5  The contract 
for the IANA function has been renewed a number of 
times since its first award in 2000, with the current 
contract due to expire 30 September 2015.  While 
the contract can be extended, NTIA has expressed a 
desire to see the transition of its responsibilities by the 
end of the current contract period.   
The US Government’s Role
The US government describes its role in the 
management of the DNS as the “procedural role of 
administering changes to the authoritative root zone 
file – the database containing the lists of names and 
addresses of all top-level domains – as well as serving 
as the historic steward of the DNS.”6   Its procedural 
or functional role in the management of the DNS is 
relatively straightforward. Complexity arises, however, 
4 National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion, “Statement of Policy on the Management of Internet 
Names and Addresses,” 5 June 1998, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
federal-register-notice/1998/statement-policy-management-
internet-names-and-addresses. 
5 National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 
“Affirmation of Commitments by the United States Department 
of Commerce and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers,” 30 September 2009, http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
files/ntia/publications/affirmation_of_commitments_2009.pdf.
6 NTIA Announcement, supra n.1.
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in the notion of “stewardship”; what this term means 
has been the subject of considerable debate.  
NTIA’s procedural role involves reviewing changes 
to the root zone file.7  In particular, NTIA establishes 
whether or not the proposals for changes to the 
Root Zone have followed “agreed upon verification/
processing policies and procedures.” Proposals that 
have satisfied those policies and procedures are then 
forwarded on to the Root Zone Maintainer (currently 
Verisign) to implement.  As NTIA notes in the FAQ to 
the transition announcement: “NTIA has no operational 
role and does not initiate changes to the authoritative 
root zone file, assignment of protocol numbers, or 
allocation of Internet numbering resources.”8  According 
to Assistant Secretary Strickling, the US government 
has not exercised “discretion or judgment”9 with respect 
to changes to the root zone file.
The notion of “stewardship” however, is more complex. 
NTIA describes its role in this context as “serving as 
the historic steward of the DNS, a role that has helped 
provide confidence in the system.”10  Since the early days 
of the internet, there has been a continuing relationship 
between the US government and the management of 
the DNS through the IANA functions, from the early 
performance of the IANA functions by DARPA and the 
7 See National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion, “Request for Comments on the Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority (IANA) Functions,” 76 Federal Register 38, 25 
February 2011, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-02-25/
html/2011-4240.htm.  At present, the process flow for root zone 
management (see diagram at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/DNS/
CurrentProcessFlow.pdf) involves three roles that are performed 
by different entities through two separate legal agreements with 
NTIA. The process itself includes the following steps: (1) TLD 
operators submit change requests to the IANA Functions Op-
erator; (2) the IANA Functions Operator processes the request 
and conducts due diligence in verifying the request; (3) the 
IANA Functions Operator sends a recommendation regarding 
the request to the Administrator for verification/authorization; 
(4) the Administrator verifies that the IANA Functions Operator 
has followed its agreed upon verification/processing policies 
and procedures; (5) the Administrator authorizes the Root Zone 
Maintainer to make the change; (6) the Root Zone Maintainer 
edits and generates the updated root zone file; and (7) the Root 
Zone Maintainer distributes the updated root zone file to the 
thirteen (13) root server operators. Currently, ICANN performs 
the role of the IANA Functions Operator, NTIA performs the role 
of Administrator, and VeriSign performs the role of Root Zone 
Maintainer. NTIA’s agreements with ICANN (IANA functions 
contract) and VeriSign, Inc. (Cooperative Agreement) provide 
the process through which changes are currently made to the 
authoritative root zone file.
8 National Telecommunications and Information Administration, 
“IANA Functions and Related Root Zone Management Transi-
tion Questions and Answers,” 18 March 2014, http://www.ntia.
doc.gov/other-publication/2014/iana-functions-and-related-root-
zone-management-transition-questions-and-answ (hereinafter 
“IANA Transition Questions and Answers”).
9 Strickling Testimony, supra n.3.
10 IANA Transition Questions and Answers, supra n.8.
USC and then their delegation in 1997 to NTIA. The 
continuity and stability of the DNS are essential to the 
continuing success of the internet, and to the extent 
that NTIA’s oversight has contributed to “providing 
confidence in the system”, this has been a crucial 
role. The idea of stewardship also has an additional 
dimension, related to institutional accountability for 
ICANN.  The NTIA’s ability to award – and possibly 
withdraw – the contract for the performance of the 
IANA functions has provided a mechanism that could 
counterbalance any actions by ICANN that might 
destabilize the DNS.  
The stewardship issue is central to a future internet 
in which the US government has stepped away from 
its role in the management of the DNS, and raises 
many important questions.  If one believes that the US 
stewardship has been, as NTIA describes, to “provide 
confidence in the DNS,” is that stewardship still needed? 
Has the DNS management system matured and 
evolved sufficiently to be able to address challenges 
in the future without the backstop of US government 
stewardship?  Is there a need to replace this stewardship 
with some other form?  These questions are central to 
ICANN’s future role and responsibilities relating to DNS 
management.  ICANN’s recently launched “Enhancing 
ICANN Accountability” review notes that one of its 
key considerations is how it “remains accountable in 
the absence of its historical contractual relationship to 
the U.S. Government and the perceived backstop with 
regard to ICANN’s organization-wide accountability 
provided by that role.”11  
The International Political 
 Dimension
The IANA transition has significant import to international 
internet governance.  As the internet became more 
widely used and as governments, in particular, began 
to fully grasp its relevance to economic development, 
questions arose as to the governance of the internet, 
the roles of the US government and ICANN, and 
control of “critical Internet resources” – domain names 
and internet protocol numbers, among others.  These 
questions were at the core of the debates during the 
World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS)12 
from 2003 and 2005, and gave rise to both the Internet 
Governance Forum13 and the process of “enhanced 
11 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, “En-
hancing ICANN Accountability,” 6 May 2014, https://www.icann.
org/news/announcement-2014-05-07-en.
12 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/183, World 
Summit on the Information Society, 21 December 2001, 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/
RES/56/183&Lang=E. 
13 Internet Governance Forum, “About the Internet Governance 
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cooperation,”14 each of which have formed the loci for 
internet governance discussions over the past decade. 
While some progress was made in acknowledging 
the importance of the distributed and bottom-up 
internet ecosystem15 and beginning to address internet 
policy and governance questions, the issue of the 
US government’s role in “controlling the root” via 
ICANN and the IANA functions was – continues to be 
– a sticking point.  The issue contributed to shaping 
deliberations at the ITU’s World Conference on 
International Telecommunications (WCIT) in December 
2012,16 particularly on the degree to which the 
International Telecommunications Regulations should 
address internet issues and the appropriate role of the 
ITU in internet governance.  Debates during the WCIT 
did nothing to move the ball on internet governance, 
and the resulting treaty was divisive, perpetuating an 
increasingly untenable status quo.
The mid-2013 revelations by Edward Snowden on the 
scale and scope of the mass surveillance practices by 
the US and its Five Eyes allies significantly changed the 
tenor of internet governance discussions. Snowden’s 
revelations emboldened those governments that had 
been calling for intergovernmental approaches to inter-
national internet policy. The US found that its internet 
freedom agenda and its push for multistakeholder pro-
cesses were widely viewed as hypocritical. The quickly 
changing internet governance landscape was one of the 
drivers of the Montevideo Statement17 in October 2013, 
when the leaders of many of the  non-governmental or-
ganizations that perform the technical coordination of 
the internet released a call for accelerating the global-
ization of ICANN and IANA functions.  
Shortly after the release of the Montevideo Statement, 
ICANN CEO Fadi Chehadé met with President Dilma 
Rousseff of Brazil, who had been a chief critic of the 
US government’s internet surveillance practices. This 
meeting led President Rousseff to agree to host a new 
Forum,” http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/aboutigf (last accessed 
7 August 2014).
14 See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 
Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation, http://unctad.org/en/
Pages/CSTD/WGEC.aspx (last accessed 7 August 2014).
15 During the WSIS, the notion of specific and defined roles in 
Internet governance for different stakeholders was introduced.  
The WSIS also introduced a broader set of stakeholders to 
governance mechanisms associated with the Internet techni-
cal community – concepts of multistakeholder and distributed 
bottom-up management (governance), with ICANN and the 
IETF typically held up as representative examples of such orga-
nizations.  
16 International Telecommunication Union, World Conference on 
International Telecommunications, http://www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/
Pages/default.aspx (last accessed 7 August 2014).
17 Montevideo Statement, 7 October 2014, https://www.icann.org/
en/news/announcements/announcement-07oct13-en.htm
conference on internet governance (the NETmundial 
meeting), with plans to discuss the “further evolution of 
the Internet governance ecosystem.”  NETmundial18 was 
a defining event: just over a decade since the Geneva 
phase of the WSIS, the “rough consensus” outcomes of 
the NETmundial, with its focus on internet governance 
principles and processes, the multistakeholder model, 
and the evolution of the internet ecosystem have 
reaffirmed the governance model at the heart of ICANN 
and other internet community technical organizations.  
The NETmundial document includes a number of 
references to ICANN and to the transition of the IANA 
functions.  It states that there is an expectation that the 
“process of globalization of ICANN speeds up leading to 
a truly international and global organization serving the 
public interest with clearly implementable and verifiable 
accountability and transparency mechanisms that 
satisfy requirements from both internal stakeholders 
and the global community.”19  It calls for the IANA 
transition to be undertaken through an “open process 
with the participation of all stakeholders extending 
beyond the ICANN community.”  And, it calls for there 
to be a review of the “relation between the policy and 
operational aspects” a reference to the need to ensure 
that policy-making within ICANN does not in any way 
influence the operational work of the IANA function 
(language that was, apparently, watered down from 
the original which included a reference to structural 
separation of ICANN and the IANA functions). 
 
There is no doubt that international events such as the 
WCIT and the Snowden revelations have contributed to 
defining and shaping the future of internet governance 
and policy development processes. The NTIA’s 
announcement on the transition of the IANA functions 
is a prime example: the degree to which those 
important events expedited NTIA’s decision remains 
unclear, but it is apparent that the increasingly vocal 
global calls to re-energize the evolution of the internet 
ecosystem were a substantial factor.  The global push 
and the NTIA’s announcement also align with others’ 
vision of the next generation of internet governance; for 
example, Fadi Chehadé envisions an ICANN without 
“training wheels” in a future shaped by the outcomes 
of the NETmundial.  Making progress on the IANA 
transition will be key to furthering the evolution of 
internet governance discussions at a global level; it is 
also a challenge that, while not insurmountable, should 
not be underestimated. 
18  NETmundial meeting, April 23-24, 2014, http://netmundial.br/
19 NETmundial. (2014). NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement.
 See http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/ 
NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf
Page 75
BEYOND NETMUNDIAL: THE ROADMAP FOR INSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE ECOSYSTEM 
US Domestic Considerations
While NTIA’s announcement was generally welcomed 
across stakeholder groupings around the world, 
the domestic reception, particularly by Republican 
members of Congress, was less than warm.  Many 
critics of the transfer echoed rhetoric from global 
internet governance debates to frame the issue as 
one of the Obama administration relinquishing US 
“control” of the internet.20  These criticisms led to 
several hearings21 in the House and the introduction 
of several bills and budget amendments22 aimed at 
preventing NTIA from completing the transfer without 
Congressional approval. 
The first of these legislative proposals is the House 
bill entitled “Domain Openness Through Continued 
Oversight Matters (DOTCOM) Act of 2014.” This bill, 
introduced by Representative John Shimkus, would 
prohibit the NTIA from relinquishing responsibility over 
the internet domain name system pending a report 
by the Comptroller General, who would have up to a 
year to produce an assessment of the pros and cons 
of the transition and an evaluation of any proposals. 
An amendment added to the Commerce, Justice, and 
Science Appropriations Bill is somewhat less severe, 
in that it “directs NTIA to conduct a thorough review 
20 See, e.g., L. Gordon Crovitz, “America’s Internet Surrender,” 
Wall Street Journal, 18 March 2014, http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/SB10001424052702303563304579447362610
955656; Brendan Sasso, “When U.S. Steps Back, Will Russia 
and China Control the Internet?” National Journal, 18 March 
2014, http://www.nationaljournal.com/tech/when-u-s-steps-
back-will-russia-and-china-control-the-internet-20140317; John 
Hayward, “China, Russia, and Iran want a crack at control-
ling the Internet,” 18 March 2014, http://www.breitbart.com/
InstaBlog/2014/03/17/China-Russia-and-Iran-want-a-crack-at-
controlling-the-Internet.
21 House Energy & Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on 
Communications and Technology, “ Ensuring the Security, 
Stability, Resilience, and Freedom of the Global Internet”, 
2 April 2014, http://energycommerce.house.gov/hearing/
ensuring-security-stability-resilience-and-freedom-global-in-
ternet; House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Courts, 
Intellectual Property, and the Internet,  “Should the Department 
of Commerce Relinquish Direct Oversight Over ICANN?”, 
10 April 2014, http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/2014/4/
hearing-should-the-dept-of-commerce-relinquish-direct-
oversight-over-icann. As the House passed the DOTCOM Act, 
Senators Marco Rubio and Ted Cruz sought a hearing in the 
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 
see, e.g., http://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/washington/
republican-senators-seek-hearing-icann-hand/131331 (21 May 
2014).
22 E.g., Shimkus Amendment to the National Defense Authoriza-
tion Act, incorporating the DOTCOM Act into the text of the 
national defense-spending bill, http://www.internetcommerce.
org/dotcom-act-passes-house/. The Senate Appropriations 
Committee also included an amendment about the IANA 
functions oversight transition in the Commerce, Justice, and 
State Departments appropriations bill for FY2015. http://www.
internetcommerce.org/senate-approps-iana/.
and analysis of any proposed transition of the IANA 
contract. This review shall ensure that ICANN has in 
place a NTIA approved multi-stakeholder oversight 
plan that is insulated from foreign government and 
inter-governmental control. Further, the Committee 
directs NTIA to report quarterly to the Committee on all 
aspects of the privatization process and further directs 
NTIA to inform the Committee, as well as the Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, not less 
than 7 days in advance of any decision with respect to 
a successor contract.”23
It is reasonable enough for legislators to call for 
transparency throughout the process to develop 
transition proposals, and to seek thorough evaluation 
of any transition proposal in an effort to ensure that 
the DNS will remain stable, secure, and resistant to 
capture or abuse by any party or stakeholder group. 
Indeed, these concerns echo the points articulated 
by NTIA in its announcement and are the same sorts 
of concerns expressed by members of industry, the 
technical community, and civil society as they begin 
to deliberate over proposals. However, there are 
concerns that it would be completely inconsistent with 
the multistakeholder approach to governance for a 
single country’s legislature to enact a law prohibiting a 
bottom-up, consensus-driven process from proceeding 
without that government’s approval.  Were Congress 
to pass such a law, it would represent a significant 
step back from the commitment to transitioning away 
from government involvement in the management of 
the DNS, and would imperil the timeline and the work 
of stakeholders on the transition proposal.  It is also 
precisely the sort of government interference with 
(what should be) multistakeholder processes that must 
be guarded against in a successful IANA functions 
oversight transition proposal.
ICANN’s Role, Scope, and 
 Accountability 
The NTIA’s announcement specifically called upon 
ICANN to “convene global stakeholders to develop a 
proposal to transition the current role played by NTIA 
in the coordination of the Internet’s domain name 
system.”  NTIA identified ICANN as the best-suited 
convener of the transition process, given its role in 
managing the DNS and having the existing contractual 
relationship for the IANA functions.  ICANN’s first steps 
were to open a consultation on the process and kick off 
discussions at ICANN49 in Singapore.  
23 Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies Appro-
priations Act, Managers’ Package, http://www.appropriations.
senate.gov/sites/default/files/hearings/CJS%20Manag-
ers%27%20Package%20of%20Amendments%20final.pdf.
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ICANN’s IANA convening process was marred in 
the early days by what were perceived to be an 
overly restrictive scoping24 of the issues that could 
be discussed, an overly prescriptive process for the 
development of a transition proposal, and a proposed 
consultation process that revolved around ICANN 
meetings alone.  There was significant pushback on 
each of these issues by stakeholders, due to concerns 
that ICANN was trying to frame the transition process 
in ways that were designed to favor a pre-determined 
outcome without an adequate and open discussion. 
Many stakeholders argued that the transition process 
must be guided by open and thoughtful discussion, 
without arbitrary scope limitations, and developed in a 
way that allows for the full engagement of the global 
internet community.
As noted above, the ambiguities in the announcement 
have also led to a robust discussion as to what is 
exactly meant by “global multistakeholder community” 
and “global internet community.” A narrow interpretation 
suggests that the “community” is typically represented 
by the internet technical community, in the form of 
organizations such as ICANN, the Internet Society 
(ISOC), the Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), the 
IETF, and so forth. This has been debated, particularly 
by civil society, as it was seen to be a more restrictive 
definition of the global internet community than is 
warranted – or used in other fora – and would limit the 
extent of stakeholder engagement and the involvement 
of interested parties around the globe.
Regarding scope, ICANN’s launch of a parallel process 
to look at enhancing ICANN’s own accountability25 
helped to address the concern that the interplay 
between US “stewardship” of the IANA functions 
and overall ICANN accountability was not getting 
sufficient attention. The IANA transition convening is 
now focused on (or some would argue restricted to) 
finding a suitable replacement for NTIA’s “clerical or 
procedural” role.  Separating the external accountability 
questions from the administrative ones may seem to be 
a convenient way of addressing two challenging issues, 
but the linkages between the two topics remain. The 
US government provided both a clerical/administrative 
role (the IANA functions) and a form of external 
accountability for ICANN.  In order for there to be 
adequate consideration of both these important roles, 
stakeholders are calling for the two ICANN processes 
to be considered interdependent and to progress in 
24  ICANN. “Scoping Document.” Accessed 8 April 2014, https://
www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/iana-transition-scoping-
08apr14-en.pdf
25 ICANN. “Enhancing ICANN’s Accountability Consultation.” 
Accessed 6 May 2014, https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/
enhancing-accountability-2014-05-06-en
sync.  At the time of writing, the IANA transition process 
is underway but the accountability process has yet to 
fully start.
There are issues that will require the consideration of 
both processes.  For example, there is the issue of 
the nature of the relationships between the “affected 
parties” – ICANN, the IETF, the RIRs, etc. – and the 
IANA functions.26  If and when the US government 
steps back, what should the nature of the relationship 
be between ICANN and the IANA functions?  What 
mechanisms need to be put in place to avoid, as 
Assistant Secretary Larry Strickling has noted, “single 
points of failure, manipulation or capture?”  And absent 
external accountability, why should one organization 
(ICANN) have a relationship with the “technical 
functions that enable the continued efficient operation 
of the Internet“ that is any different than the other 
affected parties? 
The IANA transition convening process and the 
mechanism for developing a transition proposal are now 
in the hands of the IANA transition Coordination Group 
(ICG).27  The ICG has representation from the major 
internet technical community organizations, the various 
ICANN constituencies, and global business.  Its role is to 
facilitate the transition proposal development process, 
coordinate the inputs from the various communities, 
and produce (but not decide on) a transition proposal. 
While the ICG represents various organizations and 
communities of interest, it does not represent the 
global internet community.  For all stakeholders, and 
particularly civil society, it will be essential to have 
input mechanisms beyond those specific to the entities 
represented on the ICG. It is also crucial that the ICG 
commit to ensuring that input from the global internet 
community is given appropriate consideration.  This is 
essential to meeting NTIA’s requirements that ICANN 
work with “other interested global stakeholders.”
Challenges and Opportunities
NTIA’s IANA transition announcement presents the 
global multistakeholder community with significant 
challenges and opportunities.  The first challenge will 
26 Though we have primarily focused on the management of 
the DNS, the IANA functions include management of protocol 
parameters for IETF, allocation of IP address blocks to the 
Regional Internet Registries, and management of the DNS root 
zone, which is currently maintained by Verisign. See Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, “IANA Func-
tions: The Basics,” https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/
functions-basics-07apr14-en.pdf (last accessed 7 August 2014).
27 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, “NTIA 
IANA Functions’ Stewardship Transition: Coordination Group,” 
https://www.icann.org/stewardship/coordination-group (last ac-
cessed 7 August 2014). 
Page 77
BEYOND NETMUNDIAL: THE ROADMAP FOR INSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE ECOSYSTEM 
be to produce a global multistakeholder community-
driven proposal that can garner the required broad 
community support. The second is to ensure that 
ICANN has the appropriate accountability mechanisms 
in place to account for and/or replace the contracting 
and stewardship roles of the US government. And the 
third is to ensure that the proposal and the accountability 
mechanisms are future-proof, to the extent possible, so 
as to ensure the continuity, stability, and resiliency of 
the internet.   
Of course, there many other associated challenges, 
not least of which is that the IANA transition and ICANN 
 accountability processes must each provide mecha-
nisms through which the global internet community (and 
not just the organizations or communities  represented 
on the working groups) can contribute, and that those 
contributions are appropriately taken into account. 
ICANN as convener of these two tracks must ensure 
that the processes are managed in a neutral manner, 
reach beyond the immediate ICANN community and 
actively solicit input from those potentially affected by 
the transition and those who are involved in internet 
governance writ large. The IANA functions transition is 
an important moment in internet governance, and has 
drawn a significant amount of attention from those in-
side and outside the ICANN community.  The transition 
presents an opportunity to develop praxis on identifying 
diverse stakeholders who can and should contribute to 
governance processes, conducting effective outreach, 
and bringing those stakeholders into a governance dis-
cussion typically dominated by technical considerations 
in a way that enables them to meaningfully contribute. 
There are also broader internet governance-related 
reasons for getting the IANA transition right.  NTIA 
explicitly calls for the transition of “key Internet 
domain name functions to the global multistakeholder 
community” and has as one of its key principles the need 
for the transition proposal to “support and enhance the 
multistakeholder model.” The IANA transition process 
must be undertaken in the most inclusive and open 
manner – informed by the multistakeholder approach 
as described in the NETmundial principles for internet 
governance – so as to validate and strengthen 
multistakeholder approaches to internet governance.  
As the likely continued home for the IANA functions, 
ICANN, and particularly its community, must agree and 
put in place governance and accountability mechanisms 
that are appropriate to the task today and in the 
future.  Stakeholders have voiced concerns that the 
existing accountability mechanisms are not adequate 
and that the external accountability associated with 
the US government’s contracting and stewardship 
roles must be replicated or represented in some way. 
Many stakeholders claim that the IANA transition 
and the Enhancing ICANN Accountability processes 
are interdependent and cannot progress in isolation. 
Others go further to say that ICANN’s accountability 
processes must be significantly strengthened prior to 
an IANA transition proposal being delivered to NTIA.  
Conclusion
Transition success will be measured in many ways. 
Among others, the process must be fully open 
and transparent, and must facilitate contributions 
from outside the internet technical community. The 
proposal will have to satisfy NTIA’s principles and the 
expectations of the global internet community.  The 
proposal will have to be stress-tested to ensure that it 
can survive known (and unknown) future challenges as 
well as be anchored by appropriate and strengthened 
accountability mechanisms.  And it will need to have 
broad community support and agreement from around 
the globe.  Stakeholders cannot afford for this transition 
not to be a success – the evolution of the internet 
governance ecosystem may well depend on it.
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ICANN Globalization, Accountability, and 
Transparency
Avri Doria
The stakeholders at NETmundial proposed a 
multistakeholder roadmap for the future evolution of 
the internet Governance ecosystem. One of these 
pertained specifically to ICANN:
It is expected that the process of globalization 
of ICANN speeds up leading to a truly 
international and global organization serving 
the public interest with clearly implementable 
and verifiable accountability and transparency 
mechanisms that satisfy requirements from both 
internal stakeholders and the global community.  
The active representation from all stakeholders 
in the ICANN structure from all regions is 
a key issue in the process of a successful 
globalization.1
This chapter explores the requirements of ICANN 
globalization and ICANN accountability and 
transparency.  
Globalization
Internationalization began as goal for ICANN over 
a decade ago. An early indication was given by a 
Presidential Strategic Committee that explored the 
possibility “for moving ICANN’s legal identity to that 
of a private international organization based in the 
US.”2 While the report recommended that the board 
consider such a move, it never happened. Discussing 
the importance of creating a regional presence, the 
report states, “The Committee believes that while 
ICANN’s headquarters may remain in the US, it needs 
to continue to establish and strengthen regional 
presences, staffing and continue regional outreach.”3
Over the years the conversations continued, never 
1 NETmundial. (2014). NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement. 
See http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmun-
dial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf
2 ICANN, President’s Strategy Committee Report, http://archive.
icann.org/en/psc/psc-report-final-25mar07.pdf
3 Ibid.
moving much until the current President and CEO, Fadi 
Chehadé, made the issue of globalization a priority.
Relabeling the issue from ‘internationalization’ to 
‘globalization’ reflected growing political anxiety that 
the ITU, or some other UN body, would usurp its 
responsibilities for Internet Names and Numbers. 
While domain name labels were ‘internationalized’ on 
a technical level and called Internationalized Domain 
Names (IDNs), ICANN leadership realized that 
referring to ICANN evolution as internationalization 
might provide an opportunity to those who wanted 
to transform ICANN into an inter-governmental 
organization. The political implications of the terms can 
be seen in their definitions:
Internationalization: Bring (a place) under the 
protection or control of two or more nations
Globalization: Develop or be developed so 
as to make possible international influence or 
operation
While ICANN aims to have a diverse and international 
multistakeholder process, it does not wish to be 
controlled by two or more nations. On the contrary, it 
has been aiming to free itself from oversight by a single 
nation, the United States, for over 13 years.
The discussion of ICANN globalization includes the 
complication that its generic Top Level Domain names 
(gTLD), are ‘regulated’ via Registry and Registrar 
contracts. The gTLDs are the primary source of income 
for ICANN: passing on fees paid by the world’s domain 
name registrants through its Registrars and Registries. 
The contracts that provide the regulatory framework 
governing the Registrars and Registries are signed 
in the United States and regulated by US, California, 
and other US state laws. Given the current political 
atmosphere in the United States, moving the contracts 
out of the US anytime in the near future would be 
difficult, at best.
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In the last 2 years, the organizational structure of 
ICANN has changed greatly. There are hub offices 
in Singapore, Turkey, and the US, and engagement 
offices in China, Belgium, Switzerland, Uruguay, 
Korea, and the United States (DC). While maintaining 
its headquarters in the US, ICANN now has a global 
presence, which can be seen as one step in the 
process of globalization.
Additionally it has created a new division, the Generic 
Domains Division (GDD) that aggregates all gTLD 
functions into a single independent division with its 
own president. gTLD’s are, coincidentally, the part of 
ICANN that concerns US politicians the most, due to 
IP and business domain names. It is to be expected 
that the GDD will remain within the US for the 
foreseeable future, no matter what kind of globalization 
occurs within the greater ICANN, and the gTLD 
business will retain its dependence on US law. This 
will please American lawmakers and has been noted 
as an essential requirement by the US Congress for 
any transition of the IANA Stewardship process - to 
whatever degree they may, or may not have, have a 
voice in that transition.4
The globalization changes are not only organizational. 
Ten years ago, ICANN was resolutely an US English 
language institution. ‘Linguistic imperialism’ was strong 
and any hint that it would someday be a multilingual 
organization was laughable. Over the intervening 
years, through the efforts of several ICANN board 
members, advocates, and a dedicated staff, the 
linguistic barrier has been broken and now, more or 
less, ICANN operates in at least the six languages of 
the United Nations.5
Ten years ago, all domain names were restricted 
to characters in English script, despite the fact that 
various technologies for the inclusion of multiple scripts 
had existed for a long time. Largely as a result of strong 
interest, initially from the IGF and then the international 
participants in ICANN, the IETF reworked the standards 
for Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) and over 
the last several years, IDN top level names, both as 
country code TLDs (ccTLD) and generic TLDs (gTLD), 
have begun to appear on the internet.6 ICANN has 
been a stalwart actor in the process of globalizing the 
internet by introducing and nurturing the IDNs.
4 The IANA Stewardship process is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. It has been discussed elsewhere in this volume. See: 
https://www.icann.org/stewardship
5 Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Spanish, Russian
6 One wonders, had the differentiation between Internationalize 
and Globalize been an issue at the time, whether these would 
be called Globalized Domain Names as opposed to IDNs.
This was the still nascent state of ICANN globalization 
at the time it was recommended at NETmundial that 
the process of globalization speed up “leading to a truly 
international and global organization.”7 While ICANN is 
being globalized, it still has a long way to go. Having 
offices around the world is a start, but outreach to the 
global multistakeholder community will require much 
more than creating an office. It will require bringing in 
users and non-users of the DNS from diverse nations, 
understanding their concerns and goals, and taking 
those concerns and goals seriously. Balancing the 
global interests of those who participate in the ICANN 
community, businesses, registrants, and users, will 
require balancing profit motive and the well-being of 
registrants, users, and non-users. It will also require 
understanding the Human Rights impact of ICANN 
actions and taking those rights impacts into account in 
its decision making.
One of the sad facts about the current new gTLD 
expansion is that there were almost no applications 
from developing economies. Remediating this situation 
should be part of the goal of globalization. ICANN 
needs to devote some of its resources to enable 
developing economies to participate in the economy of 
new gTLDs. Where are the Registries in the developing 
economies? Where are the Registrars in developing 
economies? It is incumbent on ICANN, as part of its 
globalization plans, to build the capacity of these 
developing countries.
Beyond enabling and assisting in the buildup of 
the internet, naming and numbering infrastructure 
of developing economies, ICANN should consider 
a remediation round for new gTLDs. There is a 
global need for a round that is oriented toward 
applications from developing economies and that 
assist entrepreneurs and civil society organizations in 
developing economies to apply for and run these new 
gTLDs. Until ICANN does that, the current globalization 
moves may be mistaken for yet another new form of 
‘neo-colonialism,’ where one puts offices in a place to 
help those that already control gTLDs, but does little 
to bring the local economies into the modern internet 
economy. To become globalized, ICANN needs to 
take its responsibilities in the elimination of the digital 
divide seriously, and ICANN globalization requires 
serving the global public interest by enhancing internet 
infrastructure everywhere.
Accountability
One of the first questions about accountability is 
“accountability to whom?” ICANN is accountable to the 
7  NETmundial. (2014). NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement
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global multistakeholder community through a bottom-
up process. It is also accountable for its execution of 
the various IANA functions as specified in its contract 
with NTIA and Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) 
with other internet organizations. In many cases the 
interests of the global multistakeholder community 
are represented among the many participants who 
dedicate themselves to ICANN service by contributing 
to its many constituencies, organized as Supporting 
Organizations (SO), Advisory Committees (AC), and 
working groups. There are also various processes 
for continual outreach to bring in participants whose 
interests are not yet represented within the various 
ICANN structures. ICANN is working on this goal and 
has some strong and capable staff working on these 
objectives.
In defining this accountability one has to see it 
within the context of multistakeholderism.8 The 
multistakeholder aspects of ICANN’s accountability 
includes its commitment to bottom-up policy making, 
and the requirement that the ICANN board should only 
approve, and the staff should only engage in, activities 
that have been initiated, or at least vetted, by the 
ICANN community using established organizational 
8  Multistakeholderism (working definition): The study and prac-
tice of forms of participatory democracy that allow for all those 
who have a stake and who have the inclination, to participate on 
equal footing in the deliberation of issues and the recommenda-
tion of solutions. While final decisions and implementation may 
be assigned to a single stakeholder group, these decision mak-
ers are always accountable to all of the stakeholders for their 
decisions and the implementations.
policy. At ICANN, this is still more the rule than the 
practice, especially with regard to staff initiatives.
Accountability normally includes three major elements: 
oversight, transparency, and methods for redress. 
Once the matter of accountability to is addressed, 
the next matter is being able to recognize when an 
organization is behaving accountably, which leads to 
oversight and community identification of problems 
that occur. Identification leads to transparency, which 
then leads to redress once the community or individual 
determines there is a problem.
Oversight
Experience shows that organizations without oversight 
will eventually run amok. However, not everyone 
means the same thing by oversight and not every 
process requires the same form of oversight, which is 
a complex concept entailing both hard (commanding) 
and soft (recommending) forms. Forms of oversight can 
also be differentiated by being external or internal to the 
organization. One can also differentiate oversight that 
is proscriptive and a-priori (in that it directs operations), 
oversight that consists of periodic reviews or audits, 
and oversight that is exception-based, dealing with 
problematic issues if and when they occur. The types 
of oversight appropriate for an organization vary, as 
do the types of oversight for different aspects of their 
operations.
ICANN does have a well-developed form of internal 
soft oversight in the Affirmation of Commitments 
SIMPLE 
MATRIX
EXTERNAL INTERNAL
Hard An external determinative body that can 
instruct an organization to modify a deci-
sion or change its operating procedures. 
Binding appeals and external dispute 
resolution mechanisms are an example. 
With the possible exception of NTIA and 
its contract granting power, ICANN does 
not have this sort of oversight.
Processes that allow for enforced man-
agement changes. For example, bylaw 
provisions that allow for officers to 
be removed from office by those who 
choose them. 
While most of the leaders of ICANN 
policy efforts are elected, it does not 
have a mechanism for removing lead-
ership other than during elections.
Soft Recommendations from external groups 
that can be rejected. 
The ICANN Independent Review Panel 
(IRP) is one example.
An Accountability Review Team that 
makes recommendations that can be 
either be accepted or rejected by the 
leadership of the organization.
 
The NTIA/ICANN AOC mechanisms 
are an example.
Figure 1: Types of Oversight
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(AOC)9 between the NTIA and ICANN. It is a novel, 
bottom-up oversight mechanism calling for periodic 
review by multistakeholder participants within ICANN, 
of major aspects of ICANN, such a Security, Stability 
and Resiliency, the WHOIS functionality, and the 
new gTLD program. These are done on a three year 
rotation. Additionally, a review of the Accountability 
and Transparency of the organization is also done 
every three years.10 In addition to taking a snapshot 
of the current situation at ICANN, the Accountability 
and Transparency Review Team (ATRT) reviews the 
outcomes and results from the previous review teams. 
Part of its review includes ICANN board and staff 
responses to recommendations made previously, as 
well as the effects of those changes.
The ATRT is a soft oversight mechanism in that the 
ICANN board is not bound by anything other than its 
respect for the process and concern about stakeholder 
reactions, to follow review team recommendations. By 
and large, the board has responded favorably to the 
recommendations of the various review teams, though 
occasionally the recommendations have been followed 
more perfunctorily rather than in the full spirit of the 
recommendation. However, the periodic ATRT reviews 
do come back to review and verify.
One of the problems with the AOC review as an ongoing 
accountability mechanism is that it is a voluntary 
arrangement between ICANN and the US NTIA. 
ICANN can pull out of the arrangement unilaterally, 
just by giving sufficient notice. There is a need to 
incorporate the AOC reviews into the ICANN bylaws as 
an institutional and ongoing obligation.
Transparency
Organizational transparency is essential to 
accountability. If the activities and positions of 
an organization are unknown, they cannot be 
learned from, mitigated, or redressed. Definitions 
of transparency vary: in some cases it means that 
besides items that have been intentionally redacted, 
documents and meeting notes are available to the 
community. For others, it means that a carefully vetted 
set of rationales for decisions are published, but that 
the actual discussions and documents that went into 
the decision are not made available to the community. 
ICANN’s style of transparency is more along the lines 
of the second definition, though the recent Affirmation 
9 Affirmation of Commitment page can be found at https://www.
icann.org/resources/pages/aoc-2012-02-25-en - the Affirmation 
itself can be found at: https://www.icann.org/en/about/agree-
ments/aoc/affirmation-of-commitments-30sep09-en.htm
10 The most recent ATRT report can be found at: https://www.
icann.org/en/system/files/files/final-recommendations-31dec13-
en.pdf
of Commitments (AOC) accountability review of the 
organization has recommended the organization 
adopt a more revelatory standard. Among the 
recommendations in the recent ATRT2 report:
• Review decision making transparency in order 
to establish a policy of default transparency. 
Periodic review of redacted material to remove 
redaction status when no longer necessary. 
(Recommendation 5)
• Develop transparency metrics and reporting. 
(Recommendation 9.4)
• Greater financial transparency. (Recommendation 
12) 11
One deficit in the ICANN transparency makeup is 
a weak whistleblower program; without an effective 
whistleblower program that protects the whistleblowers, 
transparency is all but impossible. The recent ATRT2 
report also recommended that this be reviewed and 
the opportunities and protections for whistleblowing be 
improved. 
The ICANN Board has accepted the ATRT2 
recommendations; the implementation remains TBD. 
If properly implemented, they will provide a large 
improvement in ICANN’s transparency and in verifiable 
accountability.
Redress
ICANN defines three redress mechanisms: 
reconsideration requests, the Independent Review 
Process and the Ombudsman.12 Reconsideration 
requests define a process where “any person or entity 
materially affected by an action (or inaction) of ICANN 
may request review or reconsideration of that action 
by the Board.”13 For the most part, this means that the 
board is asked to review its own decisions as well as 
staff actions. The Independent Review Process (IRP) 
is “a separate process for independent third-party 
review of Board actions (or inactions) alleged by an 
affected party to be inconsistent with ICANN’s Articles 
of Incorporation or Bylaws.”14 The ICANN Ombudsman 
is an “independent and impartial neutral dispute 
resolution practitioner whose function is to provide 
an independent internal evaluation of complaints by 
members of the ICANN community” who “believe that 
the ICANN staff, Board or an ICANN constituent body 
11 ATRT2 Final Report, https://www.icann.org/en/about/aoc-review/
atrt/final-recommendations-31dec13-en.pdf
12 ICANN. “Accountability Mechanisms.” https://www.icann.org/
resources/pages/mechanisms-2014-03-20-en
13 See Article IV, Section 2 of the Bylaws https://www.icann.org/en/
about/governance/bylaws#IV
14 See Article IV, Section 3 of the ICANN Bylaws https://www.
icann.org/en/about/governance/bylaws#IV
Page 83
BEYOND NETMUNDIAL: THE ROADMAP FOR INSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE ECOSYSTEM 
has treated them unfairly” for “matters which have not 
otherwise become the subject of the Reconsideration 
Process or the Independent Review Process.”15
The reconsideration process is a very weak appeals 
mechanism wherein the ICANN Board reviews actions 
to see if any rules were broken or processes infracted. 
By and large, decisions are rarely reversed due to 
reconsideration. The idea that the board can review its 
own decisions in a fair and balanced manner is hard 
for much of the community to accept, and the board’s 
reconsideration involves deciding whether they broke 
any ICANN rules in making the original decision. The 
bylaws define the process in such a way that prohibits 
them from considering any new facts or even previously 
known facts in a different light, with the result that the 
ICANN board and staff is free to act with very little 
restraint or consequence.
The IRP does provide for an external review of board 
decisions whereby an appellant needs to pay up front 
for the possible costs of this ‘loser pays’ process. 
Estimated to cost nearly one million USD, it is not 
used very often. Additionally, the IRP decisions are 
not binding. It has, however been used successfully. 
Unfortunately after the recent successful use by ICM  in 
the .xxx appeal, the rules for the IRP were tightened in 
the bylaws. Futhermore, all IRP actions are secret and 
not discoverable. Whatever redress it may or may not 
provide, it is not transparent.16
The Ombudsman’s office takes its role in determining 
fairness quite seriously, but can, however, only make 
recommendations and has no enforcement capability. 
The Ombudsman is also prohibited from taking a case 
from an ICANN employee, even if it concerns staff 
activities that might have an adverse effect on ICANN 
policy, operations, and bylaws commitments.
When reviewed, it becomes clear that there is very 
little opportunity at ICANN to obtain redress for board 
or staff decisions and actions. With the possible 
exception of replacing the president of ICANN, as has 
been done previously, there is no effective redress for 
staff actions. This form of redress, however, is a rather 
extreme consequence, and one best avoided in a stable 
organization. It is also not likely that the community 
could even effect such a change as the board does not 
review its decisions with regard to the president with 
the community before making them, defining them as 
15 See Article V of the ICANN Bylaws https://www.icann.org/en/
about/governance/bylaws#V
16 A recent IRP memorandum https://www.icann.org/en/system/
files/files/icann-memo-procedural-issues-20may14-en.pdf ex-
plores the issues brought out in the ICM case and their relation 
to current issues before the IRP and ICANN Accountability.
an “Organizational Administrative Function that is not 
subject to public comment.”17
What is Next for 
 Accountability at ICANN
The most recent ATRT recommended that the 
community be brought into the process of fixing 
the accountability situation. The ICANN Board has 
announced that in the near future it will initiate an 
accountability improvement process. This was not 
only recommended by the recent ATRT2 review, but 
also mandated by the NTIA as a companion process 
to the IANA Stewardship Transition. While there has 
been an open comment period on the issues that need 
to be dealt with in ICANN accountability, as of this 
writing, the community is still waiting for the analysis 
of the comments and the process to be defined in 
cooperation with the community.18 It must be noted that 
there is a bit of skepticism in the community about this 
as the previous ATRT also suggested improvements 
in accountability, but while there was improvement in 
some areas, the situation deteriorated in others in the 
intervening years. At ICANN, the community can only 
hope that something will improve, because at this point 
in time, the participants and clients of ICANN have 
little to no ability to affect the behavior of ICANN staff 
or the board, despite its commitment to a bottom-up 
multistakeholder process.
One of the biggest accountability problems ICANN has 
is that people are losing some degree of trust in ICANN 
management. During the London ICANN meeting 
in June 2014, all of the Stakeholder Groups and 
Constituencies of the GNSO made a joint statement 
related to accountability:
I’m Keith Drazek, Chair of the Registries 
Stakeholder Group, with me are the leaders 
of all of the GNSO’s Stakeholder Groups and 
Constituencies.  
I’m happy to report that the GNSO community 
took up Fadi’s challenge from the Opening 
Ceremony to seek harmony this week 
in London. Instead of a song or two, the 
17 Board decision and Rationale 30 July 2014, https://www.icann.
org/resources/board-material/resolutions-2014-07-30-en#3.c
18 Process defined at: https://www.icann.org/public-comments/
enhancing-accountability-2014-05-06-en Comment forum: 
http://forum.icann.org/lists/comments-enhancing-accountability-
06may14/. Subsequent to the article’s being written, the plan 
was released: https://www.icann.org/news/announcement-2014-
08-14-en Commentary on this plan can e found at: http://avri.
doria.org/post/94938726565/and-then-there-was-a-new-plan-to-
deal-with-icann
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statement we’re about to read represents an 
unprecedented -- yes unprecedented -- event. 
It only took us 50 meetings, but I think the rarity 
of what you’re witnessing this afternoon sends 
a very strong message about our views. The 
GNSO community, with all our diversity and 
occasionally competing interests, has come 
together to unanimously support the following:
The entire GNSO joins together today calling 
for the Board to support community creation 
of an independent accountability mechanism 
that provides meaningful review and adequate 
redress for those harmed by ICANN action or 
inaction in contravention of an agreed upon 
compact with the community.  
This deserves the Board’s serious consideration 
- not only does it reflect an unprecedented 
level of consensus across the entire GNSO 
community, it is a necessary and integral 
element of the IANA stewardship transition.  
True accountability does not mean ICANN is 
only accountable to itself, or to some vague 
definition of “the world.” It does not mean that 
governments should have the ultimate say over 
community policy without regard to the rule 
of law. Rather, the Board’s decisions must be 
open to challenge and the Board cannot be in 
a position of reviewing and certifying its own 
decisions.  
We need an independent accountability 
structure that holds the ICANN Board, Staff, 
and various stakeholder groups accountable 
under ICANN’s governing documents, serves 
as an ultimate review of Board/Staff decisions, 
and through the creation of precedent, creates 
prospective guidance for the board, the staff, 
and the entire community.    
As part of the IANA stewardship transition, the 
multi-stakeholder community has the opportunity 
and responsibility to propose meaningful 
accountability structures that go beyond just 
the IANA-specific accountability issues. We are 
committed to coming together and developing 
recommendations for the creation of these 
mechanisms. We ask the ICANN Board and 
Staff to fulfill their obligations and support this 
community driven, multi-stakeholder initiative.19
19  Personal communication of the original text. The text as spoken 
can be found at: http://london50.icann.org/en/schedule/thu-
public-forum/transcript-public-forum-26jun14-en
As of this writing, though a month has passed, 
neither the CEO of ICANN nor the ICANN Board has 
responded specifically to this request. Perhaps one of 
the first things that ICANN needs to improve in terms 
of its accountability is its responsiveness to the ICANN 
constituencies in an open and timely manner.
Conclusion
Globalization, accountability, and transparency were 
defined by NETmundial as important requirements 
for ICANN in its commitment to bottom-up 
multistakeholdersm. Together, these requirements 
represent ICANN’s commitment to the global 
multistakeholder community – the community of all of 
those with a stake in the internet, including those who 
are active in the process and those who are not, either 
due to choice or current lack of capacity to participate.
ICANN has been working on globalization, 
accountability, and transparency for a decade now. It is 
an interminable task that can be continuously improved 
upon with sufficient attention and devotion. Those who 
believe in ICANN as an organization at the forefront 
of the multistakeholder governance movement live in 
hope that the organization and its CEO, board and 
senior management will allow the community help the 
organization live up to its ideals.
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Towards Information Interdependence
James Losey
Internet governance is influenced through tensions 
of both domestic and international policies. In 2010, 
Mueller suggested that four policy areas drove internet 
governance debates: intellectual property protection, 
content control, cyber security, and critical internet 
resources,1 a list that should be updated to include 
surveillance and data retention. Debates around 
these issues illuminate overlapping tensions between 
states employing Westphalian ideologies to enforce 
territorial policy regimes to exclude outside influence, 
states attempting to affirm domestic authority including 
through data localization proposals, and states seeking 
extraterritorial control of content or access to data.  
The future growth of the internet will potentially 
destabilize existing power dynamics. What is needed 
is a third-way approach that provides a middle 
ground between extraterritorial policy regimes and 
domestic sovereignty and offers a way forward for 
the swing states in the internet governance debate. 
Following an analysis of sovereignty in debates of 
internet governance, this paper offers information 
interdependence as a way forward with examples 
across five issue areas that impact internet governance 
debates.
Background
Mueller and Wagner categorize one group of state actors 
in internet governance debates as those focused on 
affirming sovereignty with respect to internet traffic and 
content.2 These states, such as China, Russia, Brazil, 
and South Africa, have historically approached internet 
governance debates with the interest of reaffirming 
state authority over domestic internet concerns. But 
these states represent one side of the spectrum of the 
issue of territory and the global internet, and states are 
shifting along the spectrum. 
1 Milton Mueller, Networks and States: The Global Politics of 
Internet Governance (Cambridge: MA: MIT Press, 2010), 6.
2 Milton Mueller and Ben Wagner, “Finding a Formula for Brazil: 
Representation and Legitimacy in Internet Governance,” 
Working Paper, Internet Policy Observatory (2014)
The World Conference on International Telecommuni-
cations (WCIT-12) “confirmed the existence of complex 
fault lines in the international community,” particularly 
in terms of applying domestic authority to the internet.3 
There, Russia and China drove efforts to reinforce 
recognition of borders, and conference delegates 
from three dozen countries made declarations or res-
ervations about the final text with the regard to their 
sovereignty over communications.4
However, these fault lines are evolving, and Mueller and 
Wagner argue that the Global Multistakeholder Meeting 
on the Future of Internet Governance  (NETmundial) 
demonstrates a shift in alliances.5 Although Brazil 
traditionally has been aligned with states critical of the 
U.S. and U.S. controlled institutions such as ICANN, 
Brazil hosting NETmundial brought the nation together 
with ICANN in organizing a summit.6
The shifts in internet governance, and other globally 
impactful information policy issues, illuminate the need 
for a better understanding of how states approach 
 sovereignty across these issues. Mueller has 
differentiated between states seeking strong sovereignty 
over the internet under the definition of states “forcing 
the  Internet to conform to the authority and parameters 
of the  nation-state” and states that may still retain 
governance but participate in networked institutions.7 
However, Mueller acknowledges the difficulty in  including 
states seeking extraterritorial application of information 
policy regimes in this spectrum.8 Understanding 
current international tensions and defining way forward 
requires a more nuanced approach to  understanding 
sovereignty and the internet.
3 Mark Raymond and Gordon Smith, “Reimagining the Internet: 
The Need for a High Level Strategic Vision for Internet 
Governance” Internet Governance Papers No. 1, The Centre for 
International Governance Innovation (2013).
4  Ibid.
5  Mueller and Wager, “Formula for Brazil.”
6  Ibid.
7  Mueller, “Networks and States,” 256.
8  Ibid. 257
BROADER ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES
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Sovereignty and the Internet
Sovereignty, while referring to recognition and 
application of state authority, is a nuanced term, and 
differences in state application of authority provide a 
critical window of analysis. Westphalian sovereignty 
(derived from the Peace of Westphalia) is commonly 
the definition used when describing the implications 
of “cyberborders,” and states seeking to maintain 
cultural or regime stability exemplify Westphalian 
approaches to information policy.9 These examples 
include aggressive efforts to control content, such as 
China’s Green Dam filtering system,10 or the reduced 
internet speeds and filtering in Iran.11 The BRICS have 
pushed for Westphalian approaches to cyber security,12 
as have countries such as Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, 
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.13
In addition to endeavoring to exclude content, services, 
or data, some states adopt measures to reaffirm state 
authority over internet data and communications. 
Mascolo and Scott’s “technical sovereignty” describes 
state control over data storage and transport, a term 
that risks being more focused on the technological 
mechanisms while excluding other mechanisms of state 
authority, such as judicial or legislative measures.14 
Krasner’s “domestic sovereignty” is perhaps a more 
apt term to describe structures of state authority.15 
Approaches to domestic sovereignty over the internet 
include over a dozen countries discussing data 
localization proposals.16 For example, in response to US 
9 Katherine Maher, “The New Westphalian Web,” Foreign Policy, 
February 25, 2013, Accessed July 25, 2014, http://www.
foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/02/25/the_new_westphalian_
web.
10 Robert Faris, Hal Roberts and Stephanie Wang, “China’s Green 
Dam: The Implications of Government Control Encroaching 
on the Home PC,” OpenNet Initiative, Accessed July 20, 
2014, https://opennet.net/chinas-green-dam-the-implications-
government-control-encroaching-home-pc.
11 Simgurgh Aryan, Homa Aryan and J. Alex Halderman. “Internet 
Censorship in Iran: A First Look.” Proceedings of the 3rd 
USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on 
the Internet (2013); Laurent Giacobini, Arash Abadpour, Collin 
Anderson, Fred Petrossian, and Caroline Nellemann. “Whither 
Blogestan: Evaluating Shifts in Persian Cyberspace.” Iran Media 
Program, Center for Global Communications Studies (2014).
12 Hans Ebert and Tim Maurer, “Contested Cyberspace and Rising 
Powers,” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 6 (2013): 1054-1074.
13 Ron Deibert, “Distributed Security as Cyber Strategy: Outlining 
a Comprehensive Approach for Canada in Cyberspace.” 
Research Paper, Canadian Defense & Foreign Affairs 
Institution, (2012).
14 Georg Mascolo and Ben Scott, “Lessons from the Summer of 
Snowden The Hard Road Back to Trust,” Open Technology 
Institute and Wilson Center (2013).
15 Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Prince Princeton University Press, 
1999).
16 Jonah Force Hill “The Growth of Data Localization Post-
Snowden: Analysis and Recommendations for US Policymakers 
international surveillance, German Chancellor Merkel 
proposed a German internet with Deutsche Telekom 
routing traffic to stay within the Schengen area.17 
Although these proposals have yet to be implemented, 
the privacy protection regime of the European Union 
which regulates the transfer of personal data outside of 
the EU is a step in this direction. Brazil also explored 
domestic legislation to require internet companies to 
store data within domestic data centers, although the 
measure was dropped from the final version of the 
recently-passed Marco Civil da Internet.18 
Westphalian and domestic sovereignty are two 
approaches for reaffirming territorial authority on the 
internet. The other end of this spectrum is information 
empire—policies and practices in which states seek 
extraterritorial applications of internet jurisdiction. 
For example, a recent court case in Canada required 
Google to edit search results globally rather than just 
for the Canada focused search product.19 Additionally, 
in May 2014 the European Court of Justice ruled that 
Google must provide a mechanism through which 
individuals could request the removal of search 
results in order to maintain a “right to be forgotten.”20 
By late July 2014, Google had received over 300,000 
requests.21 While Google currently is only blocking 
links in Europe, the Article 29 Data Protection Working 
Party is reviewing the question of whether links should 
be blocked globally.22 US surveillance practices are 
another example of information empire: the PRISM 
program accesses user data from Skype and Microsoft, 
Google, Facebook, AOL, Apple, and others.23 In a 
and Business Leaders.” Conference on the Future of Cyber 
Governance ,The Hague Institute for Global Justice (2014).
17 Ibid.
18 Philippe Bradley and Dan Cooper, “Brazil Enacts ‘Marco 
Civil’ Internet Civil Rights Bill,” InsidePrivacy, April 28, 2014, 
Accessed July 20, 2014, http://www.insideprivacy.com/
international/brazil-enacts-marco-civil-internet-civil-rights-bill/.
19 Ashley Zeckman, “Google Censorship Ruling in Canada Has 
Worldwide Implications”. Search Engine Watch. June 19, 
2014, Accessed July 25, 2014, http://searchenginewatch.com/
article/2351154/Google-Censorship-Ruling-in-Canada-Has-
Worldwide-Implications.
20 Court of the Justice of the European Union, “Press Release 
No 70/14,” May 13, 2014, Accessed July 30, 2014, http://
curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-05/
cp140070en.pdf.
21 Loek Essers, “EU, Google, Microsoft, Yahoo meet on ‘right 
to be forgotten’ but questions remain,” PCWorld, July 25, 
2014, Accessed July 28, 2014, http://www.pcworld.com/
article/2458380/eu-google-microsoft-yahoo-meet-on-right-to-be-
forgotten-but-questions-remain.html.
22 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, “Press Release,” 
July 25, 2014, Accessed July 30, 2014,http://ec.europa.eu/
justice/data-protection/article-29/press-material/press-release/
art29_press_material/20140725_wp29_press_release_right_to_
be_forgotten.pdf.
23 Glenn Greenwald and Ewen MacAskill, “NSA Prism program 
taps in to user data of Apple, Google and others,” The Guardian, 
Page 87
BEYOND NETMUNDIAL: THE ROADMAP FOR INSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE ECOSYSTEM 
startling revelation of the scope of the US surveillance 
regime, the Washington Post revealed in March 2014 
that the NSA records all the phone calls in one country 
with plans to expand to the program to five more.24
Information Interdependence
These distinctions provide the opportunity to distinguish 
between state efforts to control domestic information 
landscapes by preventing access to specific websites 
or services in order to maintain regime stability and 
states attempting to establish domestic legislation in 
response to extraterritorial behavior of other states. 
Critically, distinguishing between Westphalian and 
domestic sovereignty allows for a potential third-way 
that bridges domestic sovereignty and extraterritorial 
policies that potentially undermine the global internet. 
Krasner defines interdependence as the control 
of transborder movements, with recognition that 
interdependence results in diminishing Westphalian 
control.25 Keohane and Nye outline a framework for 
complex interdependence on the basis of a world order 
defined by multiple channels connecting societies, 
a multitude of interstate issues with no particular 
hierarchy, and  less reliance on military force.26
Building from these characteristics of complex 
interdependence can provide a framework of 
information interdependence. The internet creates 
ever more channels between societies, including digital 
cosmopolitanism,27 and Keohane and Nye suggest that 
the information revolution strengthens the possibility for 
complex interdependence by supporting more channels 
of communication,28 including the global flows of goods 
and services.29 Furthermore, even when pursuing 
Westphalian cyber-borders, securitizing cyberspace is 
June 7, 2013, Accessed July 10, 2014, http://www.theguardian.
com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data.
24 Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, “NSA surveillance program 
reaches ‘into the past’ to retrieve, replay phone calls,” The 
Washington Post, March 18, 2014, Accessed July 10, 2014, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
nsa-surveillance-program-reaches-into-the-past-to-retrieve-
replay-phone-calls/2014/03/18/226d2646-ade9-11e3-a49e-
76adc9210f19_story.html.
25 Krasner, Sovereignty.
26 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and 
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, 2nd edition 
(Glenview: Illinois, 1989).
27 Ethan Zuckerman, Rewire: Digital Cosmopolitans in the Age of 
Connection, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2013).
28 Robert O Keohane, and Joseph S. Nye Jr. “Power and 
interdependence in the information age.” Foreign Affairs (1998): 
81-94.
29 James Manyika et al. “Global flows in a digital age: How 
trade, finance, people, and data connect the world economy” 
McKinsey Global Institute, (2014).
less viable than land or air.30 Global information policy 
is ineffectively realized through traditional hard power. 
A paradigm of interdependence offers the much needed 
middle ground that could unite countries struggling 
for domestic sovereignty while limiting extraterritorial 
regimes. Bridging this divide offers a critical third-way 
to the emerging swing states in global internet policy 
debates. Examples of interdependence are offered 
across five issue areas driving internet governance 
debates: critical internet resources, content control 
regulation, intellectual property protection, cyber 
security, and surveillance and data retention.
Critical Internet Resources
Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA), oversees 
key technical functions of the global internet including 
the allocation of IP address space and top level DNS 
registry, and the US has had oversight of IANA since 
1998.  In 2014, Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN) proposed transitioning 
IANA to the global the multistakeholder community, 
which would be an important step towards information 
interdependence. The Internet Governance Project 
proposes a suite of additional recommendations, 
including the creation of an independent DNS authority 
and granting oversight to a consortium of TLD 
registries.31
Content Control Regulation
Not only are national policies that censor content for 
political or cultural stability inconsistent with human 
rights, but blocking content and services creates 
trade barriers for digital economies. Information 
interdependence for content requires policies that 
limit barriers for content production and distribution as 
well as support for freedom of expression online. One 
critical policy is limiting intermediary liability, effectively 
reducing incentives for proactive censorship and 
allowing content production and distribution platforms 
to proliferate.32
Cybersecurity
Cybersecurity can be generally categorized in terms 
of militarily-focused cyberwar and economic-based 
30 Keohane and Nye, “Information Age.”
31 Milton Mueller and Brenden Kuerbis, “Roadmap for globalizing 
IANA: Four principles and a proposal for reform,” Internet 
Governance Project, (2014), Accessed July 29, 2014, www.
internetgovernance.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/
ICANNreformglobalizingIANAfinal.pdf.
32 CDT, “Shielding the Messengers: Protecting Platforms for 
Expression and Innovation,” December 2012, Accessed July 
30, 2014, https://www.cdt.org/files/pdfs/CDT-Intermediary-
Liability-2012.pdf.
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cyber crime.33 One approach for addressing economic-
based cyber crime can be approached through law 
enforcement cooperation. For example, through the 
US Safe Web Act the US Federal Trade Commission 
works with foreign law enforcement on issues of 
spam, spyware and online fraud.34 Military-focused 
cybersecurity trends toward realism as opposed 
to interdependence and contends with state and 
non-state based attackers. Deibert has proposed a 
framework of distributed security that “emphasizes 
checks and balances on power, oversight on authority, 
and protections for rights and freedom” as an 
alternative to a realist approach.35 Deibert’s approach 
is to ground cybersecurity in principles for society, 
consider international implications, limit the secrecy of 
intelligence agencies, respect core privacy rights, and 
work towards international norms.36 Global norms are 
still emerging at the UN level, providing an opportunity 
to establish interdependence.37
Surveillance and Data Retention
The global scope of US surveillance has caused some 
states to be concerned about the control of internet 
traffic and data and has driven debates over the 
localization of data. Similar fears have lowered trust in 
services offered by US providers. Interdependence for 
surveillance and data retention requires multilateral law 
enforcement agreements to access data while moving 
towards international privacy protection for the transfer 
and storage of data. While the latter will likely continue 
to experience tensions between domestic and regional 
interpretations, frameworks for law enforcement 
cooperation exist. For example, Mutual Legal 
Assistance Treaties (MLATs) provide mechanisms for 
accessing data from a company in another country’s 
jurisdiction. MLATs can be abused, and can delay 
investigations, but reformed processes could provide 
mechanisms for limited law enforcement access, with 
respect for due process, to user data across borders.38
33 Tim Maurer, “Cyber Norm Emergence at the United Nations – 
An Analysis of the UN‘s Activities Regarding Cyber-security,” 
Discussion Paper 2011-11, Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, (2011).
34 Federal Trade Commission. “The U.S. Safe Web Act: The First 
Three years, a Report to Congress” (2009).
35 Deibert, “Distributed Security,” 16.
36 Ibid. 
37 Maurer “Norm Emergence.”
38 Kate Westmoreland, “What are the solutions to the ‘MLAT 
problem’?” Discussion paper, 2014, Accessed July 28, 
2014, https://docs.google.com/document/d/1QS6E6_
DnENwr9ea088u8cZETdchMg_XFy1cRlF8ec04/
edit#heading=h.worb0ss9wv5i. Permission needed to view.
Intellectual Property
Intellectual property offers a cautionary tale of 
interdependence. Existing agreements include the 
World Intellectual Property Organization, created 
in 1967 as a United Nations agency focused on 
protecting intellectual property rights globally, followed 
by the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (TRIPS) agreement in 1994. However, efforts 
at new agreements demonstrate both the dominance 
of the United States in international intellectual 
property debates, and the overwhelming influence of 
US companies rather than a citizen-led debate. For 
example, TRIPS began losing support from India and 
Brazil while one effort at a renewed agreement, the 
Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, drew widespread 
protests in Europe. The United States stood alone in 
opposing the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to 
Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually 
Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, an agreement 
to increase access to books for the visually impaired.39 
However, these challenges demonstrate the dilemma 
of US influence being combined with select business 
interests rather than interdependence as framework for 
state relations. 
Conclusion
Internet use will continue to expand in the coming years, 
but the greatest increase in internet users will come 
from outside of the United States and Europe. Deibert 
writes, “Internet users in places like China, India, Latin 
America, and Southeast Asia will soon dwarf these early 
adopting constituencies” such as the United States and 
Europe.40 The increase of internet users and the ways 
in which their respective governments engage with 
information policy will undoubtedly destabilize current 
power dynamics and shift global information policy 
debates. While China is a dedicated Westphalian 
state with regards to information polices, Maurer and 
Morgus describe many of these future growth countries 
(describing nearly 30, including Argentina, Brazil, India, 
Mexico, Turkey, and South Africa) as swing states 
with multifaceted political landscapes, and the strong 
potential to influence debate.41
The emerging shift to a multipolar world necessitates 
defining a global framework of information policy 
across critical issues that both minimize information 
39 Shae Fitzpatrick. “Setting Its Sights on the Marrakesh Treaty: 
The US Role in Alleviating the Book Famine for Persons with 
Print Disabilities.” BC Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 37 (2014): 139-209.
40 Deibert 2012, 6
41 Tim Maurer and Robert Morgus, “Tipping the Scales: An 
Analysis of Global Swing States in the Internet Governance 
Debate,” Internet Governance Papers No. 7, The Centre for 
International Governance Innovation (2014). 
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empire and reduce incentives for countries that might 
otherwise use cyberborders to rally national interests. 
This essay provides the foundation for a middle ground 
to bridge this conflict.  While interdependence alone will 
not resolve the most hardline adherents to Westphalian 
policies, the risks of isolation from interconnected 
economies can facilitate the continuation of a 
global internet regulatory commons. Information 
interdependence offers a third-way for governance in 
an interconnected world.
James Losey is a doctoral candidate at the School 
of Information Studies and the Department of Media 
Studies at Stockholm University. He is also a visiting 
scholar at the University of Pennsylvania’s Center 
for Global Communication Studies at the Annenberg 
School for Communication and an affiliate at the 
Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard 
University. 
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Towards Information Sovereignty
Shawn Powers
Continuously challenged, states naturally seek means 
of legitimating their authority, a process that increasingly 
requires providing a citizenry with some level of 
freedom of expression. At the same time, technologies 
are evolving quickly and changing the ways that 
communities are formed and authority legitimized. For 
many states, allowing too much freedom of expression 
risks a loss of legitimacy by another sword: the rise of 
political challengers more able to engage the masses 
and offer alternative visions for the future. It is within 
this continuum—with absolute freedom of expression 
on one end and total information control on the 
other—that I explore four case studies in which states 
discourage access to a singular, shared internet by 
developing malleable domestic networks more capable 
of facilitating a balance between freedom and control. 
The Rise of Information 
 Sovereignty
The free-flow conceptualization of international 
communication has been continuously challenged when 
confronted with the geopolitical reality of sovereignty. 
One of the first academic volumes explicitly addressing 
the topic of international communication, edited by 
Kaarl Nordenstreng and Herbert Schiller, predicted: 
“The concept of national sovereignty will increasingly 
emerge as a point of reflection for the most fundamental 
issues of international communication.”1 Sure enough, 
the question of sovereignty became integral to debates 
in the 1970s regarding the rights of governments to 
prevent the intrusion of information flows from foreign 
actors. If states have a right to control flows of people 
into their territory, and how money is exchanged with 
foreign banks, why don’t they have a right to control 
information flows from foreign actors? 
The New World Information and Communication 
Order (NWICO) grew out of discussions within the 
United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) meetings of non-aligned 
1 Kaarle Nordenstreng and Herbert Schiller, National Sovereignty 
and International Communication: A reader, (Norwood, NJ: 
Ablex Publishing Corporation: 1979), p. xiv.
countries in Algiers (1973), Tunis (1976), and New 
Delhi (1976). With the emergence of Direct-Satellite-
Broadcast (DSB) technology, governments around the 
world expressed concern about America’s interest in 
using satellites to increase dissemination of its cultural 
products in foreign countries. Fears of neo-colonialism 
via  international media flows became widespread, 
fueling the NWICO movement. 
Despite its global appeal, NWICO failed to achieve 
much by way of substantial policy change. International 
debates about the fairness of regulation of global 
 information flows resurfaced by way of the World 
 Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) meetings in 
Geneva (2003) and Tunis (2005), focusing on critiques 
of continued inequality in access to and benefits 
from information resources. Today’s debates over 
 internet governance, as well as global connectivity, 
are direct descendants of this specific clash of world 
views  between advocates of a free flow doctrine 
of international communication and a state-based, 
information sovereignty approach. 
While the arguments for and against particular 
theories of international information flows haven’t 
changed all that much since the initial assertions of 
media imperialism and dependency, the stakes of the 
debate have altered. Whereas the NWICO movement 
argued in favor of a more fair and equitable balance 
of information flows, today’s information sovereigns 
strike a different tone, emphasizing the universally 
utilized political right of governments to manage their 
borders. This rhetorical shift, emphasizing a universally 
recognized right that provides the foundation for the 
modern international system, is gaining traction. 
Information sovereignty’s emphasis on the political 
rights of governments to control information flows 
within their geographically delineated territories doesn’t 
differentiate between developed and developing 
worlds. Thus, it leverages two simple facts: First, the 
majority of the world’s governments remain eager to 
protect and strengthen their sovereignty. Second, the 
majority of citizens support the nation-state system, 
holding on to nationalist views. It also shifts the 
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conversation from one of blame to one of rights and 
responsibilities. “I have the right and responsibility to 
control information flows, same as every government 
in the world,” is a very different argument from: “your 
information industries are dominant and overwhelming 
our culture!” As a result, while references to NWICO 
are few and far between, its intellectual successor—
information sovereignty—is gaining traction, especially 
outside the West. 
Information Sovereignty in 
Practice
Many have suggested that the internet’s growth 
means (or should mean) the end of state sovereignty 
altogether. The logic behind such arguments is 
compelling. Technology has enabled citizens to create 
and join communities based not on geography, but 
shared interests and ideologies, thus threatening the 
rationale for state-based nationalism altogether. Why 
would a citizen pledge loyalty to a state-based nation 
when a cornucopia of alternative communities that 
speak to specific interests beckon on the World Wide 
Web? According to this line of thinking, while states 
will certainly try to slow the transition, re-asserting their 
authority and legitimacy, globalization inevitably means 
the end of the nation-state as we know it.
At the same time, states control the telecommunications 
infrastructure that enables global connectivity. The 
physical nature of network connections allows any 
government to control information flows within its territory 
in a number of ways, including simply disconnecting 
its national communications infrastructure from all or 
parts of the global network. President Hosni Mubarak’s 
decision to take Egypt entirely offline in 2011, as well as 
Edward Snowden’s revelations regarding the existence 
of government-operated global surveillance apparatus, 
demonstrate just how vulnerable the Web is to state 
control. Given the ease with which states can control 
access to the web, what is stopping governments from 
restricting access to the internet? After all, even the 
father of international liberalism—Immanuel Kant—
conceded states are motivated first and foremost by 
self-preservation.2
Ethan Zuckerman suggests one answer via his “Cute 
Cat Theory” of internet activism. The theory’s name 
stems from the fact that, around the world, one of the 
most popular uses of social media is for sharing videos 
and photos of cute cats. According to Cute Cat Theory, 
governments cannot sustain widespread restrictions 
2 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, and Other Essays on Politics, 
History, and Morals, trans. by Ted Humphrey, (Hackett Pub Co, 
1983).
on internet content because activists and citizens 
communicate over the same central internet portals 
like YouTube, Flickr, Facebook, Twitter, Pinterest, etc. 
Access restrictions applied to any one central portal 
used by activists would block all access to its content, 
limiting the sharing of apolitical but highly popular 
content (like cute cat videos), thereby engendering 
widespread citizen anger and increasing the likelihood 
of greater unrest. Zuckerman explains, “Citizens who 
could care less about politics are made aware that 
their government fears online speech so much that 
they’re willing to censor the millions of banal videos on 
YouTube to block a few political ones.”3 Governmental 
efforts to restrict internet content will fail and in fact 
speed their loss of legitimacy and decline, or so the 
theory goes. 
Cute cat theory builds on what Asa Briggs and Peter 
Burke describe as the “Conservative Dilemma.”4 When 
a conservative government (typically non-democratic 
regimes, but also some ruling governments in quasi-
democratic systems) is confronted with widespread 
social protest, it has four options for restoring control: 
propaganda, censorship, total information control, 
and violent repression. Each choice entails risks, thus 
the dilemma. Whereby propaganda and censorship 
are typically inexpensive and the least disruptive, 
they have also been the least effective, potentially 
leaving the regime vulnerable and risking further social 
fragmentation. Total information control and violent 
repression are highly effective at quieting public dissent 
and restoring social stability, at least on the surface, 
but risk a loss of regime legitimacy, pushing those 
uninterested in the initial protests to join fellow citizenry 
in calling for reform or regime change. Applying this 
model to state efforts at curtailing social media, Clay 
Shirky found that total information control presented 
a dire threat to a state’s economic vitality given 
the growing interdependence between information 
systems, national economies and global trade. More 
than ever, total information control is an extraordinarily 
risky endeavor for states.5 
Both Cute Cat Theory and the conservative dilemma 
assume the existence of global connectivity. For Briggs 
and Burke, domestic propaganda and censorship often 
fail because citizens have access to information from 
actors unconstrained by a domestic censorship regime, 
thus exposing state efforts as manipulative. 
3 Ethan Zuckerman, “The Cute Cat Theory Talk at ETech,” My 
Heart’s in Accra, 2008. http://www.ethanzuckerman.com/
blog/2008/03/08/the-cute-cat-theory-talk-at-etech/. 
4 Asa Briggs and Peter Burke, Social History of the Media: From 
Gutenberg to the Internet (Polity, 2010).
5 Clay Shirky, “The Political Power of Social Media,” Foreign Af-
fairs, January 1, 2011.
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Similarly, Zuckerman did not foresee a world where 
governments would effectively transcend dependence 
on the global internet by creating their own domestically-
driven digital information ecosystems, based on 
localized content, connecting only to sanctioned parts of 
the World Wide Web. In place of cute cats on YouTube, 
for example, each country might have its own, localized 
version of YouTube, with videos of local cats or, in some 
cases, copies of selected YouTube cute cats. Citizens 
eager to generate their own web content contribute to 
the nation-based networks and portals, thus creating a 
series of smaller networks more easily controlled and 
monitored by the government while simultaneously 
offering hyper-localized applications. 
Information sovereignty refers to a state’s attempt to 
control information flows within its territory. But control 
doesn’t necessarily require a government to shutdown 
access to the internet. It can be asserted in a variety 
of ways, including: filtering, monitoring and structuring 
industry-government relations in order to maximize 
state preferences in privately operated communications 
systems. A 2010 study by the OpenNet Initiative 
concluded that more than half a billion users—over a 
third of all users then on the internet—experienced some 
form of filtering. This does not include various measures 
to enforce copyright, prohibitions on hate speech, 
prohibitions on extremist propaganda, prohibitions on 
child pornography and exploitation, prohibitions on 
sales of controlled substances and prohibitions on 
online gambling, all of which are enforced by a range 
of democratically oriented governments.  
Monitoring, in particular, is an increasingly powerful 
means of asserting control over internet-based 
communication. As more and more communication 
moves into the realm of the digital, government capacity 
to monitor private communication of all types increases. 
The digitization of information that is central to the 
internet’s functionality similarly facilitates government 
efforts to access, record and share data from around 
the world. Drawing on Jeremy Bentham’s articulation of 
the panopticon, Michel Foucault argues that the mere 
possibility of ubiquitous yet unconfirmed monitoring 
of a population is among the most effective ways of 
controlling behavior.6 As users in Iran and China are 
well aware, internet browsing and communication 
changes drastically when one thinks the government 
is watching. 
Increasingly, both democratic and non-democratic 
governments are exploring ways to control access to 
the internet without losing legitimacy and, ultimately, 
6 Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison 
(Vintage, 1995).
power. I explore these efforts through three brief case 
studies, identifying the variety of ways in which states 
restrict access to their nation-based networks, and 
local access to global networks, incentivize domestic 
oriented net browsing, and ubiquitous monitoring, all 
based upon perceived need for social control and 
security.
For some states, access is only restricted in times 
of emergency, as was the case in Egypt in 2011. For 
others, access is systematically restricted, as is the case 
in Iran. China adopts a multifaceted approach, which 
includes draconian regulation as well as encouraging 
local, indigenous content creation. The United States 
is concerned about the consequences of depending on 
a shared, unsecured internet, and is thus exploring a 
variety of public-private partnerships in an effort to find 
the right balance between free speech and security. 
Denmark, on the other hand, focuses on utilizing digital 
tools to gain information on potential criminals, as well 
as cracking down on copyright violations. 
Short of permanently cutting off all access to the 
internet, governments around the world are exploring 
the different options for exerting control over domestic 
information flows. In some cases, these mechanisms 
allow for greater control over digital flows than was 
previously asserted over analogue and interpersonal 
communications. Exploring a small sample of 
strategies, I begin to map how some states adapt 
to meet the challenges presented by 21st century 
connective technologies. 
China
China’s multi-faceted approach of government 
regulation, censorship, monitoring, self-regulation, 
encouragement of national industry and protectionism 
has been highly effective at keeping Chinese netizens 
away from foreign applications and content. This 
effort coincides with a concerted campaign to reframe 
access to the internet as a privilege, rather than a 
right, for those citizens able to use the web in ways 
fit for China’s harmonious society. Despite Western 
predictions of its inevitable failure, China’s approach 
has worked. According to Harvard’s Berkman Center, 
96 percent of all page views in China are of websites 
hosted within China.7
Although China adopted the concept of a Westphalian 
state later than most, it did so with ferocity, resulting in a 
“passionate belief in national sovereignty and territorial 
7 Hal Roberts, “Local Control: About 95% of Chinese Web Traffic 
is Local,” The Berkman Center for Internet & Society, August 
15, 2011, http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/hroberts/2011/08/15/
local-control-about-95-of-chinese-web-traffic-is-local.
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integrity.”8 This passionate belief in its territorial 
integrity also motivates its relationship with information 
technology. In 2010, just months after Hillary Clinton 
called for global recognition of a universal freedom to 
connect, China countered, arguing that access to the 
internet was not an international concern, but rather a 
state issue. Issuing its first ever State Council White 
Paper in English, The internet in China was unequivocal 
on the question of creating an international freedom to 
connect to the internet: “Within Chinese territory the 
internet is under the jurisdiction of Chinese sovereignty. 
The internet sovereignty of China should be respected 
and protected.”9 
For China, restrictions on freedom of expression are 
justified by the need for state interests and power: 
“Laws and regulations clearly prohibit the spread of 
information that contains content subverting state 
power, undermining national unity [or] infringing upon 
national honor and interests.”10 Chinese authorities 
deploy a variety of regulations (law), censorship filters 
8 Chengxin Pan, “Westphalia and the Taiwan Conundrum: A 
Case Against the Exclusionist Construction of Sovereignty and 
Identity,” Journal of Chinese Political Science 15 (4) (December 
2010): 376; Min Jiang, “Authoritarian Informationalism: China’s 
Approach to Internet Sovereignty,” Sais Review 30 (2010): 
71–89.ideology, identity, and economy between mainland China 
and Taiwan. Any prospect for its peaceful resolution, it seems, 
hinges on bridging those differences through economic and/
or political integration. Although the Taiwan conundrum has 
much to do with wide-ranging cross-strait divergence, this 
article argues that it cannot be disconnected from one important 
commonality between Beijing and Taipei, namely, a cross-strait 
normative convergence on the Westphalian notion of state 
sovereignty. Encompassing an exclusionary understanding of 
final authority, territory, and identity, Westphalian sovereignty 
provides both Beijing and Taipei with a common meaning that 
Taiwan is an issue of sovereignty, central to their respective 
national identity and political survival and hence not subject to 
compromise. As a consequence, it argues that this common 
meaning is paradoxically responsible for much of the mistrust, 
tension, and deadlock in cross-strait relations. In order to find a 
long-term solution to the Taiwan impasse, we need to pay atten-
tion to this particular normative convergence as well as to the 
many differences across the Taiwan Strait. [ABSTRACT FROM 
AUTHOR]\nCopyright of Journal of Chinese Political Science is 
the property of Springer Science & Business Media B.V. and its 
content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted 
to a listserv without the copyright holder’s express written per-
mission. However, users may print, download, or email articles 
for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty 
is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to 
the original published version of the material for the full abstract. 
(Copyright applies to all Abstracts.
9 As quoted in Yangyue Liu, “The Rise of China and Global Inter-
net Governance.,” China Media Research 8 (2) (2012): 52. 
10 People’s Republic of China Information Office of the State 
Council, “Section IV: Basic Principles and Practices of Inter-
net Administration,” Information Office of the State Council, 
People’s Republic of China. June 8, 2010. http://english.gov.
cn/2010-06/08/content_1622956.htm
(technology), private citizen content creators (subsidy) 
and intimidation (force) to maintain its information 
sovereignty.11 
As a result, China is well on its way to having a popular 
and robust de facto intranet system. While technically 
connected to providers and content from around the 
world, the government uses variations of IP blocking, 
DNS filtering and redirection, URL filtering, packet 
filtering, connection reset and network enumeration to 
control Web access throughout China. The architecture 
of its system allows the government to monitor 
and constrain every aspect of the system from the 
deployment of technology, to the operation of ISPs, to 
the creation of regulatory agencies capable of enforcing 
censorship through a dedicated internet police force.12 
The government blocks websites that discuss the Dalai 
Lama, the 1989 crackdown on Tiananmen Square 
protesters, the banned spiritual movement Falun 
Gong, and other internet sites. According to Google, 
the word “freedom” has been censored since 2010. 
Microblogging sites (called weibos) are also tightly 
controlled. New users are required to verify their 
identity, matched against police data, with the service 
before being allowed to post. Any user found disturbing 
social order or undermining social stability, including 
by “spreading rumors, calling for protests, promoting 
cults or superstitions and impugning China’s honor,” is 
punished, oftentimes without trial.13 
Regulators require ISPs to self-monitor their web 
services, deleting any objectionable content. The 
government employs over two million paid “internet 
opinion analysts” who pose as ordinary web users 
to monitor counter criticism of the government. 
Sometimes called the “50 Cent Party” members, the 
internet opinion analysts are paid 50 Chinese cents per 
posting.14 Members of the government are increasingly 
encouraged to embrace social media to monitor public 
opinion (and anger) and “actively spread the core 
values of the socialist system, disseminate socialist 
advanced culture and build a socialist harmonious 
society.”15 
Despite these controls, the Chinese intranet connects 
to the world’s internet in strategically advantageous 
11 This model of policy analysis is borrowed from: Monroe Price, 
Media and Sovereignty: The Global Information Revolution and 
Its Challenge to State Power (The MIT Press, 2002). 
12 Tom Simonite, “Reading the Tea Leaves of Censorship,” MIT 
Technology Review 116 (4) (2013): 20.
13 Murong Xuecun, “Chinese Internet: ‘A New Censorship Cam-
paign Has Commenced,’” Guardian, May 15, 2013.
14 “‘Two Million’ Monitor Web in China,” BBC, October 4, 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-24396957.
15 Edward Wong, “New Restrictions on Social Networking Sites in 
Beijing, China,” New York Times, December 16, 2011.
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ways, allowing connections to the global financial sector 
and many Western cultural exports. For example, the 
USITC estimated that in 2009, Chinese unauthorized 
downloading of copyrighted material cost the US 
creative industries $48 billion per year.16
Most popular Western websites (e.g. Facebook and 
YouTube) are either heavily censored or, at times, 
banned altogether, leaving them unreliable and 
unpopular among Chinese netizens. As a result, a 
robust Chinese copy-cat internet industry emerged, 
developing local variations of Google (Baidu), Twitter 
(Sina Weibo), Facebook (Renren), Ebay (TaoBao), MS 
Messenger (QQ), and YouTube (Youku). These local 
copies of popular web services are hugely popular, 
sometimes providing more functionality than the 
Western counterparts. For example, Baidu, the Chinese 
version of Google, includes search results from sites 
that allow users to freely download copyrighted content, 
like music, movies and television shows. Google filters 
similar results due to its compliance with US intellectual 
property law. Needless to say, Baidu is vastly more 
popular than Google among Chinese web users. 
Restricting foreign web content and applications serves 
a protectionist agenda as well. The local variations of 
Western internet services are all owned and operated 
by Chinese nationals, creating a flourishing internet 
industry that contributes to China’s job growth and 
GDP. Tencent (better known as QQ) has an annual 
revenue of $1 billion and a current market capitalization 
of $24 billion, making it as big as eBay, and bigger 
than Yahoo!. Baidu earns $1 billion in annual revenue. 
Overall, China’s internet industry generated $42.1 billion 
in total revenue 2011. This is in addition to $10.8 trillion 
in total turnover from e-commerce and $118.7 billion 
in revenue from internet-based auctions.17 Of course, 
Chinese-owned companies are also the least resistant 
to the government’s myriad intrusive regulations. 
At the same time, Chinese authorities seem cognizant 
of a need for the appearance of restraint in their efforts 
at controlling the web. For example, in 2009, the 
government pushed a rule that would have required the 
installation of a new software program called “Green 
Dam-Youth Escort” on all computers sold in China. The 
software effectively monitors a user’s every move. After 
16 US International Trade Commission, “China: Effects of Intellec-
tual Property Infringement and Indigenous Innovation Policies 
on the US Economy,” Investigation Number 332-519, USITC 
Publication 4226, Washington, DC: United States International 
Trade Commission, May 2011.
17 China Times, “China’s Internet industry saw vast expansion in 
2011,” China Times. January 12, 2012,http://www.wantchina-
times.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20120112000104&c
id=1202.
strong resistance at home and abroad, however, China 
indefinitely delayed enforcement of the requirement. 
The manufactures of Green Dam have since faced 
substantial financial difficulties and are on the brink of 
bankruptcy.  
The decision to pull back from Green Dam suggests 
a careful balancing act between control and individual 
rights. The government has, at times, scaled back its 
blocking of Western content, allowing selective access 
to certain portals while still blocking particular webpages 
with objectionable content. Such an approach allows 
the majority of users to feel as though they are not 
restricted from connecting to the outside world.18 
While many Chinese activists use the internet to 
express criticism of government officials and policies,19 
these criticisms are increasingly contained within a 
system that allows dissent, but not public protest. 
Han Han, China’s most popular blogger, recently 
soured on the potential for the internet to transform 
China, noting, “You feel everyone’s really angry, you 
feel like you could go open the window and you would 
see protesters on the street. But once you open the 
window, you realize that there’s nothing there at all.” 
The Economist suggests that the internet has helped 
Chinese leaders better manage public opinion, noting, 
“The internet may well turn out to have been an agent 
not of political upheaval in China but of authoritarian 
adaptation.”20
China has served as a trendsetter for other governments. 
Russia, Nigeria, and Vietnam each launched their own 
versions of the 50 Cent Party. Using hardware bought 
from China’s Huawei and ZTE, Belarus, Ethiopia, 
Iran and many others use deep packet inspection 
technology to monitor for subversive messaging and 
content.21 
Despite seemingly draconian controls—by Western 
standards—on the web, 85 percent of Chinese 
citizens support government control and management 
of internet content. A 2013 study by David Herold 
interviewed 70 university students in China and similarly 
18 The Economist, “How Does China Censor the Internet?” 
Economist, April 21, 2013, http://www.economist.com/blogs/
economist-explains/2013/04/economist-explains-how-china-
censors-internet.
19 Yuezhi Zhao, Communication in China: Political Economy, 
Power, and Conflict. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008).
20 Quotes from the previous two sentences are from: “A Curse 
Disguised as a Blessing?” Economist, April 6, 2013, http://www.
economist.com/news/special-report/21574635-internet-may-be-
delaying-radical-changes-china-needs-curse-disguised.
21 “Internet controls in other countries: To each their own-China’s 
model for controlling the internet is being adopted elsewhere,” 
Economist, April 6, 2013. 
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found a remarkable consensus supporting government 
restrictions and controls online.22 In terms of protecting 
its information sovereignty, China has adopted a multi-
faceted, flexible model that, thus far, has been quite 
effective. 
Denmark
Denmark is widely considered a bastion for freedom 
of expression. Section 77 of its constitution is 
extraordinarily clear on this question: “Anyone is 
entitled to in print, writing and speech to publish his 
or hers thoughts…Censorship and other preventive 
measures can never again be introduced.” In 2004, 
2005, and 2009 Denmark received a joint first place in 
the Worldwide Press Freedom Index from Reporters 
Without Borders.23 
It is consistently ranked among the most connected 
countries in Europe and is, by many accounts, a model 
for internet freedom. But such a perspective fails to 
account for the impact of surveillance on freedom of 
expression online, nor the ways in which copyright 
enforcement also stifles legitimate political speech.  
In 2006, Denmark led the push for the EU’s adoption 
of European Data Retention Directive, requiring all 
fixed network and mobile telephony providers, as 
well as internet access, email, and Internet telephony 
providers to retain data regarding traffic and location of 
users for a minimum of six months. The directive’s aim 
was to improve the investigation of “serious crimes,” 
especially terrorism, by providing European legal 
authorities access to communications data relevant to 
a criminal investigation or national security matter.24 
In 2007, Denmark became the first country to implement 
the directive for both telecommunications and internet 
data, going further than the EU mandate by requiring 
ISPs to record session logs going back 12 months.25 
It is widely considered the “most comprehensive 
[data retention] law of all the member states.”26 The 
22 David Kurt Herold, “Captive Artists: Chinese University Students 
Talk about the Internet,” Social Science Research Network, May 
1, 2013, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2259020
23 “Press Freedom Index 2004”, “Press Freedom Index 2005”, 
“Press Freedom Index 2009”, Reporters Without Borders. 
24 European Parliament Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of 
data generated or processed in connection with the provision 
of publicly available electronic communications services or of 
public communications networks.
25 Karin Retzer, “Data Retention: Denmark Is First EU Mem-
ber State to Implement Controversial Directive,” Morrison 
Foerster, May 4, 2007, http://www.mofo.com/resources/publica-
tions/2007/05/privacy-bulletin-may-4-2007
26 Torben Olander, “In Denmark, Online Tracking of Citizens is 
an Unwieldy Failure, TechPresident, May 22, 2013, http://
techpresident.com/news/wegov/23918/denmark-government-
Danish government sees retention as central to its 
law enforcement capacity. For example, in 2013, 
Justice Minister Morten Bødskov explained, “Internet 
surveillance is extremely important to the Danish 
Security and Intelligence Service in cases concerning 
economic crimes and child pornography and it will 
continue to be important as the criminals move their 
communication online.”27
Whereas the EU directive calls for the use of retained 
data as it relates to “serious crimes,” Denmark’s 
domestic implementation mandate allows for law 
enforcement officials to access retained data related 
to all criminal offenses, for crime prevention, and on 
general grounds of national security.28 In practice, 
communications data have been used by the Danish 
police in a variety of cases, very few relating to national 
security. Rather, the primary use of data has been 
for investigations pertaining to credit fraud, drugs 
trafficking, burglary and cybercrime.29 
Between 2008 and 2012, law enforcement agencies 
made 22,829 requests for communications data and 
were denied just 16 times. Requests for internet related 
data skyrocketed in 2012 to 2270 total requests, a 834 
percent increase compared to the previous year (see 
Table X.1 for additional details). 
Separately, Denmark has also come under fire for 
requiring websites containing (or even linking to other 
websites that contain) material infringing upon copyright 
protections. A list of the websites banned in Denmark, 
leaked by Wikileaks in 2008, included movie-trailor.
name, movs.name, videoshop.name, streamtv.name, 
movies4you.info, tv-project.com, bestvideomanager.
biz and other URLs accused of violating Danish 
copyright laws. 
In 2008, a bailiff’s court in Copenhagen found that one 
of Denmark’s largest ISPs, Tele2, was assisting its 
customers in copyright infringement by allowing the 
use of The Pirate Bay—“The Galaxy’s Most Resilient 
BitTorrent Site”—and issued an injunction requiring it 
to block access to the site. Tele2 complied, and other 
major ISPs voluntarily followed. While Pirate Bay is 
an infamous content sharing portal, one study found 
will-not-allow-ordinary-citizens-have-digital-privacy
27 Ibid. 
28 European Commission, “Evaluation report on the Data 
Retention Directive (Directive 2006/24/EC),” Report from the 
Commission to the Council and the European Parliament (Brus-
sels: The EU, 2011). 
29 Cybercrime includes: computer fraud and attempted fraud, 
hacking, forgery and disclosure of stolen credit card informa-
tion. From: “Evidence for necessity of data retention in the EU” 
(Directive 2006/24/EC). March 2013. http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/
home-affairs/pdf/policies/police_cooperation/evidence_en.pdf 
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accessible to prove online crimes, but also as evidence 
supporting prosecutions of offline criminal activity. Of 
particular note in this case study is the fact that such 
strict monitoring of digital information flows has been 
adopted and upheld by the highest legal authority in a 
country with robust constitutional protections for free 
speech. 
The United States
Western governments are also actively pursuing efforts 
to assert greater control over domestic information 
flows, though rarely are they mentioned in the same 
breath as those pursued by China, Iran and Russia. Yet, 
from an analytical perspective, the efforts are similar: 
governments deploying law, technology, subsidy, and 
force in order to maintain and strengthen information 
sovereignty, or control over the flow of information 
within a given physical territory. This section explores 
how the US government aims to secure the domestic 
internet from foreign attack or intrusion. Importantly, 
these efforts are separate from the NSA’s foreign 
surveillance programs, which are related but broader 
than the scope of this chapter. 
The US is pursuing various means of controlling 
access to the internet under the auspices of security, 
maintaining the integrity of confidential information, 
and protecting intellectual property. For the most 
part, new, secure technologies are tested in military 
networks and eventually deployed on civilian federal 
websites and networks. Once implemented throughout 
government, policymakers are interested in extending 
secure systems infrastructure, enabling a high level 
of monitoring and control to private networks deemed 
important for national security. Precisely which private 
networks are considered critical for national security is 
evolving, but at a minimum includes systems “essential 
to the minimum operations of the economy and 
government,” including telecommunications, energy, 
banking and finance, transportation, water systems 
and emergency services.33 
33  US Presidential Decision Directive 63, 1998.
YEAR FIXED NETWORK TELEPHONY MOBILE TELEPHONY INTERNET-RELATED TOTAL
2008 192 (0) 3273 (5) 134 (0) 3599 (5)
2009 133 (0) 3771 (10) 162 (1) 4066 (11)
2010 191 (0) 3801 (0) 243 (0) 4235 (0)
2011 191 (0) 3801 (0) 243 (0) 4235 (0)
2012 187 (0) 4221 (0) 2270 (0) 6678 (0)
that 80 percent of the torrents on the site were to legal, 
non-copyright protected material. According to Pirate 
Bay spokesperson Peter Sunde Kolmisoppi, “there is 
actually a larger proportion of infringing material on 
YouTube than on The Pirate Bay.”30
On questions of data retention and copyright 
enforcement, Denmark stands out among its European 
peers. Whereas other countries are rolling back the 
use of data retention after a 2014 Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU) ruling declaring the 
data retention directive invalid, the Danish Ministry 
of Justice concluded that the Danish retention policy 
was not implicated by the ruling.31 Similarly, while other 
governments are questioning the value of blocking 
content sharing portals, in 2010, the Supreme Court 
of Denmark denied an appeal, requiring ISPs to 
continue blocking access to The Pirate Bay.32 Far 
different from China in its approach, Danish authorities 
have effectively implemented a robust control regime 
whereby digital communications data are not only 
30 Nate Anderson, “Pirate Bay: survey says that 80% of our tor-
rents are legal.” Ars Technica, Feb 20, 2009, http://arstechnica.
com/tech-policy/2009/02/pirate-bay-survey-says-that-80-of-our-
torrents-are-legal/
31 Denmark did, however, decide to suspend key logging require-
ments, but not because of the CJEU ruling. “The motivation is 
the technical difficulties of using the retained data on internet 
sessions for police investigations.…The current session logging 
requirements were only lifted because they could not produce 
data that the police could actually use, not because of any 
inherent conflict with fundamental rights.” From: Heini Järvinen, 
Denmark: “Data retention is here to stay despite the CJEU 
ruling,” European Digital Rights, June 4, 2014, http://edri.org/
denmark-data-retention-stay-despite-cjeu-ruling/ 
32 This is the second Danish Supreme Court ruling finding ISPs 
liable for the transmission of copyright protected content to 
users. For more, see TDC v. IFPI et al., case number 49/2005 
(2006). 
 * European Commission, “Statistics on Requests for data 
under the Data Retention Directive (DG Home Affairs, 2013), 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/
police-cooperation/data-retention/docs/statistics_on_requests_
for_data_under_the_data_retention_directive_en.pdf; A query to 
the EU and Danish authorities regarding the odd similarity be-
tween self-reported data in 2011 and 2012 was not responded 
to prior to publication.
Figure 1: Danish Government Requests for Data under the Data Retention Directive,  Successful 
(unsuccessful)*
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As part of its efforts to boost cyber-security, in 2010, 
the US established Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) 
to defend the military’s electronic networks, support 
military and counterterrorism missions and assist 
civil authorities and industry planners. It is led by the 
Director of NSA and housed within NSA’s headquarters 
at Ft. Meade, Maryland. CYBERCOM has developed 
advanced threat-monitoring systems for government 
networks, including Einstein 2 and Einstein 3. 
Einstein 2 has been widely implemented in most 
government agencies and allows for data inspection 
upon entry into a federal network. Einstein 3 goes a step 
further, more thoroughly inspecting all communication 
for threat risks and alerting DHS and the NSA of 
suspicious communication in real-time. Rather than 
looking for malicious attack patterns directed at 
government sites, Einstein 3 collects, processes, and 
analyzes all person-to-person communications content 
using real-time, deep packet inspection technology 
and connects data with signatures based on personally 
identifiable information. According to cyber security 
expert Babak Pasdar, “The program is implemented 
where servers exchange traffic between one another—
in the heart of a network system rather than at the 
perimeter, which interfaces with the outside world. This 
is similar to a home security system that only monitors 
the central interior of a house, rather than keeping an 
eye on the actual doors.” As a result, cyber security 
experts argue that Einstein 3 may “offer no intrinsic 
security value.”34 
Similar to the role the military services played in assisting 
domestic recovery efforts after Hurricane Katrina 
and the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill, CYBERCOM 
envisions its task as helping secure domestic and 
civilian electronic networks that are currently at risk. 
Once tested, the NSA and DHS plan on extending 
their cyber security systems to key private networks 
deemed critical to national security. According to 
Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn (2010), “We 
are already using our technical capabilities…to protect 
government networks. We need to think imaginatively 
about how this technology can also help secure a space 
on the internet for critical government and commercial 
applications.” Lynn is pushing to establish a hacker-
free, online space for both government and civilian 
purposes. Faced with growing risks inherent in using 
the internet, Lynn suggests that private companies and 
citizens will jump at the opportunity to opt-in to secure 
government networks in the face of the “wild west of 
the unprotected internet.”35
34 Quotes from the previous two sentences are from: Jesselyn 
Radack, “NSA’s Cyber Overkill,” Los Angeles Times, July 14, 
2009.
35 W. J. Lynn, “Remarks at Stratcom Cyber Symposium,” Stratcom 
DHS is moving quickly to help secure commercial 
networks too. Jason Healey, director of the Atlantic 
Council’s cyber statecraft initiative explains that the 
DHS plans to place the “government at the center of 
the Web,” adding, “If we’re going to make progress...
we have to treat the private sector as the supported 
command, not as the supporting command.”36 The DHS 
is rolling out Einstein 3 with civilian federal agencies 
now, but is also planning on targeting industries outside 
the federal government considered critical elements of 
the nation’s infrastructure.37 
Former CYBERCOM and NSA Director Alexander 
clarified that securing private networks could not 
be achieved through voluntary mechanisms alone: 
“Recent events have shown that a purely voluntary and 
market driven system is not sufficient. Some minimum 
security requirements will be necessary to ensure that 
the core, infrastructure is taking appropriate measures 
to harden its networks.”38 
Industries considered critical to national security 
continue to expand given the impact that an attack 
on almost any industry would have on the economy, 
thus providing rationale for government securing 
large parts of the internet. Telecommunications is 
already considered a critical industry, but increasingly, 
so is the intellectual property sector. According to 
Deputy Secretary of Defense Lynn, “The threat to 
intellectual property…may over the long term be 
the most significant cyber threat our nation faces.”39 
Americans aren’t necessarily opposed to securing 
networks from intellectual property theft, with a majority 
supporting penalties for downloading copyrighted 
music and movies.40 Yet, securing telecommunications 
and intellectual property sectors with military-grade 
technology would allow for the vast majority, if not all, 
of the internet connections in the US to be monitored, 
analyzed, and their data archived in real-time. Such 
Cyber Symposium, Omaha, NE, May 26, 2010, http://www.
defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1477.
36 Arie Church, “Beyond Government Defending Itself,” The Air 
Force Association, Air Force Magazine, 2012, http://www.
airforce-magazine.com/DRArchive/Pages/2012/March%202012/
March%2023%202012/BeyondGovernmentDefendingItself.
aspx.
37 Jason Miller, “DHS Buys Software as Part of Einstein 3 Deploy-
ment,” Federal News Radio, 2011, http://www.federalnewsradio.
com/?nid=473&sid=2684411.
38 Keith Alexander, “Letter to Hon. John McCain, Ranking Member, 
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate,” 2012.
39 Lynn, “Remarks.”
40 American Assembly at Columbia University, “Copyright 
Infringement and Enforcement in the US,” Research Note, 
November 2011, http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wp-content/
uploads/2011/11/AA-Research-Note-Infringement-and-Enforce-
ment-November-2011.pdf.
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an effort could also be described as, using Briggs and 
Burke’s term, “total information control.”
Conclusion
Charles Darwin is credited with the idea that it’s not the 
strongest of species that survive, nor the most intelligent, 
but those most adaptable to change. This chapter 
explores three case studies whereby governments 
endeavor to better control domestic information flows 
for self-preservation. The results indicate that it’s not 
only species that need to adapt to survive, but states 
too. China, Egypt, Denmark and the United States 
each implement control—through law, technology, 
subsidy, and force—over domestic internet space in 
an effort to strike a balance between integration into 
the information society and maintaining sovereignty 
over domestic information flows. The specific purposes 
of each state’s efforts differ in important ways, but 
align in that each strategy represents an effort at re-
asserting control over global information flows. While 
each strategy may not be as effective as another, 
pragmatists must recognize the two trends: (1) By 
adopting a broader understanding of “control,” states 
have become quite effective at managing information 
flows; and (2) multifaceted efforts that move beyond 
merely restricting access are increasingly seen as 
legitimate among non-specialized publics. 
These trends help to explain frustrations surrounding 
the outcome of NETmundial, as well as the WSIS+10 
HLE. In both cases, civil society groups participated 
but, to a large extent, felt state interests drove the final 
outcomes.41 Their frustration reflects the simple fact 
that governments are in the driver’s seat, controlling 
the resources and authority to regulate parts of the 
World Wide Web, including the non-government 
organizations responsible for overseeing its day-to-day 
operations (ARIN, ICANN, etc.). Given the competitive 
nature of international ICT industries, and their close 
ties to internet-related civil society groups, it is difficult 
to imagine the emergence of a globally united civil 
society capable of challenging the re-emergence of 
states in the internet governance space. There is hope, 
and need, for greater action at the local and national 
levels. Thus, it may be helpful for IGF participants to 
focus discussions on questions at the heart of this 
debate, including: (a) what exactly has the forum done 
to check and monitor state efforts to re-assert control 
over various aspects of the web?; (b) What can be done 
to strengthen elements of the forum that are effective in 
holding practitioners accountable?; and (c) Would the 
41 Shawn Powers (2014) “WSIS+10: Connected, and Unpro-
tected.” CGCS Media Wire, June 20, http://cgcsblog.asc.upenn.
edu/2014/06/20/wsis10-connected-and-unprotected/
resources spent organizing and participating in the IGF 
be more effectively allocated to challenge specific state 
efforts to increase control over digital communications? 
While not every IGF delegate will welcome this 
final question, it is a crucial one. Participation in 
multistakeholder fora, like NETmundial and the IGF, 
do not necessarily benefit civil society groups unless 
they are able to win clear and actionable concessions 
from governments and the private sector. Historically, 
powerful actors engage in multistakeholder negotiations 
when they need legitimacy and/or expertise to govern 
properly. Thus, civil society groups need be careful to 
avoid participating in meetings that merely legitimize 
the status quo, allowing state actors to remain in the 
drivers seat moving forward.42 This question is not only 
relevant to the ongoing internet governance debates, 
but also broader discussions about the World Summit 
on the Information Society (WSIS), a topic the UN will 
revisit in 2015.  
42 For more, see: Shawn Powers and Michael Jablonski, The Real 
Cyber War: A Political Economy of Internet Freedom (Urbana, 
IL: University of Illinois Press, 2015), chapter 6, “The Myth of 
Myth of Multistakeholder Governance.”
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Creating a Global Internet Public Policy 
Space: Is There a Way Forward?
Marilia Maciel
The Historical Context
Why is there such a pressing effort to find alternative 
modes, globally, to fashion internet policy?  One must 
start with a simple observation: states have been 
considered the main political actors in international 
politics. Their borders gave origin to the internal/
external binomial and to the division between domestic 
and foreign policy. The domestic playing field would be 
the space where history, identity and a community of 
destiny could flourish, allowing individuals to engage 
in a public sphere as equal citizens to work to define 
common goals and the best way to pursue them. 
This space was separated from the external arena, 
traditionally characterized by anarchy, potential conflict 
and insecurity. 
As a consequence, the state has been regarded as 
the ideal space in which public policies should be 
developed. On the one hand, public policies relate to 
issues that go beyond the private sphere; they pertain 
to a domain that should be held in common. On the 
other hand, public policies embody an assessment that 
a society makes about itself and about what should 
be changed or upheld. They are social constructions, 
shaped within a cultural context that influences how 
public problems are interpreted and addressed. State 
bureaucracy would work to solve issues framed as 
public problems. 
By the end of the twentieth century, the acceleration of a 
multi-dimensional process of globalization emphasized 
some of the cracks in the foundation of this theoretical 
building. On the state level, economy, politics and 
socio-cultural practices are being transformed. The 
flow of capital became faster and insensitive to 
borders while, in parallel, the process of production 
was de-territorialized and fragmented worldwide. 
Identity and inclusion are increasingly defined through 
consumption, and this affects the way citizens perceive 
the public interest and the role of politics. It becomes 
harder to maintain the boundaries that are necessary 
for the efficient “packing” of public or collective goods 
and to measure what is the preferred state of affairs.1 
Traditional institutions involved in policy development, 
such as states and international organizations, have 
lacked the capacity to deal with many public problems. 
This is partially related to the fact that, while the state is 
considered the primary space for policy-making and the 
juridical cornerstone of existing international institutions, 
there are a variety of other actors that currently play a 
role in the development and implementation of policies. 
Denser interdependence among states takes place in 
parallel to the growth of networks, where policies are 
shaped by a diverse group of players who act not 
only below, but also above and cutting across states’ 
boundaries. Traditional concepts of public policy seem 
outdated and disconnected with this complex reality. 2 
Internet governance arrangements emerged in this 
historical context and were influenced by it. Activities 
carried out by non-governmental actors on a day-to-
day basis have a direct or indirect impact on policy 
development. The key role of non-governmental actors 
in internet governance is a reflection of the integral role 
these actors played in the  development of the internet. 
This distinguishing characteristic engendered flexible 
and distributed governance arrangements, based on 
a “web of relationships.”3 Multistakeholder networks 
have been perceived as an efficient model for internet 
governance because they could identify softer and 
speedier approaches to policy-making and regulation. 
As recognized by the Brazilian government, “the 
importance of the multistakeholder dimension in the 
1 Philip G. Cerny, Rethinking World Politics: A Theory of Transna-
tional Pluralism (Oxford University Press, 2010), 98. 
2 According to Thoening, for instance, public policy is “the 
intervention of an authority that has public power to do it and 
governmental legitimacy over a specific domain of society or 
of the territory”. Jean-Claude Thoening, “Politique Publique”. In 
Laurie Boussaguet et al., Dictionnaire des politiques publiques, 
(Presses de Sciences Po, 2004), p. 326.
3 Vinton Cerf et al. “ICANN’s role in the Internet Governance Eco-
system”, report of the ICANN Strategy Panel, (ICANN, 2014), 
https://www.icann.org/en/system/files/files/report-23feb14-en.pdf
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development of public policies cannot be overstated 
as in some cases, actions taken by other stakeholders 
may prove to be more effective to achieve goals set in 
public policies than the mere issuance of regulation by 
governments.”4 
Nevertheless, as the internet grows and becomes the 
primary environment for all forms of human interaction, 
contradictory policy options naturally emerge, reflecting 
the diversity of interests in society. The lack of clear 
procedure for coordinating policy choices and making 
decisions among a diversity of global actors puts 
pressure on distributed governance arrangements and 
gives strength to calls for institutional improvement. 
Moreover, there is a widening gap between territorially 
anchored democratic processes and cross-border 
networks5 where policies are shaped in a way 
that evades traditional democratic control. Certain 
frequently used terms, such as networks, governance 
and regime, have disguised relations of authority 
and power asymmetry among actors, de-politicizing 
the topic. Internet governance is structured around a 
managerial lexicon, in which efficiency is the key word. 
This democratic deficit takes place in parallel to a 
separation between a segment of the world population 
that is increasingly bound to the territory and those 
whose freedom of movement and information have 
been strengthened by globalization.6 In such a context, 
it is possible that those who harness the benefits of 
globalization will be the ones populating cross-border 
policy networks. 
Combining the advantages, expertise and flexibility of 
existing networks with democratic practices is one of the 
major challenges of cross-border policy development. 
This tension is present in the discussion about 
institutional arrangements for internet governance.
 
4 Brazil, Ministry of External Relations, Division for the Infor-
mation Society,  Contribution to the WGEC questionnaire 
on enhanced cooperation, 2013, http://unctad.org/Sections/
un_cstd/docs/WGEC_Brazil_Gov1.pdf
5 Policy networks could be understood as a set of stable relation-
ships which are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature 
linking a variety of actors, who share common interests with 
regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue these 
shared interests acknowledging that cooperation is the best way 
to achieve common goals. Tanja A. Börzel, “Organizing Babylon 
– on the different conceptions of policy networks”, Public Admin-
istration, 1998, 76: 233–73. 
6 Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences, 
(Polity Press, 1998), p. 3.
Internet-related Policies and 
the Future of the WSIS
The initial discussions about institutional arrangements 
for internet policy-making took place at the World 
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). Policy-
making is one of the themes encompassed by the 
Tunis Agenda, adopted in 2005 at the second phase 
of WSIS.7 The document asks for the creation of the 
Internet Governance Forum (IGF), an institutional 
space for the discussion of global public policies 
related to the internet (paragraph 72). It also deals with 
decision-making, mentioning the need “for enhanced 
cooperation in the future to enable governments, on an 
equal footing to carry out their roles and responsibilities 
in international public policy issues pertaining to the 
Internet (…)” (paragraph 69). 
The IGF was created in 2006, but controversy remains 
on the meaning of enhanced cooperation. Opinions 
were polarized between actors who argue that enhanced 
cooperation would mean improved communication 
within the network of actors and institutions dealing 
with internet governance and those who believe it 
would entail the creation of a centralized mechanism 
that would allow governments to make policy decisions 
in consultation with other stakeholders. 
The Tunis Agenda seems to confer to governments 
a differentiated responsibility in the field of policy 
development, when it mentions that “policy authority for 
Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right 
of States (paragraph 35, a).” This right is not unbridled; 
it is limited by the commitment to involve all relevant 
organizations and all stakeholders in their respective 
roles (paragraph 71). However, the definition of the 
roles and responsibilities of non-governmental actors 
is vague and falls short of their actual involvement in 
policy development (paragraph 35, b to e). The Tunis 
Agenda provides little guidance on concrete ways to 
put in place an institutional architecture for internet 
governance. 
The fact that there is no single space for decision-
making on internet-related policy issues does not 
mean, however, that regulation, policy development 
and harmonization are not being carried out. On the 
level of infrastructure, cables are operated by private 
companies with a few giants setting the rules for 
interconnection through agreements for transit or 
peering. These agreements have great impact on the 
cost of international connectivity and on policies aiming 
to provide access to the Internet. 
7 Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, (ITU, 2005), http://
www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html
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In the field of technical standards, “private institutions 
made up primarily by individuals working for private 
industry make most Internet governance decisions, 
including designing protocol.”8 The importance of 
standards to policy development should not be 
downplayed. Different choices of standards may uphold 
or undermine certain values and rights, such as the 
right to privacy, for example. In the field of applications, 
online platforms and social networks create policies 
that impact the lives of consumers by means of their 
terms of service. Fundamental rights, such as freedom 
of expression and privacy, are affected by pre-
formulated and non-negotiable private contracts that 
extend across jurisdictions. 
In addition to these levels of influence, there is an 
increasing association between governments and the 
private sector to carry out policy implementation and 
online enforcement, not always conducted with due 
transparency. Among other examples, governments 
request information from ISPs and applications to 
ascertain someone’s identity, to ask them to remove 
potentially unlawful content and on occasion to request 
ISPs to examine the content of packets to look for 
infringing content or to block specific users. 
Governments have privatized online enforcement 
because they usually lack the means to carry out 
this activity without private collaboration. All states, 
however, do not have the same capacity to put 
pressure on private actors to act as proxies for policy 
implementation and enforcement. This ability is deeply 
related to a state’s power to exert jurisdiction over these 
actors. Most of the telecommunication companies, 
domain name registries or social networks that operate 
globally are subject to a few jurisdictions. Because 
these countries can force private actors to comply 
with national regulation, their capacity to influence 
regulatory trends and to carry out enforcement expands 
across borders. The cooperation of major companies, 
such as Facebook, Google and Microsoft with the NSA 
data mining program is an example of that. For the 
other countries of the world, lack of jurisdiction creates 
barriers for enforcement of internal law and court 
orders. The Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs) 
have proven to be an outdated mechanism to address 
these concerns. 
Demands for increased transparency, openness and 
participation in internet policy have mostly targeted 
international organizations. These demands should also 
be expanded to other areas of policy development that 
are kept outside wider scrutiny, under the justification 
8 Laura DeNardis, Protocol Politics: the globalization of Internet 
Governance, (The MIT Press, 2009), pos. 1079.
that they are purely technical; that they are part of 
business decisions that should be made by private 
companies alone; or that they are national security 
issues, a label that is being applied indiscriminately by 
many governments, without the possibility of discussing 
its underlying criteria. 
Policy development in the field of internet governance 
is conducted without clear procedures for coordination 
and for providing accountability and democratic control. 
This happens not only because of the cross-border 
nature of the internet and of policy networks, but also 
because of the way issues of public interest are framed 
as private ones. 
Current proposals for institutional improvement that 
aim to create a centralized space for policy decision-
making should be understood against this backdrop. 
Firstly, they can be seen as an attempt to place internet 
policy development under democratic control that would 
be anchored on the traditional and still widely accepted 
idea that states’ representatives can legitimately voice 
the concerns of their people.  Secondly, they aim to place 
all countries on an equal footing in policy development, 
mitigating the disproportionate influence that some 
states have on private actors, mostly because of their 
capacity to exert jurisdiction. 
This understanding is consistent with positions adopted 
by many developing countries that have been asking for 
a “multilateral, transparent and democratic governance 
of the Internet.” This expression emerged for the 
first time during the Regional Ministerial Preparatory 
Conference of Latin America and the Caribbean for the 
WSIS, as part of the Bávaro Declaration9. It was adopted 
by the Arab countries, the Like Minded Group (LMG) 
and by IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa). The Brazilian 
representative at WSIS explained that “by democratic 
we mean the fullest practicable participation of all 
stakeholders, particularly governments, in the present 
system of Internet governance (…) By multilateral, 
we mean a forum that allows for the representation 
of sovereign states on an equal footing (…) Finally, 
transparency implies an accountable decision-making 
process open to the participation of all stakeholders 
and subject to the control of society at large.”10
Since the implementation of enhanced cooperation 
remains stalled, many countries that are not 
9 Bávaro Declaration, (Conferencia Ministerial Regional prepa-
ratoria de América Latina y el Caribe para la Cumbre Mundial 
sobre la Sociedad de la Información, 2003),  http://www.cepal.
org/prensa/noticias/noticias/9/11719/Bavarofinalesp.pdf.
10 Brazilian statement on the occasion of the meeting that 
constituted WGIG, http://lac.derechos.apc.org/wsis/cdocs.
shtml?x=26796.
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satisfied with the status quo of internet governance 
arrangements started to introduce the discussion of 
policy issues under existing international organizations, 
notably in the International Telecommunications 
Union (ITU). Substantive topics, such as security 
issues, have been frequently introduced in the ITU’s 
agenda. During the World Conference on International 
Telecommunications (WCIT) in 2012, a non-binding 
resolution about the internet has been included in 
the annexes of the International Telecommunication 
Regulations (ITRs), further blurring the lines between 
telecommunications and the internet. In the ITU’s 
World Telecommunication Policy Forum (WTPF) in 
2013, Brazil raised the discussion about “the role of 
Governments in the multistakeholder framework for 
Internet Governance.” 
There was a missed opportunity to reach agreement 
on the implementation of enhanced cooperation in a 
multistakeholder way. Nine years after WSIS there 
was the creation of a Working Group on Enhanced 
Cooperation (WGEC) under the UN Commission on 
Science and Technology for Development, which 
aimed to make recommendations on how to proceed.11 
However, the working group did not manage to bridge 
diverging views.12 The next significant opportunity to 
discuss internet governance institutional architecture 
and policy development will be the process towards the 
WSIS +10 in 2015.
In the face of persisting deadlocks, the usefulness of 
the Tunis Agenda is being contested. Actors involved 
in the internet governance debate will need to make 
a choice. In general terms, they could decide that the 
Tunis Agenda should be superseded by another text, 
decide that the text should be abandoned or discuss 
how to implement the Tunis Agenda. 
Good arguments can be presented to support the 
launching of a full scale WSIS review. Firstly, WSIS 
outcome documents did not fully meet the expectations 
of developing countries with regards to substance, and 
some actors believe more could have been achieved 
regarding communication rights at WSIS. Most 
importantly, the controversy about internet governance 
frameworks has consumed resources without major 
breakthroughs. The fact that WGEC fell short on its 
mandate strengthened the proposals calling for a new 
11 Information and Communications Technologies for Develop-
ment,  resolution A/RES/67/195, (General Assembly,  2012), 
paragraph 20, http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/
ares67d195_en.pdf
12 Analysis of the Responses to the Questionnaire of the UN Com-
mission on Science and Technology for Development (WGEC, 
2014), http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/
WGEC_Summary_of_Responses.pdf
summit, such as the resolution presented by Russia in 
CSTD and the resolution delivered by Fiji on behalf of 
the  G77 plus China in the General Assembly.13
In July 2014, a UN resolution about the goals and 
modalities for participation at WSIS +10 was approved.14 
In June 2015, an intergovernmental negotiation process 
will be started in informal consultation with other relevant 
stakeholders. It will lead to an intergovernmental 
outcome document for adoption at a high-level meeting 
of the General Assembly in December 2015. These 
negotiations are unlikely to be easy. In addition to the 
historic divergences that have characterized internet 
governance discussions, international cooperation 
is currently facing a downturn, if compared to the 
context in which WSIS took place ten years ago. Many 
countries are still suffering the effects of the economic 
crisis. There are budgetary constraints and many 
international negotiations are stalled or showing little 
signs of progress. There is no clear indication that a 
new summit could produce a better text. Maybe the 
opposite is even more plausible.
An example of the current difficulties to cooperate 
was the WSIS+10 High-Level Event, held in June 
2014, which aimed to review the WSIS outcomes and 
develop new targets beyond 2015. The event produced 
extensive but vague outcome documents.15 In spite of 
the existence of a Multistakeholder Preparatory Platform 
(MPP) that held six preparatory meetings before the 
High-Level Event, compromise was achieved in last 
minute intergovernmental negotiations. Moreover, the 
most controversial points related to the Tunis phase 
of WSIS were agreed to be left out of the document, 
including issues related to internet governance. It 
remains to be seen if the 2015 outcome document will 
achieve more substantive progress.
The option to abandon, either explicitly or tacitly 
the Tunis Agenda – by selectively implementing 
some paragraphs and leaving others in a limbo, for 
instance – does not look promising either, as it could 
create political rifts that would become very difficult to 
bridge. Moreover, in a challenging moment for global 
13 Information and communications technologies for development, 
resolution A/C.2/68/L.40, (General Assembly, 2013), http://
daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N13/552/87/PDF/
N1355287.pdf?OpenElement
14 Modalities for the overall review by the General Assembly of the 
implementation of the outcomes of the World Summit on the In-
formation Society (General Assembly, 2014), http://www.un.org/
ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A%2F68%2FL.54&referer=%
2Fenglish%2F&Lang=E
15 WSIS+10 Statement on Implementation of WSIS Outcomes; 
WSIS+10 Vision for WSIS Beyond 2015, (ITU, 2015), 
http://www.itu.int/wsis/implementation/2014/forum/inc/doc/
outcome/362828V2E.pdf
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cooperation and multilateralism, undermining support 
to one of the key international texts that deals with 
the information society would be a reckless move. 
Although some topics could have advanced more, the 
WSIS outcome documents are people-centered, place 
great importance on development and uphold freedom 
in its largest sense. It is a good foundation document 
to advance agendas that are important to countries all 
across the political spectrum.
The third option to be considered is how to implement 
the Tunis Agenda. Pacta sunt servanda is a basic 
principle that guides not only international relations 
but also private law. Agreements must be kept. This 
principle is fundamental for stability, legal predictability 
and trust. Nevertheless, all agreements are celebrated 
based on context and facts known at the time of 
the negotiation. This implies that they should be 
implemented rebus sic stantibus, i.e. in the absence 
of substantial, fundamental change. But much has 
changed and has been learnt in the past ten years. 
The most reasonable solution is to revisit the Tunis 
Agenda and discuss its implementation by making the 
necessary adjustments and compromises to update it 
to present challenges.
Centralized and Distributed 
Proposals for Institutional 
 Arrangements 
Different views about the meaning of enhanced 
cooperation gave birth to concrete proposals of 
institutional mechanisms for decision-making on 
internet policy issues. One of the strengths of 
centralized models is the procedural clarity they could 
provide. The usefulness of a one-stop-shop that could 
serve as a point of entry to internet policy-making 
has been pointed out since WSIS. Particularly for 
developing countries, “fragmentation of policy spaces, 
among other factors, greatly undermines the ability of 
under resourced groups to engage with global Internet 
governance, because they are unable to be present in 
all places.”16
One example of a centralized proposal was put 
forward by the government of India for the creation 
of a United Nations Committee for Internet-Related 
Policies (CIRP).17 The CIRP proposal was tabled at 
16 Brazil, Ministry of External Relations, Division for the Infor-
mation Society,  Contribution to the WGEC questionnaire 
on enhanced cooperation, 2013, http://unctad.org/Sections/
un_cstd/docs/WGEC_Brazil_Gov1.pdf
17 India, Proposal for a United Nations Committee for Internet-Re-
lated Policies, (UN General Assembly, 2011), http://itforchange.
net/sites/default/files/ITfC/india_un_cirp_proposal_20111026.pdf
the 66th UNGA. It would mainly develop and establish 
international public policies, facilitate the development 
of treaties and would coordinate and oversee the 
bodies responsible for technical and operational 
functioning of the internet, including global standards 
setting. The Committee would be composed of 50 
Member States chosen on the basis of equitable 
geographical representation. The participation of other 
stakeholder groups would be advisory in nature and 
be channeled through four advisory groups, one each 
for civil society, the private sector, inter-governmental 
and international organizations, and the technical and 
academic community. CIRP seems to fall under the 
category of a traditional intergovernmental body. 
The Brazilian government supports a less well-defined 
centralized model embodied in the creation of a “single 
convergent space or platform (…) for dealing with 
the diverse kinds of international public policy issues 
pertaining to the Internet in general.” Nevertheless, 
the country emphasizes that “this platform should be 
respectful of the multistakeholder model, with the full 
involvement of governments, the private sector, civil 
society and international organizations.”
Unlike what India did with CIRP, Brazil does not go 
as far as suggesting a concrete institutional design. It 
just mentions that “the structure of such new platform 
itself should emerge from the multistakeholder debate.” 
Brazil is moving forward very carefully and justifies its 
decision not to propose any concrete mechanism in 
the following manner: “the discussion of any suitable 
framework or mechanisms should be guided by the 
purpose of addressing perceived needs or filling gaps 
and should only be undertaken when there is some 
comfortable margin of support for these ideas. In other 
words, Brazil proposes first to deepen discussion on 
WHAT we want before discussing HOW to achieve 
what we want.”18 The country seems to be adopting the 
principle that “form follows function.” 
In parallel to the centralized models, there are others 
that show different degrees of decentralization. Some 
of them try to combine elements of intergovernmental 
legitimacy with the flexibility of networks. During WSIS, 
Wolfgang Kleinwächter proposed a multilayer and 
multiplayer mechanism of consultation, coordination 
and cooperation (M3C3). The point of departure of this 
proposal was the need to foster both intergovernmental 
harmonization and non-governmental self-regulation 
through networks. One should not be superseded by 
the other, but achieve complementarity by means of a 
co-regulatory model.19 
18 Brazil, Ministry of External Relations, op. cit. 
19 Wolfgang Kleinwächter, “Internet Co-governance: towards a 
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More recently, Kleinwächter revisited his proposal. 
He suggested that a “Multistakeholder Internet Policy 
Council” (MIPOC), linked to the IGF, could function as 
a policy clearing house. The Council would discuss 
how to proceed with IGF outcomes and recommend 
that existing intergovernmental or non-governmental 
organizations include the issues in their agendas. 
For new and emerging issues that do not find a home 
in existing organizations, MIPOC could also start a 
bottom up policy development process.20
This proposal has some similarities with the one 
put forth by Anja Kovacs on behalf of the Internet 
Democracy Project. She suggested the creation of 
a global body that could function as a non-decision 
making clearing house. Its role would be to identify 
policy issues and send them to multistakeholder 
networks of actors with expertise to deal with them.21 
If the issue identified happens to fall under the scope 
of a WSIS action line, the international organizations 
that are action line facilitators could convene the 
multistakeholder network to address it. The networks 
would, therefore, take advantage from the knowledge 
already produced in the WSIS process. In general, 
these networks could adopt two approaches: to tackle 
the policy issue themselves or to delegate it to other 
body. For example, if an international treaty is needed, 
the issue would be delegated to the international 
organization with mandate to deal with it.
Moreover, involving international organizations as 
key facilitators of the multistakeholder networks 
may enhance governmental involvement, increase 
the legitimacy of the process and strengthen the 
commitment of international organizations with 
the outcome of network discussions. Therefore, if 
the issue is eventually taken to a multilateral body, 
chances are that the discussions carried out in the 
networks will percolate and have a larger impact on 
intergovernmental discussions. 
Up to the present moment, the decentralized proposal 
presented by Kovacs seems to be the one that best tries 
to reconcile intergovernmental and multistakeholder 
multilayer multiplayer mechanism of consultation, coordination 
and cooperation (M3C3),” (XXX, 2006), http://www.wwwords.
co.uk/pdf/freetoview.asp?j=elea&vol=3&issue=3&year=2006&ar
ticle=18_Kleinwachter_ELEA_3_3_web.
20 Wolfgang Kleinwächter. Internet Governance Outlook 2014: 
Good News, Bad News, No News? (CircleID, 2013), http://
www.circleid.com/posts/20131231_internet_governance_out-
look_2014_good_news_bad_news_no_news/
21 Anja Kovacs, A Third Way? Proposal for a Decentralized, 
Multistakeholder Internet Governance Model, (Internet 
Democracy project, 2013), http://internetdemocracy.in/
reports/a-third-way-proposal-for-a-decentralised-democratic-
internet-governance-involving-all-stakeholders/
spaces. Nevertheless, there are still points that need to 
be enhanced for this proposal to address the concerns 
that underlie the calls for improving institutional aspects 
of internet governance, particularly those that relate to 
transparency and democratization. 
First of all, Kovac’s proposal does not address 
the possibility of political capture in distributed 
arrangements, which usually lack clear rules of 
engagement. It would be necessary to ensure that 
participants of the networks represent the diversity of 
views in their own stakeholder group. So far, bottom-up 
selection and self-organization have mostly translated 
into larger participation of men from developed 
countries. Civil society, business companies and 
technical actors from developing countries, as well as 
cross-cutting groups, such as women, still remain less 
involved in governance arrangements.
Secondly, the proposal does not address the concerns 
of developing countries related to the fragmentation 
of policy spaces; it in fact leads to an increase of the 
points of entry to the internet governance debate. 
Regarding this point, Kovacs expresses the opinion 
that it is currently hard to have a clear perception of 
how participation in internet governance would benefit 
developing countries “because existing processes tend 
to address a hotchpotch of issues.” Her argument is 
that “a distributed structure of Internet governance 
with well-defined aims and purposes will resolve 
this problem as it will make it much more obvious to 
developing country actors (as well as others) which 
processes are worth their time.”
The danger with this reasoning is that it departs from 
the idea that it is acceptable that actors are forced 
to choose, due to their scarce human and financial 
resources, to follow-up policy discussions about issues 
as different as access to infrastructure and privacy, for 
example. If developing countries remain discussing 
only a few topics, most important decisions will already 
be made for them when they start to have resources to 
follow the other issues. 
Lastly, Kovac’s proposal mentions that the decision-
making power among stakeholder groups that are 
part of the networks would be distributed: no group 
alone could make decisions. Nevertheless, it is 
not clear if a single stakeholder group could block 
decisions. Considering the high degree of divergence 
on some issues, such as privacy, conversations could 
become stalled, undermining the alleged efficiency 
of the model. It should be remembered that lack of 
action is not a neutral position: ultimately, inaction 
can be characterized as action because it has public 
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consequences, reinforcing the status quo and the wave 
of events already in motion.22 
Another important point to consider is that the main 
distributed proposals that have been tabled do not 
address the need to increase the accountability of 
private actors who already perform internet governance 
functions. CIRP mentions the need for oversight 
of standard-setting organizations. The European 
Commission recently stressed the need to create or 
strengthen mechanisms “to allow regular, early and 
truly inclusive upstream participation, review and 
comment in technical decisions.”23 Nevertheless, the 
most innovative and detailed proposals that emerged 
from civil society leave areas such as standards-setting 
untouched. 
NETmundial: A Game 
 Changer?
The Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of 
Internet Governance (NETmundial) was held on April 
23rd and 24th 2014 in São Paulo, Brazil.24 The event 
was organized by means of a partnership between the 
Brazilian Internet Steering Committee (CGI.br) and 1 
Net, a coalition that gathers actors from the stakeholder 
groups involved in internet governance discussions. 
Revelations of mass surveillance of communications 
were a catalyst to the decision of convening NETmundial, 
although the issue was not prominently included in the 
scope of the meeting. In September 2013, President 
Dilma Rousseff gave a speech at the opening of the 
68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, 
in which she criticized policies of mass surveillance. 
The President also mentioned the need to develop a 
framework for the governance and use of the internet 
and to create mechanisms to ensure basic principles 
are guaranteed, such as privacy, freedom of speech 
and net neutrality. In the following month she received 
the visit of Fadi Chehadé, Chief Executive Officer of 
ICANN. After their conversation the global meeting was 
jointly announced. 
NETmundial aimed to address two problems, which 
directly inspired its agenda items: the need to identify 
a set of universally acceptable internet governance 
principles and the need to propose a way forward for 
the evolution of the internet governance ecosystem. 
In addition to these explicit goals, the convening of 
22 Benjamin Barber, Strong democracy. Participatory politics for a 
new age. (University of California Press, 1984), p. 123-4. 
23 European Commission, Internet Policy and Governance Eu-
rope’s role in shaping the future of Internet Governance, COM 
(2014) 72 final, (European Commission, 2014), p. 9. 
24 NETmundial, http://www.netmundial.br/
NETmundial – a new event in an already consolidated 
agenda of internet governance meetings and fora – 
attests to the existence of a gap. There is currently no 
multistakeholder global space where actual decision-
making could be carried out. From the outset, the 
meeting was convened under the expectation that it 
should present conclusions and a concrete outcome. 
Some steps forward were made in discussions about 
the evolution of the ecosystem in the NETmundial 
outcome document. The direct and indirect references 
to the Tunis Agenda corroborate the relevance and 
legitimacy that the document still garners. This should 
be taken into account in the negotiations towards 
WSIS+10 in 2015. The outcome document reinforces 
that actors have different roles and responsibilities 
in policy development, but it also rightly adopts 
the understanding that “the respective roles and 
responsibilities of stakeholders should be interpreted 
in a flexible manner with reference to the issue 
under discussion”. 25 To achieve a compromise with 
actors who would like to override the idea of different 
roles and responsibilities encompassed in the Tunis 
Agenda, the outcome document acknowledges that 
further discussion is still needed on “different roles and 
responsibilities of stakeholders in Internet governance, 
including the meaning and application of equal footing.”
NETmundial also demonstrated wide support 
for strengthening the IGF by implementing the 
recommendations of the CTSD working group on IGF 
improvements, paying special attention to improving 
the outcomes of the meeting, ensuring stable and 
predictable funding, adopting mechanisms that 
would allow inter-sessional work and extending IGF’s 
mandate beyond five years. 
No breakthrough was made regarding enhanced 
cooperation. The document only mentions that it must 
be implemented on a priority and consensual basis. 
Reaching consensus on the topic has proven to be 
particularly difficult. Nevertheless, the NETmundial 
outcome document innovates when it expresses 
preference for a distributed model for internet 
governance, elevating it to the status of a principle. 
It mentions that “Internet Governance should be 
carried out through a distributed, decentralized 
and multistakeholder ecosystem.” Nevertheless, 
25 DeNardis and Raymond have called attention to the dangers of 
seeing multistakeholderism as a teleological goal or as a value 
in itself, when it should rather be one possible approach to 
meeting public interest objectives such as preserving interoper-
ability, stability, security and openness. Moreover, for different 
issues, there can be different governance settings that can more 
efficiently preserve those core values. Laura DeNardis; Mark 
Raymond. Thinking Clearly About Multistakeholder Internet 
Governance, (SSRN, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2354377 
Page 106
BEYOND NETMUNDIAL: THE ROADMAP FOR INSTITUTIONAL IMPROVEMENTS TO THE GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE ECOSYSTEM AUGUST 2014
the organizations that are part of this ecosystem 
need to enhance communication and coordination. 
Actors should consider the option of creating internet 
governance coordination tools to perform monitoring, 
analysis, and information-sharing functions.
The document admits the possibility that new 
mechanisms should be created to take into account 
emerging topics and issues that are not currently being 
adequately addressed by existing internet governance 
arrangements. A detailed mapping of internet 
governance issues has been started by a group of 
volunteers assisting WGEC and it is important that this 
work is meticulously reviewed and concluded. 
Finally, the outcome document seems to recognize 
that there is a deficit of democracy and accountability 
in current governance arrangements. It acknowledges 
the importance of improving multistakeholder decision-
making and policy formulation, and presents several 
calls to reinforce transparency, accountability and 
participation in governance networks. It suggests, for 
instance, that all of the organizations with responsibilities 
in the internet governance ecosystem should 
develop and implement principles for transparency, 
accountability and inclusiveness, prepare periodic 
reports and make them publicly available. 
An interesting development after NETmundial was the 
announcement by ICANN of a “NETmundial Alliance,” 
later called “NETmundial Initiative.” In general terms, 
the aim of the initiative would be to develop concrete 
ways to apply the principles of NETmundial and to 
enable a distributed approach to internet cooperation 
and governance through innovative and legitimate 
mechanisms. 
The initiative will be based of the outcome document 
of NETmundial and on the Report “Towards a 
Collaborative, Decentralized Internet Governance 
Ecosystem”26 produced by the High Level Panel 
(HLP) chaired by president Toomas Ilves of Estonia 
and supported by ICANN and the World Economic 
Forum (WEF). On the level of promoting dialogue, the 
initiative aims: to foster exchanges about policy-issues 
by a network of interdisciplinary decision-makers and 
constituents; to encourage the creation and cross-
level synchronization of governance arrangements on 
the national, regional and global level and to support 
discussions through the IGF. On the level of concrete 
action, it aims to map internet governance issues and 
link them to their respective solution; to make actors 
26 “Towards a Collaborative, Decentralized Internet Governance 
Ecosystem.” Panel on Global Internet Cooperation and Gover-
nance Mechanisms, 2014. 
coalesce around distributed groups (section II, A of the 
report) and to provide capacity development. 
The Ilves report raises some interesting concrete 
suggestions of how a distributed model could function. 
It follows a similar direction of other distributed 
mechanisms that have already been proposed (see 
section 3) and suffers from similar shortcomings when 
it comes to transparency, accountability and inclusion. 
So far, there is little clarity about the initiative and about 
the actors who are expected to be the main driving 
forces behind it. Invitations to join the initiative have 
been made on a case-by-case basis. It seems that, for 
the moment, the main goal is to galvanize the support 
of key governments and of a selective group of non-
governmental actors. 
The NETmundial Initiative should be understood in the 
broader context presented so far. It seems an attempt 
to counter-balance tendencies of creating a centralized 
model for internet governance or to further develop 
structures that would work under the United Nations. 
There is no sign that the members of the HLP took into 
account the large amount of information produced by 
WGEC, for example.  If this assessment is correct, it 
is curious that developing countries such as Brazil and 
China have agreed to take part in this effort. 
If successful, this could mean a decisive move away 
from intergovernmental forms of legitimizing policy-
making towards a model that promises efficiency and 
speedy decisions. Issues of legitimacy and democratic 
procedures are still unclear and being undervalued. In 
the Ilves report these issues have been listed as open 
questions to be discussed in a later stage. As it is gaining 
shape right now, the proposal would not address many 
of the concerns related to the democratic deficiencies 
of cross-border policy networks.
Conclusion
There is a widening gap between territorially anchored 
democratic processes and cross-border networks, 
where many internet policies are being developed. 
Institutional arrangements that place policy decision-
making under the sole responsibility of states may be 
an attempt to address a real and important democratic 
deficit, but they ignore the interdependence among 
actors and the complexity of the internet governance 
ecosystem. 
In the United Nations, discussions about the 
implementation of enhanced cooperation have made 
little progress. The next significant opportunity to 
discuss internet governance and policy development 
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will be the process towards the WSIS +10 in 2015. Good 
arguments can be presented to support the launching 
of a full scale WSIS review, but recent meetings have 
shown that major breakthroughs are unlikely. During 
the stalemate of the last ten years, proposals for 
centralized and distributed governance arrangements 
have been put forth. In the present moment it could be 
useful to revisit them.
To counterbalance discussions in the UN, private actors 
have created panels and commissions to discuss 
internet governance institutional arrangements. 
The NETmundial initiative promises to build upon 
advancements made in the NETmundial outcome 
document. Nevertheless, the initial discussions seem 
far less inclusive than the NETmundial meeting and 
do not seem inclined to address democratic deficits of 
cross-border policy networks. 
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Moving from the NETmundial of Today to 
the “NETmundial +” of Tomorrow   
Nnenna Nwakanma
There is a level of insurance that comes with certainty. 
The FIFA World Cup is done and dusted in Brazil. Fans 
know that in the summer of 2018, they will be head-
ing to Russia for the next edition and in 2022, it will 
take place in the gulf nation of Qatar. In the multistake-
holder internet governance space, however, this is not 
the case, primarily because four years is a generation 
in the ecosystem and secondly, the model itself is con-
tinuously evolving.
We are certain that some lessons will persist as we 
step into the beyond, but we are also certain that en-
tirely new paradigms will emerge in the next coming 
months.
Earlier Experiences to take 
into NETmundial +
Before NETmundial, there were several fora at which 
internet governance was the focus, some of which 
are still around today. Irrespective of whether they are 
coming to the end of their lifespan or ongoing, we can 
borrow a few lessons from them on our journey beyond 
NETmundial.
The first is the experience from the World Summit on 
the Information Society (WSIS). In its first edition in Ge-
neva in 2003, and its second edition in Tunis, 2005, 
WSIS recognized the unique nature of the internet and 
the need to have all actors engaged in its governance. 
Its agenda adopted an Internet Governance Forum 
that  is, in its operation, multilateral, multistakeholder, 
democratic, and transparent. The summit broke with 
the status quo in international governing and, engag-
ing multilaterally with issues of global concern, is here 
to stay. Going beyond WSIS and NETmundial, it is key 
that internet governance stakeholders, as well as those 
engaged in other ICT-oriented policy processes, keep 
this principle in mind in their practices. It may well be 
possible to have processes that will still be run with the 
traditional multilateral process, but their resulting out-
puts will likely be highly disputed by actors in the ICT 
landscape.
Another lesson is from the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs).1 In delineating eight goals 
and giving stakeholders 15 years to work on them, the 
UN set a precedent in “measurability” of development 
work. The yearly reports have proved efficient in de-
politicizing the results achieved and have helped even 
more stakeholders at regional and national levels ramp 
up efforts towards achieving the goals. The 2014 report 
shows that considerable results have been achieved,2 
and the G8’s cancellation of a portion of debt owed by 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries to allow such funds 
to be redirected to development initiatives has also 
proved beneficial. There are two lessons we can learn 
from the MDG process: set clear goals with measur-
able objectives, and proactively support parts of the 
world whose challenges, if not overcome, will endanger 
collective success. 
The Internet Governance Forum (IGF) also serves as a 
valuable example. Over its nine years of existence, the 
IGF’s mandate as a multistakeholder meeting for policy 
dialogue has strengthened. Though initially only a five-
year mandate, the IGF has shown consistent efforts in 
building on its directives from WSIS, and stakeholder 
buy-in at the IGF has increased, evidenced by the 
annual increases in proposed workshops, sessions 
and pre-conference events. Several other internet 
governance-related meetings have come out solidly 
in favor of extending and strengthening the IGF’s role 
and capacities. The take away from the IGF example 
is to maintain focus on an agreed mandate, as well 
as the importance of managing a huge network on a 
lean secretariat, supported by volunteers, fellows and 
a dedicated Multistakeholder Advisory Group (MAG). 
1 United Nations. “Millennium Development Goals and Beyond 
2015.” http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/
2 United Nations. “Millennium Development Goals: 2014 Progress 
Chart.” See: http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/2014%20
MDG%20report/MDG%202014%20Progress%20Chart_English.
pdf  
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NETmundial:  Lessons to take 
to NETmundial +
Convened by the Brazilian government, the Global 
Multistakeholder Meeting on the Future of Internet 
Governance marked a historical turn in the internet 
governance policy dialogue. The global excitement it 
generated is attributable not just to the subject matter. 
It may be linked to President Rousseff’s famous speech 
at the United Nations General Assembly, on the heels 
of the Snowden revelations, which reverberated across 
the globe, and to the pre-World Cup fervor. Whatever 
the reasons were, it inspired unprecedented contribu-
tions, comments, and cooperation and resulted in an 
extremely successful internet governance meeting.
The NETmundial meeting was initiated amidst the 
need for more leadership in the internet governance 
(IG) space. The 2012 edition of the World Conference 
on International Telecommunications (WCIT),3 which 
sought to review the International Telecommunications 
Regulations (ITRs), could not get a clear consensus 
among International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
member states. The Snowden surveillance revela-
tions raised a whole host of other issues among global 
stakeholders, and Brazil took up the mantle of lead-
ership in calling on the world to come together on a 
common vision for the future of internet governance. 
It would have taken longer for the United Nations or 
any of its agencies to pull it off. Brazil’s leadership has 
been strengthened by its own Internet Bill of Rights – 
Marco Civil. Though the law may not perfectly cover all 
human rights concerns, it does prove, beyond doubt, 
that Brazilians could work in an open, inclusive and 
participatory manner to address an issue on internet 
governance, and the efforts have resulted in Brazil’s 
emergence as a leader in internet governance-related 
matters. Moving beyond NETmundial, we need more 
countries that can demonstrate this leadership and 
have the capacity to address important thematic areas: 
access and affordability, human rights, infrastructure, 
openness etc.
The secretariat of NETmundial was led by Brazil’s 
Committee for the Management of the Internet – CGI.
BR.4 CGI.BR has been proactive in all of the nation’s 
internet governance issues, explaining, perhaps, the 
overall leadership of the country at the international 
level. One of the major challenges with implement-
ing IG decisions at national levels in many countries 
3 International Telecommunications Union. “World Conference 
on International Communications.” http://www.itu.int/en/wcit-12/
Pages/default.aspx
4 The Comitê Gestor da Internet no Brasil is Brazil’s Internet 
Management Committee. 
is the lack of a functional national entity. So far, inter-
net governance discourses have largely remained a 
global issue, and moving beyond NETmundial might 
mean that countries would do well to organize viable 
information societies at the domestic level. Five days of 
meetings convened by the United Nations or a cham-
pion government will not in any way supplant the need 
for a free, open, inclusive and multistakeholder internet 
governance instance at a national level.
 
The NETmundial  meeting could have tried to delve into 
a lot of topics at the same time, but a wise choice was 
made to stick to the principles of the road map. Though 
security and surveillance dominated the debates (and 
still do), the meeting elected to be focused, and while 
this may not have satisfied all stakeholders, it helped 
focus the meeting and in turn, the output.  NETmun-
dial  recognized many key issues that influence internet 
governance that are in dire need of addressing in the 
next appropriate forum, including:
• Different roles and responsibilities of stakeholders 
in internet governance, including the meaning and 
application of equal footing; 
• Jurisdiction issues and how they relate to internet 
governance;
• Benchmarking systems and related indicators re-
garding the application of internet governance prin-
ciples; and 
• Net neutrality. 
Moving beyond NETmundial, we may benefit from this 
principle of focusing on a limited number of issues per 
year with a clear plan for following up on them, along 
with a roadmap for the future issues to be dealt with at 
the next convening.  
The meeting’s principle of openness encouraged 188 
contributions from 46 countries which made up the 
first draft which was also opened for comments. In 
just one week, 1,370 comments on the draft document 
were received by the organizers, and these contribu-
tions and comments are still available for reference 
purposes months later.5 In most current global internet 
governance instances, this is largely a replicable pro-
cess, however, at regional and national levels, this is 
not widely practiced. Moving beyond NETmundial, it is 
advisable to adhere to this principle of being open to 
ideas and contributions, as well as have the intellectual 
fortitude to accept comments on drafts. 
Given the short time in which NETmundial was or-
ganized, perhaps its most important takeaway is on 
remote participation. Brazil used a platform that it had 
5 NETmundial. “References.” http://NETmundial .br/references/
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tested in its national process, and the open call for 
hubs was an example of inclusiveness; the high par-
ticipation proof of global interest. Thirty-one remote 
hubs from all continents were registered, three hubs 
from within Brazil itself. Ten of the international hubs 
were bidirectional, allowing not just for text contribu-
tion, but audio and video as well. According to the 
NETmundial  secretariat, the bidirectional remote par-
ticipation was only limited by the number of concurrent 
computers that could be placed in direct view of the 
plenary chair at a given time. Of special mention is the 
Arena NETmundial, hosted by the Cultural Center of 
São Paulo. The Arena was not just a remote participa-
tion hub; it was central to the event’s networking and 
collaborative function. Panels of experts met with stu-
dents, and grassroots organizers had an opportunity to 
join in musical concerts. The participants at the Arena 
also did daily debriefings of official NETmundial events. 
Engaged with the “Participa.br,” Brazilians were vocal 
under the “Web We Want” campaign.6
As we move beyond NETmundial, it is key that we 
invest more in participation. There will always be physi-
cal and financial limitations to mass participation that 
mean reaffirming the importance of remote participa-
tion. NETmundial is an example of this being done very 
well and the CGI.BR is willing to help build capacity for 
countries who request. We must treasure this advance-
ment.
New Paradigms Emerging 
Though NETmundial elected not to have a discus-
sion on security and surveillance, Snowden’s shadow 
loomed large in Brazil, and looms large across the 
globe as online publics gain in awareness and reactiv-
ity to new knowledge on these fronts. The Marco Civil 
is just the beginning global demand for a web that is 
free, open, and respectful of human dignity, personal 
data, and individual privacy. Some stakeholders have 
opined that internet governance and internet users’ 
security may not belong to the same policy basket. 
Whichever way this is eventually tackled, the clamor 
for internet rights and freedoms enshrined in a bill of 
rights, an ‘internet Magna Carta,’ will be on the rise. 
National laws on cyberspace security, anti-defamation, 
monitoring and interception of communications, and on 
cybercrime are also either on the rise or are shedding 
their shrouds and strutting in the open. 
6 The Web We Want Campaign is a coalition for the promotion 
and safeguard of online rights and freedoms, launched by the 
founder of the web, Sir Tim Berners-Lee. See: https://webwe-
want.org/
As the  battles in the war for access and affordabil-
ity are  fought from country to country and barriers in 
policy, infrastructure, hardware and content are broken 
from place to place, the reward is an increase in on-
line publics. As efforts like the Alliance for Affordable 
Internet (A4AI ), the mobile revolution, Wikimedia, 
and social media are increasing, so too is the popula-
tion of internet users, with positive effects for growth 
in e-commerce, web services and content marketing. 
However, the growing population also begets more 
governance challenges: how do we tackle critical in-
ternet resources, data protection, cyberspace security, 
and user rights? 
The fastest rates of growth in internet use are in the 
global South. This is inherently accompanied by an 
increasing awareness of internet governance, and 
ultimately, greater participation in these global policy 
processes. In the last year, the African School of Inter-
net Governance has started graduating students. More 
of these efforts will be seen. The corresponding push at 
the global internet governance level, especially in the 
framework of organizations like the International Cor-
poration for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), 
the Internet Society (ISOC), the World Wide Web Con-
sortium (3WC) and the International Engineering Task 
Force (IETF) and similar efforts at influencing technical 
policies of internet management will be on the increase. 
In moving beyond NETmundial, we need to provide 
more opportunities for the global South to participate.  
Stakeholder participation in the governance of the in-
ternet is a sacred principle adopted from the very first 
days of WSIS. However, after ten years, there should 
be a revisiting of the term. Heated debates at NETmun-
dial (ongoing before this meeting as well), could not 
resolve the “different roles and responsibilities of stake-
holders in internet governance, including the meaning 
and application of equal footing,”7 and the topic was 
set aside to be discussed later. We cannot postpone it 
forever. The earlier it is tackled, the better for all stake-
holders.
The United Nations has been a key stakeholder across 
the internet governance space, convening WSIS and 
the IGF. Key action items from WSIS were entrusted 
to UN agencies. Of special influence is the ITU, which 
has been at the forefront of telecommunications, even 
before the internet was the internet we know today. 
Moving forward, the strong emergence of the multi-
stakeholder model in internet governance processes 
means that the role of these UN agencies, especially 
7 NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement, São Paulo, April, 24th 
2014, p. 11, http://netmundial.br/netmundial-multistakeholder-
statement/
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the ITU, will need to be discussed, as their original con-
figurations are not inherently “multistakeholder.”
NETmundial’s outcome document received positive 
support both from participating stakeholders and a 
large portion of the global internet community. The “let-
ter and spirit” of NETmundial, while in no way replacing 
the IGF, needs to be kept alive, and the legacy should 
be transformed from documents to actions, from 
intentions to policies, and from agreements to achieve-
ments. A multistakeholder coalition, initiative, alliance 
or something similar, is a natural outcome in this vein. 
A NETmundial Initiative will be launched at a meeting 
held by the World Economic Forum on 28 August 2014. 
We need to watch that space.
Conclusion
The NETmundial document is the non-binding outcome 
of a bottom-up, open, and globally participatory pro-
cess involving thousands of people from governments, 
private sector, civil society, the technical community, 
and academia. It is expected that the outcomes will 
feed into other processes and forums, such as the post 
2015 development agenda process, WSIS+10, IGF, 
and all internet governance discussions held in differ-
ent organizations and bodies at all levels. 
By 2015, the United Nations General Assembly will 
have adopted its Sustainable Development Goals as a 
follow-on to the Millennium Development Goals. In the 
same year, Brazil will be hosting the 10th IGF. Between 
now and then, we must keep the NETmundial light 
burning, not just for the sake of internet governance 
but for an internet that is a global public good.
Nnenna Nwakanma is an experienced development 
professional who has worked in the ICT field in Africa 
for over a decade. Leading a highly regarded consul-
tancy platform, Nnenna has in recent years co-founded 
The Free Software and Open Source Foundation for 
Africa, and served as a board member of the Open 
Source Initiative. She is the Africa Regional Coordina-
tor for the World Wide Web Foundation. She delivered 
a memorable keynote address on behalf of Internet 
users and organizations at the opening ceremony of 
NETmundial .
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NETmundial: Watershed in Internet Policy 
Making? 
Wolfgang Kleinwächter
Was NETmundial a watershed in internet policymak-
ing? History will tell whether the São  Paulo conference 
in April 2014 was the start of a new beginning in the 
still unchartered territory of learning how to govern 
the borderless cyberspace.  Indeed, NETmundial and 
the associated follow up discussions contrast sharply 
with the last ten years of discussions and meetings on 
internet governance. The NETmundial meeting and 
processes produced, within less than six months, a 
set of reasonable results: A Universal Declaration on 
Internet Governance Principles and an Internet Gov-
ernance Roadmap. To many observers, NETmundial 
filled a gap in the global internet governance ecosys-
tem.1 
No Real Progress in the Last 
Decade
Since the adoption of the Tunis Agenda in 2005 by 
the 2nd UN World Summit on the Information Society 
(WSIS),2 the internet governance discussion has not 
really moved forward.  Numerous meetings and end-
less committees produced a never-ending chain of 
reports, summaries and papers with nice reflections 
but very little move towards action.  The United Nations 
Commission for Science and Technology Develop-
ment (UNCSTD), responsible for the WSIS Follow Up, 
annually discussed internet governance issues and 
reported to the ECOSOC and the 2nd Committee of 
the UN General Assembly (UNGA). The UNGA, in re-
verse, instructed the UNCSTD to look deeper into the 
two main outcomes of the Tunis Agenda: the Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF) and the process of enhanced 
cooperation. However, neither the ping-pong between 
UNCSTD and UNGA nor the WSIS 10+ process, which 
1 NetMundial Multistakeholder Statement, Sao Paulo, April 24, 
2014, in: http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/
NETmundial-Multistakeholder-Document.pdf 
2 Tunis Agenda for the Information Society, November, 18, 2005, 
in: http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/tunis/off/6rev1.html 
started in 2011,3 produced concrete innovations or sus-
tainable results. 
The UNCSTD implemented the UNGA resolutions, in-
ter alia, by the establishment of two working groups: 
the UNCSTD Working Group on IGF improvement 
(2010 - 2012)4 and the UNCSTD Working Group on 
Enhanced Cooperation/WGEC (2012 - 2014)5. The two 
groups had about ten meetings and drafted several 
hundred pages of reports and recommendations. This 
is useful material, but it lacks any practical decisions. 
The WGEC was even unable to reach a rough consen-
sus about a set of non-binding recommendations. 
The lengthy and complex discussions that occurred 
in the various committees often got lost in the debate 
over single words from WSIS documents such as 
“enhanced cooperation,” “respective roles” or “equal 
footing.” This debate, rather than focusing on con-
crete issues, was occupied by more abstract questions 
about these terms and processes: Do governments 
have more clout than other stakeholders? Are multi-
lateral treaties more important than multistakeholder 
arrangements? Would a 3rd WSIS summit meeting be 
better than a WSIS ministerial meeting in 2015? Word-
smiths played language from the 2003 WSIS Geneva 
Declaration against language of the 2005 WSIS Tunis 
Agenda to find arguments for the establishment of new 
intergovernmental internet bodies, a proposition which 
was later rejected by the followers of the multistake-
holder model. Technical issues became politicized, 
national sovereignty was “rediscovered” and the more 
3 WSIS 10+ is managed by UNGIS (United Nations Group on the 
Information Society) which has only intergovernmental organi-
zations of the UN system as members. See: http://www.ungis.
org/ 
4 “Working Group on Improvements to the Internet Governance 
Forum.” UNCTAD.info. Accessed August 28, 2014. http://www.
unctad.info/en/CstdWg
5 Working Group to examine the mandate of WSIS regarding 
enhanced cooperation as contained in the Tunis Agenda (Work-
ing Group on Enhanced Cooperation [WGEC]).” UNCTAD.org. 
Accessed August 28, 2014. http://unctad.org/en/Pages/CSTD/
WGEC.aspx
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scholastic “Ism-Controversy” (multilateralism vs. mul-
tistakeholderism) blocked any progress. The debate 
turned around and around and did not work towards 
making constructive contributions towards solving im-
portant and emerging internet issues of the 2010s. 
The good news was that governments were not the 
only voices in the multistakeholder UNCSTD Working 
Groups. However, the non-governmental stakeholders 
in those groups did not have the power to act without 
governmental consent. Additionally in UNCSTD, ECO-
SOC and UNGA only governments have voting power. 
After ten years of internet governance discussions 
within those UN bodies, one can conclude that there 
was and is very little political will among governments 
to bridge differences, to reach consensus and to move 
forward.  
Regardless of the 56 recommendations of the UNCTSD 
Working Group on IGF Improvement, even the IGF is 
today more or less still the same as it was in 2006. 
The meetings of the Multistakeholder Advisory Group 
(MAG) are becoming routine work. The IGF Dynam-
ic Coalitions are not as dynamic as anticipated. The 
secretariat is understaffed. The whole process is un-
derfinanced. And it is always a miracle that regardless 
of the obvious difficulties and weaknesses of the IGF 
infrastructure the annual IGF meeting mobilizes gener-
ous hosts and engaged participants: a strong argument 
for the ongoing attractiveness of the basic idea behind 
the multistakeholder IGF.  
The call for more concrete IGF outputs has been 
repeated year after year with nobody proposing a work-
able mechanism allowing the IGF to work on practical 
projects without it becoming a negotiation body. Even 
less weighty ideas such as the  establishment of an 
Internet Governance Observatory or an Internet Gov-
ernance Clearinghouse under the umbrella of the IGF 
remained unfulfilled. 
This is no argument against the IGF. On the contrary, 
the IGF has demonstrated its usefulness. It is greatly 
beneficial to have a multistakeholder IGF as an inter-
net policy stimulating body. However, it needs to be 
strengthened, and its mandate has to be renewed. Ten 
years after Tunis, and against the background of a fast 
changing environment in the internet governance eco-
system, it would also be beneficial to develop (on top 
of or linked to the IGF) a multistakeholder internet poli-
cymaking mechanism where stakeholders can find out 
how to deal with concrete political, economic, cultural, 
social and legal internet issues.  
In other words, in the decade since Tunis, no real in-
novative breakthrough in internet governance was 
achieved. In 2004 the former UN Secretary General 
Kofi Annan told the UN Working Group on Internet 
Governance (WGIG) that not only technology but also 
policy needs innovation, saying “In managing, promot-
ing and protecting [the internet’s] presence in our lives, 
we need to be no less creative than those who invented 
it.” He added, “Clearly, there is a need for governance, 
but that does not necessarily mean that it has to be 
done in the traditional way, for something that is so very 
different.”6 
Entering unchartered territory calls for creative and in-
ventive solutions. Two decades ago ICANN emerged 
as a policy innovation in the internet world. Ten years 
ago, the policy innovation of the time was the IGF. But 
where is today´s internet policy innovation? Is it NET-
mundial?
A Changing Internet 
 Governance Environment
To find this out one must first examine the new realities 
of the internet governance environment in the middle 
of the 2010s. Today´s challenges are rather different 
from the Internet policy problems we had 10 years ago. 
a. The number of internet users has tripled since 
2005 from 1.2 billion to nearly 4 billion and the 
majority of those newbies are coming from de-
veloping countries;
b. Underserved regions such as South-East Asia, 
Sub-Saharian Africa, the Arab world or the 
Pacific Islands have seen a boom in internet 
connections, mainly linked to enhanced mobile 
communications;
c. In 2005, the internet governance debate was 
dominated by the US, the EU and China. Now 
new rising internet powers such as Brazil, In-
dia, Russia, South Africa, Korea, Iran, United 
Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and others have 
entered the global internet governance policy-
making scene;
d. In 2005, policy issues related to social networks 
or search engines did not play a role in draft-
ing the Tunis Agenda. Now they are of central 
importance. Additionally, issues related to the 
use of smartphones, cloud computing and the 
6 United Nations. (2004). Internet governance issues are nume-
rous and complex, Secretary-General says at opening of global 
forum [Press release]. Retrieved from http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/2004/sgsm9220.doc.htm
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Internet of Things need to be addressed.
e. In 2005, we had a re-birth of private start up in-
ternet companies which suffered after the blast 
of the .com-bubble at the end of the 1990s. In 
2015, those private sector players have grown 
into billion dollar businesses, dominating glob-
al markets and affecting public policymaking 
worldwide. The majority of the giants of this 
“new new economy” are coming from the US 
(Google, Facebook, Yahoo, Amazon, Apple, 
Microsoft, AT&T, Verizon, Cisco etc.) and from 
China (Baidu, Alibaba, Sina, Waibo, Lenovo, 
China Mobile, Huawei etc.); 
f. It is now recognized that the internet is deep-
ly linked to human rights, in particular to the 
right to freedom of expression and the right to 
privacy. This has stimulated the adoption of a 
resolution by the UN Human Rights Council 
(2012) which states that individuals have the 
same human rights offline and online. Court 
decisions, in particular by the European Court 
of Justice (Luxembourg) and the European 
Court on Human Rights (Strasbourg), have 
upheld this principle;
g. It is now recognized that the internet is as 
place which is of strategic importance for na-
tional security. The fight against cybercrime, 
cyberterrorism and cyberwar becomes a 
crucial element in national and international 
policy making. This has triggered discussions 
around cybersurveillance, cyberspionage and 
cyberweapons which are partly reflected in ne-
gotiations within the 1st and 3rd Committee of 
the UN General Assembly as well as in bod-
ies like NATO, OSCE, the Council of Europe, 
BRICS and the Shanghai Group; 
h. The internet has become increasingly more 
important in international trade negotiations as 
we have seen in the failed ACTA project and as 
we will see in the ongoing Trans-Atlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP), Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Trade in 
Service Agreement (TISA) negotiations where 
issues such as the protection of intellectual 
property, personal data and cultural diversity in 
cyberspace will play a role;
i. In 2005, the risk of the fragmentation of the 
internet was mainly language based. In 2015, 
efforts to fragment the internet are increasingly 
politically motivated. More and more countries 
try to re-nationalize the internet by introducing 
specific legislation, erecting national firewalls 
and controlling the distribution of internet 
content. This was reflected, inter alia, in the 
(failed) proposal, made by a group of countries 
(including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia) to 
introduce the concept of a “national internet 
segment” into the International Telecommuni-
cation Regulations (ITR) during the ITU World 
Conference on International Telecommunica-
tion (WCIT) in Dubai (2012);
j. The management of critical internet resourc-
es such as root servers, internet protocols, 
domain names and IP addresses – which 
dominated the internet governance discus-
sion in the WSIS process 10 years ago – has 
been proven to be quite efficient. In the early 
2000s there were no internationalized Domain 
Names (iDNs) and not more than a handful of 
generic Top Level Domains (gTLDs). The tran-
sition from IPv4 to IPv6 was slow. The Root 
Server System had only 13 members, 10 of 
them based in the US, and there were security 
holes in the system. In 2015, iDNs and nearly 
1000 new gTLDs are available, the transition 
to IPv6 has sped up, there are more than 380 
Anycast Root Servers around the globe and 
DNSSec has enhanced substantially security 
in the internet infrastructure; 
k. When the WSIS process started in 2002, 
ICANN was under oversight of the US govern-
ment via a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) and the IANA contract. ICANN’s GAC 
had less than 50 members and no At Large 
Structures (ALSs) existed. Ten years later, 
ICANN has demonstrated its maturity by 
launching programs as iDN, new gTLDs and 
DNSSEC. In 2009, it became partly indepen-
dent from the US government by the Affirmation 
of Commitment (AoC). ICANN opened formal 
seats in Istanbul and Singapore and about 
ten offices around the globe. In March 2014, 
the US government announced its readiness 
to terminate the IANA contract. The GAC has 
now 136 members and nearly 200 ALSs are 
accredited, many participating in the 2nd Inter-
net User Summit in June 2014 in London; 
l. New players from all stakeholder groups have 
entered the internet governance ecosystem as 
OECD, Council of Europe, OSCE, Shanghai 
Group, IBSA, BRICS, Global Network Initiative 
(GNI), World Economic Forum (WEF), Interna-
tional Chamber of Commerce/BASICS (ICC), 
Access, Human Rights Watch, Reporter with-
out Frontiers and others. 
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As is apparent, within the last ten years the internet 
governance ecosystem has changed in a fundamental 
way. There are new problems, new priorities and new 
players. The management of critical internet resources 
is still an issue, but the debate is dominated by internet 
related public policy issues as international security, 
sustainable development, job creation, innovation and 
human rights with related problems as infrastructure, 
access, cybercrime, cyberwar, content control, mass 
surveillance, privacy, freedom of expression, intellectu-
al property, e-commerce, network neutrality and others.
How to deal with all those issues and challenges? Is 
the UN system the right place to negotiate solutions? 
What are the alternatives? 
The Internet Governance 
 Ecosystem: A Virtual 
 Rainforest?
One important conclusion from the last ten years is 
the recognition that internet governance cannot be a 
hierarchical system with a sole (intergovernmental) de-
cision maker at the top of a pyramid. What we have is 
an internet governance ecosystem with various gover-
nance models for specific issues and where different 
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders 
work hand in hand in a decentralized and layered sys-
tem of shared responsibilities. 
From a technical point of view, the whole system has 
worked in an incredibly flexible way, allowing for growth 
from 4 million to 4 billion internet users within 20 years, 
stimulating economic development and broadening 
individual freedoms. With IPv6 there are enough IP 
addresses for zillions of individuals, institutions and 
objects. With the iDN- and gTLD-programs there are 
enough domain names for everybody in any language. 
Root servers and Internet Exchange Points are dis-
tributed around the globe and DNSSec has made the 
domain name system much more secure for anybody 
sending an email or requesting access to a website. 
Those are strong arguments in favor of Vint Cerf’s oft-
repeated statement, “if it isn´t broken, don´t fix it.” 
However this is only half of the truth. On top of this 
working infrastructure there are new risks, threats 
and growing opportunities for misuse, which call for 
enhanced responses. The problem here is that the 
management “of” the internet and the management “on” 
the internet are two different shoes but have laces that 
are heavily interwoven. The management of the tech-
nical internet resources, mainly run by “codemakers,” 
has political implications. On the other end, it is impos-
sible to find political solutions, which are discussed by 
“lawmakers,” independent from the underlying techni-
cal infrastructure.   
How the numerous governmental and non-governmen-
tal actors who are involved in various levels of internet 
policymaking understand the nature of this complexity 
plays an important role in the evolution of internet gov-
ernance. 
The internet is not a “single issue” which needs to be 
regulated in one way or another as might be true of 
the Antarctic or Outer Space. The internet, as it has 
evolved over half of a century, has penetrated all ar-
eas of the political, economic, cultural and social life 
around the globe. It constitutes today´s environment 
in which individuals and institutions live and learn, do 
their business, buy and sell, communicate and have 
all kind of individual or collective activities. Life without 
the internet is unthinkable, especially for the younger 
generation. 
The internet governance ecosystem can be compared 
partly to the rainforest. In the real rainforest an un-
countable number of diverse plants and animals live 
together in a very complex system. In the virtual rain-
forest we have also an endless and growing diversity 
of networks, services, applications, regimes and other 
properties which co-exist, communicate, collaborate, 
contradict and conflict. 
One thing that can be learned from this metaphor is 
that the rainforest as a whole is not a homogeneous, 
manageable entity. It can be neither governed nor con-
trolled, but it can be damaged and destroyed. In the 
internet governance ecosystem many players with very 
different legal status operate on a multitude of layers, 
on local, national, regional and international levels, 
driven by technical innovation, user needs, market op-
portunities and political interests. This has produced a 
broad variety of different regulatory, co-regulatory or 
self-regulatory regimes, which complement or conflict 
with each other. The system as a whole is decentral-
ized, diversified, layered and has no central authority. 
However, within the various subsystems there is an 
incredibly broad variety of different sub-mechanisms 
ranging from hierarchical structures under single or in-
ter-governmental control to non-hierarchical networks 
based on self-regulatory mechanisms by a combina-
tion of non-governmental groups  (private sector, civil 
society and technical community) and government. 
There is neither a “silver bullet” nor a “one size fits all” 
solution. The specific form of each sub-system has to 
be designed according to the very particular needs and 
natures of each individual issue. In such a mechanism, 
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traditional national legislation and intergovernmental 
agreements continue to play a role but have to be em-
bedded into the broader multistakeholder environment 
while new emerging mechanisms have to take note and 
recognize existing frameworks and regulations on vari-
ous levels. The “do-not-harm” principle becomes more 
important than ever. It means that whatever a govern-
mental or non-governmental player decides to do with 
regard to the internet, actors have to take into consid-
eration these actions’ direct or indirect consequences 
for third parties as well as the unintended side-effects 
for the system as a whole. 
Such a competitive coexistence of rather different 
regimes and mechanisms creates opportunities but 
also has risks. There are incredible prospects for new 
mechanisms, platforms and services to lead to more 
dynamic political strategies, social actions and market 
developments. This competitive coexistence can stim-
ulate innovation, promote job creation, enlarge all kinds 
of cultural activities and broaden the use of individual 
freedoms by the public at large both in developed and 
developing nations. But there is also a risk that dif-
ferences between regimes and systems could create 
controversies and produce substantial issues, ham-
pering innovation, impeding sustainable development, 
eroding individual freedoms and polluting the internet 
governance ecosystem in a way that parts of it will be 
damaged or destroyed. 
The challenge is to find flexible mechanisms for en-
hanced communication, coordination as well as formal 
and informal collaboration among the various players 
at the different layers to allow for all stakeholders to 
be able to play their respective roles on equal foot-
ing without discrimination in an open and transparent 
mechanism based on mutual respect and democratic 
checks and balances in a workable and recognized ac-
countability system. 
To keep this growing internet governance ecosystem 
safe, stable and unfragmented it needs efforts by all 
involved and affected stakeholders, something like a 
“rainbow coalition” where actors, regardless of their 
legal status, economic weight or political power are 
working hand in hand and share principles, programs, 
responsibilities and decision making capacities. 
The Limits of the UN 
 Machinery in Internet 
 Governance
For the existing UN machinery with its fixed proce-
dures it is nearly impossible to react adequately to 
such a growing complexity and changing environment. 
This does not mean that intergovernmental organiza-
tions and the multilateral treaty system are irrelevant 
for the internet. They will continue to play a role as an 
important element in the broader internet governance 
ecosystem. The traditional procedures and instruments 
have their merits, but they also have their limits. The 
internet diplomacy of the 21st century has to go beyond 
the 20th century mechanisms. What is needed is a po-
litical innovation which Kofi Annan called for ten years 
ago and which reflects this new internet governance 
complexity. 
A demonstration of the limits of the existing mecha-
nism was the Dubai WCIT conference (2012). In its 
150 years of history the ITU has adopted all decisions 
by consensus among its member states. The plan to 
update the 1988 ITR treaty in 2012 failed to produce 
a consensus. The 193 member states of the ITU were 
unable to agree and only 89 governments signed the 
new ITR contract. 
Another example is the Budapest Cybercrime Conven-
tion of 2001. Nearly all governments agree that efforts 
are needed to fight against criminals and terrorists in 
cyberspace. But only 53 states have signed the Buda-
pest Convention. A substantial number of UN member 
states are looking for an alternative instrument in the 
UN General Assembly where a draft convention on 
cybersecurity, proposed by the government of the Rus-
sian Federation, has been pending for more than ten 
years without any progress. 
What are the consequences from this broken intergov-
ernmental consensus? If governments are unable to 
agree among themselves in multilateral intergovern-
mental organizations as the UN, WIPO, WTO, ITU or 
even in ICANN´s Governmental Advisory Committee 
(GAC), they will consider unilateral actions or bilateral 
arrangements leading to widening gaps among gov-
ernments. 
This is in particular true for the governments of the two 
internet superpowers, the United States of America and 
the People´s Republic of China. The US has ratified the 
Budapest Convention, while China did not. China did 
sign the ITRs, and the US did not. The US government 
has published several unilateral statements on inter-
net policy, from the Principles on the Internet’s Domain 
Name and Addressing System in 2005 to the recent 
NTIA statement on the IANA transition in 2014. The 
Chinese government, which has recently established 
a new ministry on Cyberspace Affairs, has adopted a 
whole set of national internet rules and procedures. 
Both governments have published unilateral national 
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cybersecurity strategies and proposed their own set of 
principles. For the US a “free internet” has first priority, 
for China it is the “clean internet.”
Is there a possibility to build bridges between the two 
approaches? A comparison of the proposed principles 
and policy papers show how deep the gap is between 
the positions of the two governments. There are some 
commonalities, but there are many more differences. 
There is a common interest in keeping the internet 
stable and safe to ensure cybersecurity and to keep 
the door open for a flourishing global eCommerce. 
There is even a common interest in an unfragmented 
internet. But all this is overshadowed by the conflicts, 
rooted in different value systems. If both sides speak 
about “national security in cyberspace” they have a 
rather different understanding of what this means in re-
ality and how to achieve it. This is a philosophical but 
very political “free vs. clean” or “individual human rights 
vs. collective social harmony” conflict, which makes 
compromises between the two internet superpowers 
difficult. 
The good thing is that both sides talk to each other. 
There is a bilateral US-Chinese Cyberdialog. And the 
two presidents, Obama and Xi, have discussed cy-
bersecurity issues at its summit meeting in June 2013 
extensively. This can help to avoid a cold cyberwar. But 
there is a big difference between talking the talk and 
walking the walk. 
NETmundial as a Third Way?
Another consequence of the lack of intergovernmental 
consensus has been a push for new coalitions among 
like-minded governments and non-governmental 
stakeholders. The “rest of the world” is obviously not 
quite excited to “multilateralize” the internet policies of 
the two internet superpowers. China’s internet policy 
never received global support, even from many mem-
bers of the G-77. After the Snowden revelations there 
was also a growing frustration about the role of the US 
government in internet policymaking, including from 
western allies in Europe, Canada, Australia and Japan, 
governments that share the value of a human rights 
based internet. 
The idea of NETMundial filled a growing niche by 
offering something like a “third way.” It entered an unoc-
cupied space in a landscape where growing frustration 
about bad behavior of individual governments met the 
need to stumble forward to keep the existing internet 
governance ecosystem dynamic, open, free, safe and 
based on human rights. The idea of NETmundial al-
lowed internet stakeholders, including governments, to 
escape from making a choice between US surveillance 
and Chinese censorship. It also allowed these stake-
holders to escape from the time and energy consuming 
debates within the UN system. 
NETmundial demonstrated that multistakeholder co-
operation on equal footing is doable. NETmundial 
emerged in a bottom up, open and transparent pro-
cess. NETmundial was outcome oriented. NETmundial 
also stimulated concrete actions: from the adoption of 
a universal set of Internet Governance Principles to the 
launch of an Internet Governance Roadmap which in-
cluded the globalization of IANA and ICANN. 
To understand the philosophy of NETmundial it is im-
portant to remember its history. It was triggered by the 
revelations of Edward Snowden in summer 2013 and 
started with two events in Fall 2013: The speech by the 
president of Brazil, Dilma Rousseff, before the 68th UN 
General Assembly in New York and the meeting of the 
so-called I*Organizations in Montevideo in October.
 
In New York, the Brazilian president, who was the tar-
get of NSA surveillance, described this as a “grave 
violation of human rights and of civil liberties; of inva-
sion and capture of confidential information concerning 
corporate activities, and especially of disrespect to 
national sovereignty.” She said, “we expressed to the 
Government of the United States our disapproval, and 
demanded explanations, apologies and guarantees 
that such procedures will never be repeated. …Infor-
mation and telecommunication technologies cannot 
become the new battlefield between States. Time is 
ripe to create the conditions required to prevent cyber-
space from being used as a weapon of war, through 
espionage, sabotage, and attacks against systems and 
infrastructure of other countries.” And she proposed 
the establishment of “a civilian multilateral framework 
for the governance and use of the internet and to en-
sure the effective protection of data that travels through 
the web.”7
7 Such a framework should be based, the president said, on prin-
ciples such as: “1. Freedom of speech, privacy of the individual 
and respect for human rights; 2. Open, multilateral and demo-
cratic governance, carried out with transparency by stimulating 
collective creativity and the participation of society, Govern-
ments and the private sector; 3. Universality that ensures the 
social and human development and the construction of inclusive 
and non-discriminatory societies; 4. Cultural diversity, without 
the imposition of beliefs, customs and values; 5. Neutrality of 
the network, guided only by technical and ethical criteria, thus 
making unacceptable any restriction due to political, commer-
cial, religious or any other purposes”. See: http://gadebate.
un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/68/BR_en.pdf, Statement 
by H.E. Dilma Rousseff, President of the Federative Republic of 
Brazil at the Opening Session of the 68th General Assembly of 
the United Nations, New York, September 24, 2013
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Just two weeks later the so-called I*Organizations8 ar-
gued in Montevideo in a similar way as the Brazilian 
president did in New York: “Harnessing the full po-
tential of the Internet requires, therefore, responsible 
regulation, which ensures at the same time freedom 
of expression, security and respect for human rights. 
…Internet and World Wide Web have brought major 
benefits in social and economic development world-
wide. Both have been built and governed in the public 
interest through unique mechanisms for global multi-
stakeholder Internet cooperation, which have been 
intrinsic to their success.”9
Rousseff’s speech and the I* document are pointed in 
the same direction. They stressed the need for a global 
regulatory framework which ensures human rights and 
security and the importance to re-build trust and to keep 
the internet open, free, stable and unfragmented. How-
ever there was also difference in the used language: 
President Rousseff spoke about “multilateralism” and 
the United Nations, the I*s about “multistakeholderism” 
and the internet governance ecosystem. 
One week after Montevideo, the Brazilian president 
met with ICANN’s president in Brasilia. Both sides 
found that there was no contradiction in the two ter-
minologies if they are put into a broader context. In 
the internet governance ecosystem, multilateral trea-
ties among governments will continue to be important 
but they are embedded in a multistakeholder environ-
ment where governments play a role next to the private 
sector, civil society and the technical and academic 
community. There is no single model for the gover-
nance of the internet. The community has to learn to 
find the right answer to the many individual challenges 
of the internet world case by case, in a bottom up, open, 
transparent and inclusive policy development process. 
From this presidential conversation came the idea to 
convene a “Global Multistakeholder Meeting on the 
8 The so-called I* Organizations include IETF, ICANN, RIRs, IAB, 
ISOC and other technical groups of the Internet Governance 
Ecosystem, 
9 In four points they summarized their conclusions: They “1. rein-
forced the importance of globally coherent Internet operations, 
and warned against Internet fragmentation at a national level; 
2. expressed strong concern over the undermining of the trust 
and confidence of Internet users globally due to recent revela-
tions of pervasive monitoring and surveillance, 3. identified the 
need for ongoing effort to address Internet Governance chal-
lenges, and agreed to catalyze community-wide efforts towards 
the evolution of global multistakeholder Internet cooperation 
and 4. called for accelerating the globalization of ICANN and 
IANA functions, towards an environment in which all stakehold-
ers, including all governments, participate on an equal footing.” 
See: Montevideo Statement on  the Future of Internet Coop-
eration, October 7, 2013, see: http://www.iab.org/documents/
correspondence-reports-documents/2013-2/montevideo-state-
ment-on-the-future-of-internet-cooperation/ 
Future of Internet Governance” which soon became 
known as NETmundial. In other words, NETmundial 
served to bridge the artificial “Ism-Controversy” by 
looking forward into the complexity of the internet re-
lated public policy issues. 
The NETmundial preparatory process had two interre-
lated components: An institutionalized framework and 
an open, bottom up and transparent discussion pro-
cess.
The discussion started during the 8th IGF in Bali in 
October 2013 with numerous consultations among 
all stakeholder groups from around the globe. In Bali, 
the general response was positive. The majority of 
the IGF participants shared the impression that there 
is a need to move from reflections to actions and that 
something has to be done after the revelations of Ed-
ward Snowden. There was no enthusiasm to recycle 
old plans for an “Intergovernmental Internet Council” 
as proposed by some governments during the Tunis 
WSIS Summit in 2005. The Bali spirit was not driven by 
the wish “to sail backwards.” The spirit of the day was 
“to stumble forward” and to explore further the still un-
chartered territory of the multistakeholder processes. 
And the idea of NETmundial was seen as an opportu-
nity for the next “stumbling step.” 
One key discussion point was how “equal” the stake-
holders would be who were involved. In a meeting 
between ICANN’s Fadi Chehadé, the Brazilian orga-
nization committee and civil society representatives 
there was strong support for NETmundial, but there 
was also a very clear message that civil society should 
be included on equal footing. Civil society made clear 
that a NETmundial without a strong role for civil society 
would be a farce and they would reject any top down 
process or deals behind closed doors among govern-
ments and the private sector. 
Within a rather short period of time, the various groups 
involved did form a NETmundial institutional frame-
work which created a mechanism to bring the various 
stakeholders into a structured process of communica-
tion, coordination and collaboration.  Four bodies were 
established:
• A High-Level Multistakeholder Committee, respon-
sible for conducting the political articulation and 
fostering the involvement of the international com-
munity;
• An Executive Multistakeholder Committee, re-
sponsible for the meeting agenda, the design of 
the meeting format and the invitation of attendees, 
all equally balanced across the global multistake-
holder community;
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• A Logistics and Organizational Committee respon-
sible for guiding all logistical aspects of the meet-
ing including media outreach, international com-
munications, website design and management, 
awareness raising, meeting venue, traveler fund-
ing strategy, security, and remote participation; and 
• The Council of Governmental Advisors which in-
volved all government representatives who partici-
pated and contributed to the meeting.
The four main stakeholders groups (governments, pri-
vate sector, civil society, technical community) were 
involved on equal footing but recognized in their specific 
roles. The committees were populated by the stake-
holder groups themselves in open and transparent 
processes which gave the groups the needed legitima-
cy. The committees were instrumental in organizing the 
input from their constituencies in the process of drafting 
the final document.  NETmundial became like a car-
riage with four horses moving forward together in the 
same direction. It looked like a “Roman Quadriga.” 
The “Internet Governance Quadriga” model worked for 
the discussion. In contrast to ICANN meeting where 
discussants queue behind a main microphone, the set-
ting in the NETmundial conference room provided four 
microphones where speakers from the four stakehold-
ers groups were queueing to make their two minute 
statement. The chair of the session managed the bal-
anced distribution of speaking time among the four 
queues.10 
This “Internet Governance Quadriga” model also 
worked quite well for the decision making procedures. 
It stimulated 186 proposals from around the world. It 
allowed for an agreement on a conference agenda 
for a two day meeting and a draft document with 15 
10 See the speech of the German Foreign Minister, Frank Walter 
Steinmeier at the opening of EURDIG, Berlin, June 12, 2014. 
“For the German Foreign Office, my colleague Dirk Brengel-
mann went to Sao Paolo. And when he came back, Ambassador 
Brengelmann told me a story about how this conference 
worked. He said: When we were putting together the different 
parts of the final document, everybody got an equal say. A truly 
equal say: Because all participants –software engineers, en-
trepreneurs, NGO people and government people – all of them 
had to line up at the microphone to deliver their statements. And 
each had the same time to talk – exactly two minutes. Now I 
ask you: Can you imagine a NATO Defence Summit, where a 
minister waits in line to speak after a human rights activist? Or 
a G20 Meeting, where a President queues at the microphone? 
Or, in fact, can you imagine any politician who speaks for only 
two minutes? Can you imagine that? I can’t. And if I could, I 
am sure my protocol office would give me a very hard time… 
The internet is different. It is, and it should be, a free, safe and 
open space. That is why we use this rather technical term: 
the multi-stakeholder model.” http://www.auswaertiges-amt.
de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2014/140612-BM_EuroDIG.
html?nn=555306
pages, structured into two main parts with a section for 
Internet Governance Principles and a section for an 
Internet Governance Roadmap. The draft of the final 
document was published before the conference and 
triggered another 1000 comments, allowing the High 
Level Multistakeholder Committee, in an open and 
transparent drafting meeting, to reach rough consen-
sus. The document was finally adopted by acclamation 
by all stakeholders. Only four governments expressed 
reservations. 
However, this does not mean that the whole process 
was perfect. Some parties did not find their original po-
sition adequately reflected in the final document. There 
were last minute lobbying efforts by some powerful pri-
vate corporations and governments. There were efforts 
to settle some problems via the traditional diplomatic 
“horse-trading behind closed doors”. Civil society was 
not happy with the language related to net neutrality 
and surveillance. The Russian government was not 
happy with the text related to cybersecurity. The private 
sector was not happy with the paragraphs on privacy. 
The fact that all consultations and the drafting of the full 
text took place in an open and transparent environment 
with the equal participation of representatives from all 
stakeholder groups created a rather balanced final 
outcome which made everybody equal unhappy. The 
São Paulo Multistakeholder Internet Governance Dec-
laration represents the rough consensus of the time by 
keeping the process open for further improvements in 
the coming years. 
Internet Governance 
 Principles
A key part of the final NETmundial document was the 
section on internet governance principles. The dis-
cussion on such principles goes back into the 1990s 
when the former EU Commissioner Martin Bangemann 
proposed a “Global Communication Charter.” Internet 
governance principles were discussed again in the 
context of the WSIS although the Tunis Agenda did not 
introduce any specific internet regulation. The Internet 
Governance Forum (IGF) became the place for a con-
tinuation of the debate, mainly via the IGF Dynamic 
Coalition on Internet Rights and Principles. In the early 
2010s, intergovernmental organizations such as the 
G8, the Council of Europe, the OECD, and the Shang-
hai Group, and non-governmental organizations such 
as the Global Network Initiative (GNI) from the private 
sector, the Association for Progressive Communication 
(APC), a global civil society organization and the tech-
nical oriented I*-organizations adopted declarations on 
internet governance principles. 
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Until 2013, more than 25 different documents with 
principles on how to govern the internet were flying 
around. This resulted in confusion and “principle shop-
ping” where actors just picked the principles they liked 
to justify their behavior in cyberspace. The weakness 
of all those principles and documents was that they 
were supported either by only one stakeholder group 
or were limited in scope by geography and substance. 
None of the 25+ documents were universal and multi-
stakeholder. 
At the 8th IGF in Bali (2013) the main sponsors of the 
various declarations – OECD, Council of Europe, the 
governments of Russia, China and India, cgi.br, APC, 
I* and GNI – were sitting at one table. However, no 
agreement could be reached on how to “globalize” and 
“multistakeholderize” the process of the making of prin-
ciples for internet governance. 
What the IGF could not achieve, was accomplished by 
NETmundial: a rough consensus across all stakehold-
er groups. The São Paulo Declaration summarizes - in 
eight principles with 17 subparagraphs - the essence of 
the previous 25+ documents. It “globalized” and “multi-
stakeholderized” them. 
The Preamble of the São Paulo Document states that 
the principles are legally not binding. It is worth remem-
bering in this context that the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights from 1948 is a legally non-binding 
document. It became an important reference source 
because it got such a broad support from all corners 
of the political spectrum in the post-WWII years. The 
São Paulo Document reflects a similar consensus in 
the Internet Age. Never before in the history of inter-
net governance has there been a document which had 
such broad political support both from governments 
and non-governmental stakeholders. Regardless of 
its legal nature, this document constitutes a basis with 
criteria allowing for measurement and evaluation of in-
ternet policies, of good or bad behavior in cyberspace. 
There is no mechanism to bring a wrongdoer to an 
international internet court, but the NETmundial docu-
ment allows “naming and shaming” if a government, a 
corporation or users conflicts with its principles.  
If a government restricts access to Twitter or Facebook, 
it can be “named and shamed” by violating Principle 
1.1 (freedom of expression). If governments negotiate 
treaties to regulate internet issues behind closed doors 
they can be “named and shamed” because they violate 
the principle 7.3, transparency. If a corporation ignores 
data protection laws it can be “named and shamed” be-
cause it violates the right to privacy (principle 1.3). If 
somebody wants to change the open internet architec-
ture, it can be “named and shamed” to violate principle 
4 (unified and unfragmented space) and principle 6 
(open and distributed architecture) which states that 
the internet should “upholds the end-to-end nature of 
the open Internet.”11
Conclusion
Did NETmundial create a new multistakeholder model? 
Yes and no. No, because there is and will not be one 
single multistakeholder internet governance model. But 
the answer can also be yes, because NETmundial in-
troduced some new elements which went beyond the 
previous experiences in bringing life to the multistake-
holder approach. 
The Tunis Agenda defined internet governance and 
recommended that all stakeholders should share prin-
ciples, programs and decision making in the further 
evolution and the use of the internet. Since then we 
have seen different forms of the mutistakeholder ap-
proach: 
• In the WSIS Follow up (WSIS 10+, UNCSTD etc.) 
all governmental and non-governmental stake-
holders are involved but at the end of the day the 
governments decide. This is a multistakeholder 
process under governmental leadership. 
• In ICANN we see also the involvement of all stake-
holders. However, governments participate in 
ICANN processes only in an advisory capacity. At 
the end of the day it is the ICANN Board—where 
governments are represented by one non-voting 
liaison—which decides. This is a multistakeholder 
process under private sector leadership.
• In the IGF all stakeholders are involved on equal 
footing, but the IGF has no decision-making capac-
ity. 
The NETmundial added an important component. It 
was mainly a discussion process – like the IGF – but 
produced tangible results. It involved all stakeholders—
as WSIS and ICANN—but treated them in the decision 
making process as equals. This is an innovation. 
11  Over the years the legally non-binding Human Rights Declaration 
became a highly respected political instrument. If a government 
tortured prisoners, censored media or restricted freedom to 
travel, human rights groups around the globe referred to the 
relevant articles of the declaration. It is also interesting to remem-
ber that there was no full consensus, when the 3rd UN General 
Assembly adopted the Human Rights Declaration in December 
1948. 48 UN member states voted with yes, but eight govern-
ments expressed their reservations and abstained, among them 
the Soviet Union, Ukraine, Yugoslavia, the apartheid South Africa 
and Saudi Arabia.
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The decision making process within NETmundial was 
different from the intergovernmental decision-making 
within the UN machinery, but it was also different from 
ICANN processes. There were “language negotiations” 
as in a UN body, but the language was not negotiated 
among governments only but produced by a multi-
stakeholder committee in an open environment. On the 
other hand, there was a bottom up and open policy de-
velopment process (PDP) as in ICANN. However, the 
decisions were made by a committee in which govern-
ments were members on equal footing (and not only 
advisers). Decisions in NETmundial were made not by 
voting, as in a UN body or in the ICANN Board, but 
by rough consensus. Running code and rough consen-
sus is the way RFCs are emerging in the IETF. The 
NETmundial combined in a certain way two different 
decision making cultures that have thus far shaped the 
rule making of the internet. 
Such an approach obviously has the potential to or-
ganize a broad commitment which goes beyond 
intergovernmental agreements and embraces also 
large internet corporations, technical institutions and 
civil society organizations from governmental as well 
as non-governmental stakeholders around legally non-
binding guidelines for internet related public policy 
issues. This is novel and could become the starting 
point for a new journey into unchartered territory. 
At this stage it would be unrealistic to expect that such 
an approach could produce legally binding agreements. 
But the NETmundial approach could help to discover 
what has to be done if there are issues that need more 
than general principles. Such an approach could also 
help to clarify which existing body or which mechanism 
would be best suited to produce legally binding agree-
ments, if needed. 
To a certain degree such a process would be similar 
to a clearinghouse function. One could imagine a situ-
ation where the IGF identifies and discusses issues, 
flagging problems for further action. The NETmundial 
process could take this as an invitation and investigate 
—via its multistakeholder committees or a new NET-
mundial Initiative—what the best way would be to find 
a practical solution.  
NETmundial and IGF could complement each other. 
The weakness of one process could be compensat-
ed by the strength of the other one. Both IGF and 
NETmundial are based on the same principles. The (in-
tergovernmental) Tunis Agenda has paved the way for 
the (multistakeholder) São Paulo Declaration. If NET-
mundial and IGF would combine their strengths, they 
could create more opportunities to achieve concrete 
results in managing the growing number of internet re-
lated public policy problems.  
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